We construct measures of U.S. state partisan identification, self-reported ideology, and policy mood using data from the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) and the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). These measures improve on existing methods for estimating state-level preferences because the surveys provide larger state samples without pooling across years. After detailing our methods for constructing the measures, we assess their validity through comparisons with measures already in use by scholars of state politics. We find that our measures correlate strongly with those created by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) and Berry et al. (1998) and with measures from state-level polls. We conclude that our measures can be useful to research in state politics.

Legislative redistricting in the states is highly contentious due, at least in part, to its partisan implications. But does the method by which states draw legislative districts affect partisan competition in the elections that are held in these districts? We examine the effects of three methods used by states to draw district boundaries on competition in congressional elections. Specifically, we evaluate the effects on competition of legislative, judicial, and commission redistricting plans enacted prior to the 1992 and 2002 congressional elections. We find that more competitive elections occur when courts and commissions are directly involved in the redistricting process, as opposed to when redistricting is handled only in the state legislative process.

American state politics scholars have generally relied on Ranney's measure of the partisan composition of state legislatures and governors' offices to evaluate competition between parties for control of state government, and Holbrook and Van Dunk's measure of the competitiveness of individual state legislative elections to evaluate the degree of electoral competition in a state. Both measure “competition” and were previously correlated with one another, so researchers might be tempted to consider them two measures of the same concept. This would be mistaken, however, because they are measuring two distinct concepts. We use new data on state legislative partisan balance and election returns to compute (and make publicly available) the two measures of competition from 1970 to 2003, a time span that is significantly longer than any previous study. We show that the relationship between the two measures has drastically changed over the last 30 years. Although the two measures were positively correlated in the 1970s and 1980s, they are now (as we might expect, given they are different concepts) negatively correlated. We investigate one possible explanation for this change and conclude by discussing a set of practical recommendations for scholars who plan to incorporate a measure of competition in future studies.

State legislatures have been extremely active in passing legislation relating to all facets of immigration policy over the last several years. In this article, I develop a framework that explains how party ideology, party control of the legislature, and electoral conditions affect the likelihood that a state legislature will adopt policies that increase immigration enforcement. I test my arguments using state immigration policy adoption data that span from 2005 to 2011. I find that conservative Republican state parties are more likely to pass legislation enhancing immigration enforcement—on the condition that the Republican Party controls the state's legislative institutions. However, the willingness of Republican-controlled legislatures to pass immigration reform is often tempered by electoral concerns. Republican-controlled legislatures in states where Latinos make up a large proportion of the electorate are significantly less likely to adopt new legislation that targets undocumented migrants. I argue that Republican support for increasing sanctions on undocumented migrants is eroded by the potential for an electoral backlash from Latino voters. Democratic-controlled legislatures are unlikely to pass legislation under any conditions. Ultimately, the observed pattern of policy adoption is the product of the trade-off between the state parties' ideologically driven policy goals and the electoral consequences associated with actually implementing immigration policies.

Welfare reform gave the U.S. states the opportunity to engage in second-order devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretion in the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Proponents of welfare decentralization insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore able to implement TANF more effectively. Nevertheless, opponents argue that decentralization could lead to a “race to the bottom” and, thus, SOD might lead to more restrictive TANF implementation. We investigate these competing claims by examining how differences in decentralization affect (1) TANF caseload decline, (2) the use of sanctions, and (3) several work-related outcomes among recipients. Based on a series of state-level analyses, we find that SOD states experienced a greater degree of caseload decline than non-SOD states. In addition, SOD states were more likely to use punitive policy tools, such as TANF sanctions. However, we also find that SOD states display marginally better TANF performance, as reflected in higher rates of employment exits and earnings gains among TANF recipients. Thus, we find support for both sides of the decentralization debate.

Despite many important recent advances in the study of policy diffusion, this research has devoted limited attention to what happens after the adoption decision. This article attempts to fill this gap in diffusion research by examining the adoption and subsequent modification of “Three Strikes and You're Out” laws in the American states. Its analysis suggests that distinct political forces affected state-level outcomes at these two stages of the policymaking process. The rapid spread of Three Strikes laws in the 1990s seems to have occurred because states with more conservative leanings and higher proportions of African-American residents gravitated to a salient and visible policy. In contrast, the modification of Three Strikes laws appears to have been encouraged by financial necessity and shifting ideological environments but hindered by the mobilization of stakeholders with an interest in preserving the status quo, including private prison operators and prison officer unions. The contrast illustrates the usefulness of treating policy diffusion as a multistage process, and the stakeholder mobilization results provide empirical support for recent theorizing about policy feedback effects.

Since 1990, the American states have adopted a variety of reforms to regulate lobbying in an attempt to address a host of ethical issues. Such regulation can have important impacts on a variety of aspects of the legislative process because it typically impacts the relationships between legislators and lobbyists. How does such lobbying regulation vary across the states and over time? I have developed a measure of state lobbying regulation from 1990-2003. This measure validly captures the laws that limit relationships between lobbyists and legislators and, as such, can be used to help assess a variety of hypotheses about the legislative process.

How do Americans feel about the respective policy responsibilities of the national and state governments? This article addresses this question using data from a public opinion survey in South Carolina. The study has three major findings. First, people do seem to have meaningful opinions about national versus state government responsibilities, regardless of whether the issue is presented in policy-specific or general terms. Second, framing effects do not exist for these attitudes because the aggregate distributions of opinion do not change across the two presentations. Third, citizens' beliefs about specific programmatic activities appear to be derived largely from their more general comparative evaluations of the national and state governments. These findings have important implications for both scholarly theories of and practical political concerns about federalism in the United States.

Term limit laws for state legislators now exist in 19 states. While these laws were passed as early as 1990, they have only recently actually forced legislators from office. Prior to the 2000 elections, only two states (California and Maine) had experienced virtually complete legislative turnover in at least one chamber as a result of term limits. Nine other states have had at least one cohort of legislators forced out of office. Now that a significant portion of these legislative bodies has been replaced by term limits, we can begin to examine the consequences of this reform. We report findings from a survey of lobbyists in five term-limits states. We find strong consensus among these lobbyists that term limits have caused the state political influence structure to shift away from the legislature and toward the governor, administrative agencies, and interest groups. With regard to the impact on internal operations and procedures of the legislature, we discover considerable variation across states, variation that, in part, is related to legislative professionalism.

Job approval ratings for state governors, unlike those for the United States president, have been relatively inaccessible to political scientists. We introduce the U.S. Officials Job Approval Ratings (JAR) dataset, a new compilation of gubernatorial job approval ratings—along with senatorial and state-level presidential ratings—that draws together many of these ratings, beginning with the first published rating in 1947 and extending through 2000. We describe some of the characteristics of these data, especially the kinds of rating scales used and their impact on overall approval assessment. We then show that 1993–2000 presidential approval levels varied widely from state to state and are correlated with state-level support for Clinton in the 1996 presidential election. Finally, we note that while gubernatorial approval often declines over time, many governors remain popular over the length of their term.

I use elements of overhead democracy and policy implementation theory to explain hate crime law enforcement in American cities. I develop hypotheses of the relationships between law enforcement, state and local policies, and the preferences of elected officials, bureaucrats, and the public. Using survey and demographic data, I find that local hate crime law enforcement is driven by the presence of state hate crime policies, the support and efforts of bureaucrats, the tractability of the hate crime problem, police funding and training, and public preferences. Law enforcement does not appear to be significantly influenced by the preferences of elected officials, local hate crime policies, or administrative procedures for hate crime cases. Thus, although political control by local elected officials is weak, state officials and citizens have some influence over local hate crime law enforcement.

In a nationwide survey Carey, Niemi, Powell, and Moncrief (2006) found that term-limited state legislators feel less constrained by their constituencies. I use direct measures of legislative activity to examine how this “Burkean shift” in attitudes is manifested in roll-call behavior. With a new dataset consisting of all competitive state legislative roll calls for the 1999–2000 sessions and a new measure of district constituency preferences, I examine three hypotheses: that term-limited legislators are less representative of their constituents, are more polarized, and participate less in roll-call voting. I find no evidence that term-limited legislators are any less representative, and no differences in levels of party polarization appear associated with the term limits reform. I find that the impact of term limits on roll-call voting is manifested in decreased legislative effort, but this effect only appears in the more demanding legislatures. The results are consistent with the sorting model in which elections are reasonably efficient at selecting leaders whose preferences align with those of their districts, but the prospect of re-election has little role in achieving representation of constituents' ideological preferences.

Past research has shown that elected officials are generally responsive to the public's attitudes on policy, particularly in domains such as morality policy. But will this responsiveness survive an externally imposed, non-incremental policy “shock”? The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade represents such a shock regarding abortion policy. We examine the responsiveness of state lawmakers to mass abortion attitudes in the post-Roe period through a longitudinal analysis of state abortion policies. We find that the connection between mass abortion attitudes and abortion policies has grown stronger over time, and that mass preferences have become the primary determinant of such policies. Mass abortion attitudes are now a stronger predictor of abortion policies than elite abortion attitudes, and certain elite abortion attitudes that once moderated the link between mass abortion attitudes and policy no longer do so. These findings suggest that lawmakers will attempt to respond to public preferences about contentious morality policies despite the imposition of an external policy constraint.

After an exceptionally swift reform movement in the 1990s, 15 states are now adjusting to the most significant institutional change to their governments in a generation—legislative term limits. Beyond the basic task of identifying and cataloguing their various substantive impacts, term limits have presented scholars with an exceptional opportunity to test legislative theory for two reasons. First, most legislative theory is based on behavioral assumptions that term limits appear to affect systematically, such as the reelection motivation. Second, the distribution of term limits across the states gives scholars exceptional methodological advantages for testing theory. In this article, I review the scholarly literature on the impacts of state legislative term limits, describe their theoretically relevant implications and methodological advantages, and advocate using the reform to develop an important research agenda.

The idea of social capital has had a powerful impact on the study of politics, policy, and social science at large. Much of what we know about the causes and effects of social capital, however, is limited by the nature of data used regularly by scholars working in this area. Current data sets allow researchers to study changes in social capital over time at the national level and static differences in the distribution of social capital across the states. The inability of scholars to know how social capital varies over time and across space limits the kinds of questions that can be asked. In this article, we use sample data of more than 20,000 individuals conducted biannually in the continuous 48 states by the marketing research firm MediaMark Research, Inc. to create a unique measure of social capital that varies across time and space. These data are available at the state level from 1986 through 2004.

Interjurisdictional pollution spillovers are a critical issue in U.S. environmental policy. When policy responsibility is decentralized, state governmental agencies have incentives to promote these externalities in order to capture the benefits of economic activity within their borders while compelling neighbors to shoulder the resultant environmental costs. To test this free riding hypothesis, prior studies have relied on crude proxies to delineate a regulated entity's proximity to a neighboring state. In this article, we develop a more refined set of measures using newly available data on facility location to isolate the conditions under which free riding is theoretically more likely to occur. We then assess state enforcement of the federal Clean Water Act directed at major water polluters under these conditions to determine the extent to which U.S. states engage in environmental free riding behavior. Our empirical results are mixed, but in general they fail to support theoretical expectations generated by the free rider argument.

The literature on women in state legislatures has grown dramatically over the last few decades, examining in detail their personal characteristics, behavior, and the impact they have had on state legislatures. Highlighted throughout this body of work are the many ways in which these female officials differ from their male colleagues. While it may once have been necessary to identify and categorize women legislators, we now need to broaden our research to examine both the diversity among women state legislators and the contexts in which they may or may not make a difference. This broader focus should include analyses of state-level forces, such as legislative professionalism and state political culture, and it should also investigate more thoroughly policy outcomes and processes. Interactions between gender and other social forces, such as race, ethnicity, and class, should also be explored in greater depth. This new direction would build on the richness of the existing literature and allow the two fields of women in politics and state politics to better inform and contribute to each other.

Political scientists are increasingly turning to direct democracy, as practiced in the American states, to investigate a broad range of questions dealing with median voter preferences and policy responsiveness, minority interests, theories of representation, policy implementation, political knowledge and behavior, citizen engagement, mobilization and turnout, voter competence, activities of interest groups and political parties, campaign finance, media effects, and agenda-setting. In this review article, we examine recent research on the instrumental effects of ballot measures on policy outcomes as well as the educative (and spillover) effects of the process of direct democracy on candidate contests. Throughout the article we suggest avenues for possible future research.

Students of race and politics in the U.S. have long asserted a relationship between the racial composition and public policies of states. A related but distinct line of research demonstrates a strong connection between white attitudes about the perceived recipients of social welfare spending—blacks and members of other minority groups—and support for these programs. This article bridges these lines of scholarship by asking how racial diversity shapes aggregate attitudes about minorities in the American states and how these opinions in turn influence welfare spending. Using public opinion data from the General Social Survey (1974–96), I find that diversity has a direct influence on welfare policy in the states, as well as an indirect influence through shaping majority-group racial attitudes. Diversity and racial attitudes are found to have these effects even when controlling for factors traditionally used to explain variation in state spending levels, such as party competition, lower class mobilization, ideology, and state capacity.

This article examines the relationship between party competition for control of governing institutions and legislative party polarization. Although the competition/cohesion thesis dates to the 1940s, it has never before been subject to a test with data from the 50 states. Drawing upon newly available data, we take stock of the evidence. Five measures of party competition are used: (1) the number of recent shifts of party control, (2) an index of party competition for state offices, (3) the closeness of presidential elections in the state, (4) the effective number of political parties in the state, and (5) the ratio of Republicans to Democrats in the electorate. Nearly all of these measures correlate with higher levels of party polarization in both the lower and upper chambers, and none are associated with a lower level of polarization.