The prospects are considered of deploying batteries and fuel cells in order to reduce the carbon emissions from various modes of transport. It is proposed that the government has not done enough to advance these technologies and that Britain is lagging behind other countries. The adequacy of Britain’s future supplies of energy is called into question.

Adam Smith had a longstanding interest in colonialism and more generally relations between Europe and the rest of the world. It was through engagement with these issues that he worked through some of the central elements of his thought. This paper examines both Smith’s contexts and our own and argues that Smith’s work provides an important resource for reflecting today on relations with distant and diverse others today. It identifies three aspects of Smith’s thought that are particularly relevant: the political and economic costs of colonial ventures to the colonisers themselves, the question of whether and how imperialism had encouraged ‘progress’, and the question of how social and cultural differences should be understood and judged. The paper teases out Smith’s sometimes uncertain arguments in these areas and suggests that they can contribute to our own reflections on the troubled practices of liberal imperialism.

This paper uses economic history to probe the relationship between state capacity and economic growth during the Great and Little Divergences (c.1500–c.1850). It identifies flaws in the dominant measure of state capacity, fiscal capacity, and advocates instead analysing state expenditures. It investigates five key activities on which states historically spent resources: waging war; providing law and administration; building infrastructure; pursuing industrial policy; and fostering a national culture. The lesson of history, it concludes, is not to build a capacious state. Rather, we need a state that uses its capacity to help (or at least not hinder) market activity.

We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.

The article considers crises of globalization: the 1840s, the 1870s, the Great War, the Great Depression, the Great Inflation (1970s), the Global Financial Crisis (2008) and the Great Lockdown (2020). Each led to a reshaping of the institutions that supervised or regulated economic development globally but also nationally. In each case, a series of questions are answered: what were the origins of the crisis, what were the monetary and fiscal policy responses, how did the crisis affect the drivers of globalization, trade, migration and capital flows? And how did these different challenges affect governance and views of politics? The article concludes that supply shocks are most easily dealt with by inflationary mechanisms, allowing groups to gain some apparent compensation for their losses through the supply shock. But the resulting mobilization into groups also strains social cohesion.

Taxation is accepted as a fact of modern life, despite recurring political conflict over the nature and direction of fiscal policies. Most financiers regard obligations issued by the state as a safe investment option. Neither taxation nor state obligations were taken for granted during much of the history of public finance, however, at least not before the early 1800s. The ‘tax state’ developed in fits and starts, driven by the exigencies of warfare, which provided the main rationale for raising state income. Although wartime fiscal innovations eventually facilitated the rise of an efficient military state, the options available for implementing such improvements and preferences for specific fiscal or financial instruments varied greatly across early modern states. Focusing on the ‘long’ eighteenth century, this introduction presents a framework for assessing these differences and introduces the other articles in this special issue.

This paper examines the background to calls for further fiscal decentralisation in Scotland in the light of theories of fiscal federalism. In particular, it examines whether spatial differences in preferences, which are central to ‘first generation’ theories of fiscal federalism can be argued to play a central role in the case for granting Scotland further tax and spending powers. ‘Second generation’ theories of fiscal federalism draw attention to the political economy of allocating tax powers to different levels of government. Some of the authors in this strand of theory argue that the case for allocating tax powers to subnational governments can be made in terms of ‘accountability’ – the notion that local politicians can be better held to account for the outcomes of policy actions. Our empirical analysis suggests that there is no clear difference in preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK along a number of key political dimensions. However, the Scottish parliament enjoys substantially higher levels of trust among the Scottish electorate than does the UK parliament.

This paper offers a long-term comparative study of Bolivian public finances using a new detailed database. First, it shows that Bolivian government revenues and expenditures were particularly small and volatile until the 1980s. Second, it stresses that, whereas the relative importance of social expenditure has grown constantly since the late 1930s, public revenues have always had an unbalanced structure. Finally, it confirms that budget deficits have been constant, at times reaching levels that were especially damaging for the overall economy. This suggests that the potential redistributive impact of Bolivian public finances was not necessarily (or not only) hindered by the lack of an explicit commitment towards redistributive expenses, but by an extreme vulnerability in the revenue side.

Economic issues will be key determinants of the outcome of the Scottish referendum on independence. Pensions are a key element of the economic case for or against independence. The costs of funding pensions in an independent Scotland would be influenced by mortality risks, the costs of borrowing and the segmentation of costs and risks (i.e. pricing to Scotland's experience rather than pooled across UK experience). We compare the overall costs of providing pensions in an independent Scotland against the resources that are available to cover these costs. Scotland has worse mortality experience than the UK as a whole, and Scottish government debt is likely to attract a liquidity premium relative to UK government debt. An independent Scottish government would have to create a bond market for public debt. The liquidity premium would make pensions cheaper to buy, but taxpayers or the consumers of public services would have to pay the cost.