For the purpose of understanding recent developments in Soviet historiography, it is necessary to consider its philosophical basis in the classic works of Marx and Engels. Especially pertinent are the normative orientations and epistemic foundations of Marxian social science, and the relevance of scientific socialism and historical materialism to the leading principles of not only Marxian historiography, but also political economy. Of basic importance is the dual commitment of socialist humanism to both the common good and the partisan interests of a particular class, and the dual character of materialist dialectics in its effort to be scientifically impartial and intellectually partisan at the same time. Also revealing is the high degree of correlation between “vulgar Marxist” partisanship in the social sciences and ultra-leftist heterodoxy and between “formalism” or “academicism” in social science and revisionist political persuasions.

Although the ideological struggle between the East and the West has been carried into the natural sciences, the author contends that there is no connection between Marxism and physical theory, whether deterministic or indeterministic. Marxism, which concerns itself with social theory, deals with physical theory only in so far as it is used for specific class purposes instead of social needs. Marxism does not derive its social theory, as has been asserted, either from, or by analogy with, physical processes, nor does it read “social laws” of development into nature. The attempt to do so by way of “dialectical materialism” must be regarded as a Marxist aberration. The author deals with the history of this aberration and with the reasons for its persistency in Marxism-Leninism.

Materialism is the view that existence does not necessarily involve perceiving or being perceived, knowing or being known. Dialectics is the view that the universe is a system of entities in process of change, the dynamic arising from the impact of the parts on one another. The epistemology of Dialectical Materialism (Marxism) is therefore the view that truth (i.e. the correspondence of a sentence with fact) can be determined by the following rule: “Examine any alleged state of affairs as related to and distinguished from a total environment, and you will know whether or not the sentence alleging that state of affairs is true.”

No special pedagogy is required for Marxist epistemology: the only rule is the usual rule of honesty and candor which bids us teach every subject as that subject actually is.

This paper represents an attempt to analyze the basis for the lack of interest and study in the sociology of science within American sociology and within American society. An attempt is first made to indicate the divergence between the meta-sociology of the sociologist of knowledge and contemporary American sociology; and in a derivative manner to indicate the way in which divergent meta-sociologies may lead to different claims about the relationship of science and society. Secondly, an attempt is made to show how the prestige position of the sociologist and the clarity of his status with regard to natural science may also be construed as grounds for the neglect of this field of inquiry.

Social scientific development has been greatly influenced by Galilean-Newtonian thought which emphasized formulation of abstract hypotheses valid throughout all time and space and independent of human characteristics. This influence has resulted in an artificial hiatus between social science and social problem-solving. Dissolution of certain Galilean-Newtonian assumptions has opened the way for integrating aspects of another stream of thought, the Hegelian-Marxian one, into the social scientific endeavor. Hegelian-Marxian thought emphasizes the individual becoming self-conscious of, and involved in, the social-historical process. The uniting of certain aspects of Galilean-Newtonian and Hegelian-Marxian thought provides a genuinely experimental social science in which abstract hypothesis-testing is united with social action that is based on persons’ awareness of relevant hypotheses viewed in historical perspective.

This is a discussion of the claim by certain recent philosophers to have established universal human abilities and disabilities on “logical” grounds, or as a priori necessary. These traits would be independent of empirical conditions, and not of the sort which could be disproved by psychology which, accordingly, would share its field with the a priori philosopher. The author agues, using a series of examples, that these supposed traits do, or could, vary with empirical conditions, and that it is unlikely that in this psychological area there is any good alternative to inductive methods.