In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

In June/July 1994, I was fortunate in having been selected by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to be the chief inspector (CI) of one of the most interesting inspections conducted by the commission, namely UNSCOM 84/BW6. This particular inspection was fascinating because of its complexity—the team not only conducted inspections of Iraqi biological research and production facilities, it also excavated a site that UNSCOM surmised might contain materials from Iraq's former BW program. As such, this inspection was the first time that UNSCOM collected environmental samples for analysis. In this paper I discuss my experiences during this inspection and comment on the effectiveness of sampling and analysis as a verification measure.

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.

Under the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) program mandated by Security Council Resolution 715, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) has installed more than a hundred remote-controlled video cameras at Iraqi “dual-capable” facilities—that is, facilities that have legitimate commercial applications but that could also be misused to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Since January 1995, these cameras have collected optical data for analysis at UNSCOM's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, located on the third floor of the former Canal Hotel (Smith, 1994).

This paper has four parts. First, I begin my examination of the aerial surveillance measure by reviewing the work by VEREX on this measure. Second, I discuss aerial surveillance as it relates to UNSCOM's mission in Iraq specifically. Third, I make some general observations about the applicability of this measure to detecting biological facilities and activities. Last, I comment on the utility of this measure for UNSCOM and international biological arms control.

My contribution differs in several aspects from the others in this symposium. To begin, instead of addressing a specific element of future Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) verification operations, I have been asked for my unique “Canadian” perspective on the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in which I have participated, and some of the lessons that I have come away with after having been a member of four inspections in 1994 and 1995.

Members of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) have a considerable history of bringing scientific and technical knowledge to the issue of biological weapons control and being available to serve in advisory roles to the government. ASM's involvement with the biological weapons issue began in the 1940s, when microbiologists served as advisors to the government's Biological Defense Research Program and participated in the Biological Warfare Committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. In 1970, a controversy resulting from the ASM's involvement with this issue abated when the ASM Council approved a statement concerning non-secrecy and free movement in research. Simultaneously, the society affirmed support for President Richard M. Nixon's action to end the U.S.'s offensive biological weapons program. The society's code of ethics, published in 1985, contains two relevant sections that seek to discourage ASM members from participating in biological weapons development.

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB) published its latest major report, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues on April 20, 1995. The news item in Nature described the NCoB as “widely seen as the United Kingdom's national bioethics council” (vol. 374:665). This is exactly what the trustees of the Nuffield Foundation had in mind when they established the council in July 1991.

The Group of Advisers on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology of the European Commission:

1. • Having regard to the request of the Commission of 23 September 1993 for an Opinion on gene therapy;

2. • Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular articles 129, 129 A and Article F.2 of the Common Provisions;

3. • Having regard to European Regulations in particular the Council Directives on genetically modified (micro) organisms 90/219/EEC and 90/220/EEC and relevant product legislation;

4. • Taking account of the statements expressed by the European institutions, the Council of Europe, the UNESCO and other international or national ethics committees;

5. • Having heard the report on “Ethical Aspects of Gene Therapy” by the rapporteur Professor Luis Archer;