Tactical litigation is a reality of the adversarial litigation framework that is currently in place. However, there is a difference between the tactical litigation of choosing a forum which may have more favorable law or be more convenient and choosing a forum with the intent to drive the opposing party to failure. The latter has been the issue with some of the tactical litigation that has occurred under the European Union’s framework of lis pendens. While the Recast Brussels I Regulation has alleviated some of those issues, it has not addressed all of them. While some scholars have argued that these issues of lis pendens may be answered by introducing the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to these proceedings, that is not the case. This Article explores the pitfalls of lis pendens and forum non conveniens and ultimately finds that forum non conveniens is unable to solve the issues lis pendens creates in tactical litigation. Furthermore, the Article finds that forum non conveniens, inherently and acting as it should, has its own problems which echo lis pendens’ own issues in the European Union. Furthermore, forum non conveniens is simply incompatible with the policies the European Union implemented with lis pendens. Ultimately, forum non conveniens is unable to answer the problems lis pendens has created and solutions must be found from within the European Union’s own civil system.

In a recent article in this journal, James Christensen, Tom Parr and David Axelsen argue that millionaire salaries are unjust and women have no grounds of fairness to unjust salaries in parity with men. They accept that disrespect is expressed toward women when they are paid less than men because of their gender. Their argument largely replicates a similar argument developed earlier by Anca Gheaus. By drawing on the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, we argue that Christensen et al. and Gheaus hold women to unacceptably high standards of justice and arguably higher standards than men are held to.

As governments increasingly adopt algorithms and artificial intelligence (AAI), we still know comparatively little about citizens’ support for algorithmic government. In this paper, we analyze how many and what kind of reasons for government use of AAI citizens support. We use a sample of 17,000 respondents from 16 OECD countries and find that opinions on algorithmic government are divided. A narrow majority of people (55.6%) support a majority of reasons for using algorithmic government, and this is relatively consistent across countries. Results from multilevel models suggest that most of the cross-country variation is explained by individual-level characteristics, including age, education, gender, and income. Older and more educated respondents are more accepting of algorithmic government, while female and low-income respondents are less supportive. Finally, we classify the reasons for using algorithmic government into two types, “fairness” and “efficiency,” and find that support for them varies based on individuals’ political attitudes.

This paper uses a conjoint survey experiment fielded in the US, Australia, Chile, and Argentina to develop and test the compensatory theory of tax fairness, which states that higher taxes on the rich can be used to compensate for other benefits unequally granted by the state. Drawing on social psychology, this paper argues that evidence of preferential treatment by the state violates well-established fairness principles and shows, experimentally, that it leads to taxation to restore equality in crisis times, irrespective of wealth and across a variety of settings. The paper makes two important contributions: it provides the first direct, causal evidence of the importance of compensatory arguments for tax preferences and presents unconfounded estimates of the effect of more established fairness considerations as benchmarks against which to compare the importance of compensatory arguments.

Does providing information about the costs and benefits of automation affect the perceived fairness of a firm's decision to automate or support for government policies addressing automation's labor market consequences? To answer these questions, we use data from vignette and conjoint experiments across four advanced economies (Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US). Our results show that despite people's relatively fixed policy preferences, their evaluation of the fairness of automation—and therefore potentially the issue's political salience—is sensitive to information about its trade-offs, especially information about price changes attributable to automated labor. This suggests that the political impact of automation may depend on how it is framed by the media and political actors.

In the article ‘How to be absolutely fair, Part I: the Fairness formula’, we presented the first theory of comparative and absolute fairness. Here, we relate the implications of our Fairness formula to economic theories of fair division. Our analysis makes contributions to both philosophy and economics: to the philosophical literature, we add an axiomatic discussion of proportionality and fairness. To the economic literature, we add an appealing normative theory of absolute and comparative fairness that can be used to evaluate axioms and division rules. Also, we provide a novel definition and characterization of the absolute priority rule.

Sustainability and sustainable development are the buzzwords of our era. Nowhere is this clearer than in primary production/extraction industries, such as aquaculture and fisheries. Yet in the seafood sector (as with many others), the term continues to be used most commonly in relation to the environmental dimension; much less is known about social and economic sustainability. In this review, we explore what is known about social sustainability in the seafood sector. We identify seven key thematic areas: livelihoods and human development; human rights; social, psychological, and cultural needs; equitable access to resource and benefit sharing; a voice in public issues; flow-on benefits for local and regional economies and improved infrastructure and access. We reveal that while there has been a clear focus on developing social sustainability indicators, this has largely missed more relational and subjective aspects of social sustainability. We also show that some thematic areas of social sustainability also remain underdeveloped. Overall, we argue that it is imperative that we address the knowledge gaps and incorporate what we already know about social sustainability into existing industry and governance processes. If we do not, not only risk not achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, but we also risk moving closer towards environmental and societal collapse.

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.

What justifies differences in the acceptance of paternalism towards competent minors and older people? I propose two arguments. The first argument draws on the widely accepted view that paternalism is easier to justify the more good it promotes for the paternalizee. It argues that paternalism targeting young people generally promotes more good for the people interfered with than similar paternalism targeting older people. While promoting people's interests or well-being is essential to the justification of paternalism, the first argument has certain unfair implications in that it disfavours paternalism towards the worse off. The second argument caters to such fairness concerns. It argues that priority or inequality aversion supports age-differentiated paternalism because young people, who act imprudently and thereby risk their interests or well-being, are worse off than older people who act in similar ways. I suggest that both arguments are pertinent in evaluating specific paternalistic acts and policies.

Xenotransplant patient selection recommendations restrict clinical trial participation to seriously ill patients for whom alternative therapies are unavailable or who will likely die while waiting for an allotransplant. Despite a scholarly consensus that this is advisable, we propose to examine this restriction. We offer three lines of criticism: (1) The risk–benefit calculation may well be unfavorable for seriously ill patients and society; (2) the guidelines conflict with criteria for equitable patient selection; and (3) the selection of seriously ill patients may compromise informed consent. We conclude by highlighting how the current guidance reveals a tension between the societal values of justice and beneficence.