Within the last ten years there has been increasinginterest in tritium behaviour and distribution in the environment.This is based partly on empirical findings that tritium dischargedmostly as HTO can become transformed into organic forms in environmentalsamples. An international workshop was convened in France in 2012 togather the scientific community interested in organically boundtritium to share their experience and to establish a current stateof knowledge. This paper summarises the outcome of the workshop,which aimed to improve skills concerning OBT (OrganicallyBound Tritium) determination, transfer and behaviour in the environment.In order to improve OBT measurement credibility,it was decided to conduct and promote OBT analysisthrough inter-laboratory exercises. This practice will reduce uncertaintyin OBT analysis results, providing better OBT modelvalidation data and public dose assessments.

As part of the ongoing European project NERIS-TP, a revision has been made of someparameters influencing dose estimates in the European emergency management decisionsupport systems RODOS and ARGOS. On the basis of survey data, the estimates of the timefractions typically spent indoors and outdoors over longer time periods have been revised.On the basis of measurement data, also new values for the natural ventilation rategoverning early ingression of contaminants into dwellings have been derived for differentparts of Europe. Other potential parameterisation improvements for the decision supportsystems are discussed.

We used CR-39 detectors to evaluate radon activity concentrations in several habitationsof Bamako. The calibration factor of the dosimeters was determined experimentally withknown radon activity concentrations inside a radon chamber, and was also simulated withMCNPX. The experimental and simulated calibration factors are, respectively,kexp = 0.119 ± 0.017 and ksim= 0.126 ± 0.007 tr.cm-2.d-1.Bq-1.m3. Indoorradon activity concentrations in Bamako were found to vary from 70 ± 18 to 154 ± 35Bq.m-3. No significant differences were observed in the mean radon activityconcentrations compared with five other African countries. Taking into account anoccupancy factor of 0.8 and an equilibrium factor of 0.4 for radon indoors, the effectivedose rate ranges from 1.77 to 2.35 mSv.y-1. In all cases the radon activityconcentrations measured were below the action limits recommended by the InternationalCommission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Statement on Radon.

The improved use of collective dose following the 2007 ICRP recommendations is studiedfor nuclear and radiological emergency situations. To study the accumulation of lowindividual doses to the collective dose the collective dose is calculated as a function ofthe minimum individual dose for three cases including nuclear as well as radiologicalaccidents. It is found that the use of collective dose in this way can have an added valuein nuclear emergency preparedness and response in particular related to decisions onoverall protective actions following an accident.

The Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) of the International Atomic Emergency Agency(IAEA) is the global focal point for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiologicalincidents and emergencies irrespective of their cause. In the area of preparedness theCentre continuously works to develop standards and guidance for strengthening MemberStates’ preparedness; practical tools and training programs to assist Member States inpromptly applying the standards and guidance; and organizes a variety of training eventsand exercises. This paper provides an overview of the information presented in the IAEASafety Standards and Guidance in the area of emergency preparedness and response.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and NuclearSafety (BMU) has asked the German Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) to provideadvice on the revision of the German “Radiological Fundamentals for Decisions on Measuresfor the Protection of the Population against Accidental Releases of Radionuclides”(Radiologische Grundlagen). A working group has been established to guide the preparationof a new version of that document. It was asked that the revision has to consider mostrelevant publications of international bodies such as ICRP, EC and IAEA. Therefore, theICRP recommendations 103, 109 and 111 have to be considered together with the draftdocuments of the European Union and the IAEA Basic Safety Standards. Recommendations ofworking groups of NEA (WPNEM) as well as the EPAL working group of HERCA (Heads ofEuropean Radiological Protection Competent Authorities) will be also taken into account.Within the discussion it turned out that the practical application of the newrecommendation for professionals working in the operational community is extremelyimportant. As the current recommendations are widely accepted and operational all overGermany, it was investigated to which extent the current procedures can be taken over withminor modifications.

In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is the competent authority andthe national warning point with respect to bilateral and international agreements. STUKhas drafted proposals for new guides for intervention levels in different phases of anemergency to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Finland. These guides arewritten separately for early phase and intermediate phase of a radiological emergency.STUK selected 20 mSv effective residual dose from all exposure pathways during the firstyear of an emergency as the reference level. This overall goal has been supplemented withthe following general guidance; if a projected dose without protective measures is duringthe first year: (1) higher than 10 mSv, it is necessary to perform protective measures;radiation expose is dominant in decision making, (2) 1–10 mSv, protective measures areusually justified but other factors effect decision making, (3) below 1 mSv, theprotective measures may be carried out especially if they are easily feasible; otherfactors are dominant in decision making. More specific criteria are given for separatecountermeasures as a projected dose in a certain time period or as an operationalintervention level (OIL) in a quantity which can be directly measured (external dose rate,magnitude of surface contamination, concentration level) or as a trigger (such as plantconditions). This paper presents the main intervention levels and criteria to be used in aradiological emergency for members of the public.

HPA is updating and consolidating its advice on radiation emergencies and recovery.Current advice was published in 1997. Since 2007, the ICRP has issued a set ofrecommendations to elaborate its guidance for emergency exposure and existing exposuresituations. It is expected that the European Basic Safety Standards, when published, willalso reflect the ICRP recommendations. The new ICRP guidance represents a marked change inapproach, with emphasis placed on optimisation of whole protection strategies usingreference levels of residual dose. These new concepts as well as the relevant lessonsidentified following the Fukushima accident will be included in the new UK advicedocument. The scope of the UK advice includes reactor and transport accidents as well asreleases from waste stores, reprocessing and defence activities. The revised advice willconsider the initiation of emergency countermeasures based on averted dose criteria andoptimisation of the subsequent protection strategy based on reference levels of residualdose. The advice will illustrate that the type of protection strategy selected depends onthe contribution of different exposure pathways over time to projected dose, and this willvary according to the scenarios considered as reasonably foreseeable. Due to the potentialimpact of the advice, a wide range of stakeholders are being consulted. In particular,feedback will be required on the potential for adapting current practices for shelteringand stable iodine prophylaxis to situations involving longer duration releases or thosewith a prolonged threat phase. The advice document will contain guidance for emergencyplanning and response, criteria for the withdrawal of emergency countermeasures, factorsto consider during the transition to an existing exposure situation and the management oflong term contaminated areas. It is the first time that the whole spectrum of advice willbe presented in a single publication, which is expected to be published in 2013, followinga public consultation process.

The nuclear reactor remote monitoring system of the federal state of Baden- Wuerttemberg(KFUe BW) is realized according to the renewed “recommendations for remote monitoring ofnuclear power plants” (BMU, 2005a). The spectrum of the system covers both, pursuit ofoperational procedures, and incidents or accidents. The KFUe BW provides a measurementnetwork and information system for operational parameters at the plant sites as well asradiological and meteorological measurements in their vicinity. For the Ministry, itpreferentially serves as an instrument of nuclear supervision. This paper gives a briefsurvey of the system architecture and concentrates on the role of the KFUe with respect tothe determination and evaluation of the radiological situation in the range of off-siteemergency management.

During nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response a processing pipelineis put in place at the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority to produceassessment reports of the current situation, its likely evolution with time, andrecommendations on protective actions. Within the processing pipeline raw data is more andmore refined towards these end products as experts, advisors, and decision makers collect,analyze, portray, annotate, filter, arrange and rearrange, share, approve or dismiss, andpublish content. Emergency procedures and guidelines assist and guide them through theprocess, as do information and communication technologies. The inner working of theprocessing pipeline is in constant flux as information and communication technologiesdevelop and allow better facilitation of the process, and as social and political demandschange. The present article describes the overall working of the pipeline, and how it hasrecently been improved by the KETALE collaborative software. The focus then shifts to thenew ICRP recommendations and how the new national emergency guidelines are planned to beimplemented within the KETALE software. The KETALE software has greatly increased thethroughput of our emergency processing pipeline and improved product quality.

The new recommendations on emergency exposure situations of the International Commissionon Radiological Protection (ICRP) advise a reference level for the residual dose in arange of between 20 and 100 mSv effective dose (acute or per year). At the same time, theprotection strategy should account for the simultaneous consideration of all the exposurepathways, as well as all of the protective actions. Similarly to other countries, theactual Belgian nuclear emergency plan is based on individual projected doses (thyroidcommitted dose and total effective doses) and independent protective actions that mainlyfocus on the early phase of an emergency situation. The two approaches are compared inthis study on the basis of the projected and residual dose calculations obtained usingJRODOS and the Belgian Noodplan models for different radiological or nuclear accidentalscenarios. The comparison has been made by considering separately the early and the latephase contributions. The ingestion dose has been investigated from the predicteddeposition values and compared to the single level of the ICRP 109 recommendations.