A key insight from Adam Smith is that economists should base their conclusions about a monetary institution or policy on a careful study of the history of that institution or policy, a study that includes the experiences of other countries. To illustrate Smith’s reliance on financial history we cover five current monetary problems that have close analogies with problems that Smith discussed: (1) inflation, (2) banking panics, (3) public debt, (4) usury laws, (5) central bank digital currencies.

This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

This article examines the aftermath of the 1897 Riksbank Act in Swedish banking. The act placed banks with unlimited liability and those with limited liability on equal footing, removing the note-issuing privileges of the former. We consider whether changes in risk preferences occurred subsequent to the act, or whether extended liability was a sufficient deterrent. We conclude that when legal differences were removed, lower transaction costs for unlimited liability banks (ULBs) spurred aggressive competition, reflected in narrower interest spreads relative to limited liability banks (LLBs). ULBs also took on greater leverage and held less liquidity, which supports the Coasean interpretation that the shareholder liability regime mattered little. After 1897, ULB shareholders continued to receive higher dividends, enjoyed substantially superior returns on equity, and maintained an array of corporate governance controls to shield themselves against their additional risk.

While the International Debt Crisis of the early 1980s was the most severe financial crisis since World War II and while national and international banking supervision was developing at that time, little is known about the response of supervisors to the deteriorating financial environment in the years preceding the crisis. Complementing the political and business history of the international debt situation, this article aims to unravel the international banking supervision side of the question. Based on archival material from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and various central banks, the article examines how the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), then emerging as the leading forum on international banking supervision, anticipated the International Debt Crisis through the prism of ‘country risk’. The article shows that the Committee refused to recommend strict regulations in this area. It argues that members adopted this position because of the lack of good information and the difficult position of banking supervision between macroeconomic issues and individual banks’ own responsibilities, but also because of somewhat excessive faith in market mechanisms. Their discussions on country risk shed light on critical challenges of banking supervision and, thereby, on the history of banking regulation and prudential thinking.

This article explains the problem of adjustment to the challenges of globalization in terms of the logic underpinning four distinct policy constraints, or trilemmas, and their interrelationship, and in particular the disturbances that arise from capital flows. The analysis of a policy trilemma was developed first as a diagnosis of exchange rate problems (the incompatibility of free capital flows with monetary policy autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime); but the approach can be extended. The second trilemma we describe is the incompatibility between financial stability, capital mobility and national policy choice over exchange rates. The third example extends the analysis to politics, and looks at the strains in reconciling democratic politics with monetary autonomy and capital movements. Finally, we examine the security aspect and look at the interactions of democracy with capital flows and international order. The trilemmas, in short, depict the way that domestic monetary, financial, economic and political systems are interconnected with the international order, or the impossible policy choices at the heart of globalization. Frequently, the trilemmas conjure up countervailing anti-globalization tendencies and trends.

Classic accounts of the English industrial revolution present a long period of stagnation followed by a fast take-off. However, recent findings of slow but steady per capita economic growth suggest that this is a historically inaccurate portrait of early modern England. This growth pattern was in part driven by specialization and structural change accompanied by an increase in market participation at both the intensive and extensive levels. These, I argue, were supported by the gradual increase in money supply made possible by the importation of precious metals from America. They enabled a substantial increase in the monetization and liquidity levels of the economy, hence decreasing transaction costs, increasing market thickness, changing the relative incentive for participating in the market and allowing agglomeration economies to arise. By making trade with Asia possible, precious metals also induced demand for new desirable goods, which in turn encouraged market participation. Finally, the increased monetization and market participation made tax collection easier. This helped the government to build up fiscal capacity and as a consequence to provide for public goods. The structural change and increased market participation that ensued paved the way for modernization.

Since the onset of the Federal Reserve's unconventional programme of large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing (QE), some economists and financial practitioners have feared that the consequent buildup of the Fed's balance sheet could lead to a large expansion of the money supply, and that such an increase could cause a sharp rise in inflation. So far fears about induced inflation have not been validated. This article examines the basis for the original concerns about inflation in terms of the classic quantity theory of money, which holds that inflation occurs when the money supply expands more rapidly than warranted by increases in real production. The article first reviews the US experience and shows that whereas rapid money growth might have been a plausible explanation of inflation in the 1960s through the early 1980s, subsequent data have not supported such an explanation. It then shows that the quantity theory of money has not really been put to the test after the Great Recession, because a sharp increase in banks’ excess reserves and corresponding sharp decline in the ‘money multiplier’ has meant that the rise in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has not translated into increased money available to the public in the usual fashion. The most likely aftermath of quantitative easing remains one of benign price behaviour. However, if nascent inflationary conditions materialise, the Federal Reserve will need to manage adroitly the large amounts of banks’ excess reserves that have accumulated as a consequence of QE in order to limit inflationary pressures.

Five years after the financial crisis, the global economy remains unbalanced and many of the advanced countries are still struggling to return to robust, sustainable growth. Taking a historical perspective, I argue that this predicament reflects a failure to adjust to profound changes in the economic landscape, which have given rise to the (re-)emergence of major financial booms and busts. The economic developments that really matter now take much longer to unfold – economic time has slowed down relative to calendar time – and yet the planning horizons of economic agents have shortened. The key problems arise from the cumulative effects of past decisions on stocks, and yet these effects are treated as short-term flow issues. The risk is that instability will become entrenched in the system. Policy needs to adjust.

This paper describes research that integrates Keynesian and Walrasian economics in a new way. The author develops a model in which high unemployment can persist and any unemployment rate can occur as an equilibrium. Equilibrium is selected by the self-fulfilling beliefs of asset market participants. Using this new framework, the author argues that fiscal policy is not the best solution to the problem of restoring full employment. A policy of asset market management, similar to quantitative easing, is put forward as a more effective approach.

On compare deux cas d'incertitude qui ont abouti à des arguments de référence en faveur de moins d'activisme de la politique monétaire : celui où l'incertitude porte sur l'effet global de la politique, comme dans Brainard (1967) ; et celui où elle porte sur ses délais d'action, comme dans Friedman (1960). On montre que l'approche bayésienne donne des résultats similaires dans les deux cas, mais que ce n'est qu'avec une incertitude sur les délais d'action qu'une approche en termes de robustesse (critère du minimax) conduit nécessairement à moins d'activisme. De plus, dans ce cas, l'activisme de la politique robuste est encore plus faible que ce que donne l'approche bayésienne.

This article reviews the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for central bank independence, including political economy considerations. It concludes that the optimal institutional framework to keep inflation lastingly under control is based on granting independence to central banks and establishing price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy. This framework — combined with appropriate appointment procedures, a sound governance structure and a well-defined monetary policy strategy of the central bank — would ensure price stability. Finally, public support for central bank independence also matters. In this respect, the central bank has a special role in nurturing a stability-oriented culture in society.

Dans les années soixante, l’étude de la stabilité, lorsque les échanges ont lieu en dehors de l’équilibre (Hahn-Negishi), a été par la suite utilement complétée par la prise en compte de la monnaie (Arrow-Hahn). Cependant, son introduction dans le modèle, à partir d’une contrainte de transaction monétaire associée à une offre de monnaie exogène et en quantité donnée, n’est pas entièrement convaincante. En particulier, elle ne permet pas l’examen des conséquences possibles de l’endettement des ménages sur la stabilité de l’équilibre. C’est cette question que nous avons étudiée, en adjoignant une monnaie interne aux dotations initiales en biens des agents. A partir d’un modèle de non-tâtonnement, nous montrons que la quasi-stabilité et la stabilité globale sont soumises dans ce cas à des conditions plus restrictives. La convergence du processus d’échanges vers une ou plusieurs valeurs d’adhérence suppose en effet qu’une règle précise relative à l’émission de monnaie ou à la détermination du taux d’intérêt débiteur soit appliquée. Quant à l’unicité des allocations optimales, elle ne peut être vérifiée que dans la mesure où la monnaie créée pendant le processus de convergence est entièrement détruite au moment où l’équilibre concurrentiel est atteint.

L’article s’interroge sur les relations entre l’intégration monétaire européenne et la persistance de spécificités et d’un certain degré d’autonomie des marchés nationaux du travail, actuellement hétérogènes dans leurs structures institutionnelles, leur fonctionnement et leurs résultats. L’inspiration théorique trouve son origine dans la remarque de John Hicks selon laquelle les économies seraient passées, après 1932, de l’équivalent d’un «gold» standard, à un «labour» standard. L’intégration européenne désigne un changement de régime économique d’ampleur équivalente mais de sens opposé. Le fait que l’intégration monétaire précède très largement la charte sociale pose donc la question de la viabilité de relations professionnelles et des mécanismes nationaux de formation des revenus. En effet, il est peu de variables macroéconomiques nationales susceptibles de garantir le parallélisme des évolutions de prix et l’identité des taux d’intérêt, si ce n’est à relation salariale inchangée, des mouvements divergents du taux de chômage. Il faudrait donc réformer les relations professionnelles mais les partenaires sociaux ne seront pas nécessairement conduits à négocier des contrats salariaux compatibles avec les objectifs macroéconomiques associés à l’intégration européenne.