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Remote Monitoring of Dual-Capable Biological Facilities in Iraq

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Jonathan B. Tucker
Jonathan B. Tucker*
Affiliation:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, USA
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Extract

Under the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) program mandated by Security Council Resolution 715, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) has installed more than a hundred remote-controlled video cameras at Iraqi “dual-capable” facilities—that is, facilities that have legitimate commercial applications but that could also be misused to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Since January 1995, these cameras have collected optical data for analysis at UNSCOM's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, located on the third floor of the former Canal Hotel (Smith, 1994).

Type
Symposium: Biological Weapons Inspection
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , August 1995 , pp. 247 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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