Propositional temporal logic over the real number time flow is finitely axiomatisable, but its first-order counterpart is not recursively axiomatisable. We study the logic that combines the propositional axiomatisation with the usual axioms for first-order logic with identity, and develop an alternative “admissible” semantics for it, showing that it is strongly complete for admissible models over the reals. By contrast there is no recursive axiomatisation of the first-order temporal logic of admissible models whose time flow is the integers, or any scattered linear ordering.

We present sound and complete sequent calculi for the modal mu-calculus with converse modalities, aka two-way modal mu-calculus. Notably, we introduce a cyclic proof system wherein proofs can be represented as finite trees with back-edges, i.e., finite graphs. The sequent calculi incorporate ordinal annotations and structural rules for managing them. Soundness is proved with relative ease as is the case for the modal mu-calculus with explicit ordinals. The main ingredients in the proof of completeness are isolating a class of non-wellfounded proofs with sequents of bounded size, called slim proofs, and a counter-model construction that shows slimness suffices to capture all validities. Slim proofs are further transformed into cyclic proofs by means of re-assigning ordinal annotations.

A new characterization of tabularity in tense logic is established, namely, a tense logic L is tabular if and only if $\mathsf {tab}_n^T\in L$ for some $n\geq 1$. Two characterization theorems for the Post-completeness in tabular tense logics are given. Furthermore, a characterization of the Post-completeness in the lattice of all tense logics is established. Post numbers of some tense logics are shown.

The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted on the class of dynamic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ${\sf ITL}^{\sf c}_{\Diamond \forall }$ , recently shown to be decidable by Fernández-Duque. In this article we axiomatize this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces.

We show that monadic intuitionistic quantifiers admit the following temporal interpretation: “always in the future” (for $\forall $ ) and “sometime in the past” (for $\exists $ ). It is well known that Prior’s intuitionistic modal logic ${\sf MIPC}$ axiomatizes the monadic fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic, and that ${\sf MIPC}$ is translated fully and faithfully into the monadic fragment ${\sf MS4}$ of the predicate ${\sf S4}$ via the Gödel translation. To realize the temporal interpretation mentioned above, we introduce a new tense extension ${\sf TS4}$ of ${\sf S4}$ and provide a full and faithful translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ into ${\sf TS4}$ . We compare this new translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ with the Gödel translation by showing that both ${\sf TS4}$ and ${\sf MS4}$ can be translated fully and faithfully into a tense extension of ${\sf MS4}$ , which we denote by ${\sf MS4.t}$ . This is done by utilizing the relational semantics for these logics. As a result, we arrive at the diagram of full and faithful translations shown in Figure 1 which is commutative up to logical equivalence. We prove the finite model property (fmp) for ${\sf MS4.t}$ using algebraic semantics, and show that the fmp for the other logics involved can be derived as a consequence of the fullness and faithfulness of the translations considered.

In this work we present some new contributions towards two different directions in the study of modal logic. First we employ tense logics to provide a temporal interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers as “always in the future” and “sometime in the past.” This is achieved by modifying the Gödel translation and resolves an asymmetry between the standard interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers.

Then we generalize the classic Gelfand–Naimark–Stone duality between compact Hausdorff spaces and uniformly complete bounded archimedean $\ell $ -algebras to a duality encompassing compact Hausdorff spaces with continuous relations. This leads to the notion of modal operators on bounded archimedean $\ell $ -algebras and in particular on rings of continuous real-valued functions on compact Hausdorff spaces. This new duality is also a generalization of the classic Jónsson-Tarski duality in modal logic.

Abstract taken directly from the thesis.

E-mail: [email protected]

URL: https://www.proquest.com/openview/5d284dbfb954383da9364149fa312b6f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

This paper explores the analysis of ability, where ability is to be understood in the epistemic sense—in contrast to what might be called a causal sense. There are plenty of cases where an agent is able to perform an action that guarantees a given result even though she does not know which of her actions guarantees that result. Such an agent possesses the causal ability but lacks the epistemic ability. The standard analysis of such epistemic abilities relies on the notion of action types—as opposed to action tokens—and then posits that an agent has the epistemic ability to do something if and only if there is an action type available to her that she knows guarantees it. We show that these action types are not needed: we present a formalism without action types that can simulate analyzes of epistemic ability that rely on action types. Our formalism is a standard epistemic extension of the theory of “seeing to it that”, which arose from a modal tradition in the logic of action.

This is a sequel article to [10] where a hypersequent calculus (HC) for some temporal logics of linear frames including Kt4.3 and its extensions for dense and serial flow of time was investigated in detail. A distinctive feature of this approach is that hypersequents are noncommutative, i.e., they are finite lists of sequents in contrast to other hypersequent approaches using sets or multisets. Such a system in [10] was proved to be cut-free HC formalization of respective logics by means of semantical argument. In this article we present an equivalent variant of this calculus for which a constructive syntactical proof of cut elimination is provided.

In this article, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together an article of van Benthem (1979), “Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,” and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal algebras, or as we call them, ${\cal V}$-baos. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem’s article resolves the open question in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to ${\cal V}$-baos, namely the provability logic $GLB$ (Japaridze, 1988; Boolos, 1993). We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is ${\cal V}$-complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy (Blok, 1978) to degrees of ${\cal V}$-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem’s theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness.

We consider Minkowski spacetime, the set of all point-events of spacetime under the relation of causal accessibility. That is, x can access y if an electromagnetic or (slower than light) mechanical signal could be sent from x to y. We use Prior’s tense language of F and P representing causal accessibility and its converse relation. We consider two versions, one where the accessibility relation is reflexive and one where it is irreflexive. In either case it has been an open problem, for decades, whether the logic is decidable or axiomatisable. We make a small step forward by proving, in each case, that the set of valid formulas over two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime is decidable and that the complexity of each problem is PSPACE-complete.

A consequence is that the temporal logic of intervals with real endpoints under either the containment relation or the strict containment relation is PSPACE-complete, the same is true if the interval accessibility relation is “each endpoint is not earlier”, or its irreflexive restriction.

We provide a temporal formula that distinguishes between three-dimensional and two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime and another temporal formula that distinguishes the two-dimensional case where the underlying field is the real numbers from the case where instead we use the rational numbers.

In this paper we provide a mathematical model of Kant’s temporal continuum that yields formal correlates for Kant’s informal treatment of this concept in the Critique of Pure Reason and in other works of his critical period. We show that the formal model satisfies Kant’s synthetic a priori principles for time (whose consistence is not obvious) and that it even illuminates what “faculties and functions” must be in place, as “conditions for the possibility of experience”, for time to satisfy such principles. We then present a mathematically precise account of Kant’s transcendental theory of time—the most precise account to date.

Moreover, we show that the Kantian continuum which we obtain has some affinities with the Brouwerian continuum but that it also has “infinitesimal intervals” consisting of nilpotent infinitesimals; these allow us to capture Kant’s theory of rest and motion in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.

While our focus is on Kant’s theory of time the material in this paper is more generally relevant for the problem of developing a rigorous theory of the phenomenological continuum, in the tradition of Whitehead, Russell, and Weyl among others.

Stit semantics grows out of a modal tradition in the logic of action that concentrates on an operator representing the agency of an individual in seeing to it that some state of affairs holds, rather than on the actions the individual performs in doing so. The purpose of this paper is to enrich stit semantics, and especially epistemic stit semantics, by supplementing the overall framework with an explicit treatment of action types. We show how the introduction of these new action types allows us to define a modal operator capturing an epistemic sense of agency, and how this operator can be used to express an epistemic sense of ability.

Hypersequent calculus (HC), developed by A. Avron, is one of the most interesting proof systems suitable for nonclassical logics. Although HC has rather simple form, it increases significantly the expressive power of standard sequent calculi (SC). In particular, HC proved to be very useful in the field of proof theory of various nonclassical logics. It may seem surprising that it was not applied to temporal logics so far. In what follows, we discuss different approaches to formalization of logics of linear frames and provide a cut-free HC formalization of Kt4.3, the minimal temporal logic of linear frames, and some of its extensions. The novelty of our approach is that hypersequents are defined not as finite (multi)sets but as finite lists of ordinary sequents. Such a solution allows both linearity of time flow, and symmetry of past and future, to be incorporated by means of six temporal rules (three for future-necessity and three dual rules for past-necessity). Extensions of the basic calculus with simple structural rules cover logics of serial and dense frames. Completeness is proved by Schütte/Hintikka-style argument using models built from saturated hypersequents.