Questioning the compatibility of Islam with liberal democratic principles has become a common argument in the public rhetoric across the socio-political spectrum. This article examines this claimed irreconcilability through the prism of a constitutive dimension of healthy democracies: active citizenship. Drawing on a systematic synthesis of recent studies, the article argues that, while it is impossible to ultimately decide whether Islam as a faith is compatible with liberal democratic norms, the lived religiosity of most Muslims is generally not an obstacle to civic engagement in non-Muslim majority countries; active involvement in mosques rather tends to enhance their active citizenship. Data from an explorative study on Muslims’ engagement in Australia and Germany allow new insights into the different ways civically active Muslims refer to their faith as a driver for their citizenship. Some describe it as a religious duty, while for others ‘serving humanity’ constitutes a fundamental aspect of lived religiosity.

Religious appeals have been part and parcel of campaign strategy for decades. Most often, however, these appeals to have come from men, but little is known about how women would fare using religious appeals on the campaign trail. To remedy this, we used an experimental design to examine voter reaction to religious appeals from a female and a male candidate competing for an open United States Senate seat. We find that women's use of religious appeals is governed by the dynamics of tokenism — reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes and serving to reduce voter support of the female candidate. This suggests that women must be careful in using a key campaign tool traditionally employed by men, and that this may affect the extent to which female candidates can effectively shape voter perceptions on the campaign trail.

This article analyzes political participation and the attitudes of Muslim-Americans. Assessing national patterns, the first part highlights several regression models, discerning the impact of race/ethnicity, gender, foreign born status, age, and education on political activity and attitudes. I also compare changes in voting patterns among respondents between the 2000 and 2004 elections. The second half is based on in-depth interviews of Muslims from St. Louis, Missouri, probing more directly particular shifts in views and participation since September 11. Among the national sample, South Asians and Middle Easterners largely supported Republican George W. Bush in 2000, while African-Americans voted for Democrat Al Gore. However, by 2004, race and ethnicity were no longer statistically significant factors dividing the Muslim vote; instead, support largely went to Democrat John Kerry. Changes in voting patterns between 2000 and 2004 were also evident in the St. Louis sample of South Asians and Middle Easterners. They generally cited unfavorable views of Muslim treatment both at home and abroad since the War on Terror began as major reasons for these changes. Partisan and voting shifts were not evident among African-Americans, who have been consistent Democrats. However, many African-Americans in addition to Middle Easterners and South Asians reported heightened interest in politics and similar changes since September 11. Only Bosnians, who are relatively new to the United States, report few changes. This is largely because they have yet to develop firm political identities. Among both samples, Muslim-Americans generally exhibit high rates of participation in various political activities, many reporting increasing interest and involvement since September 11. Therefore, regardless of the hardships they may currently feel, Muslim-Americans are not hiding in the shadows but are fully participating in the political sphere.

A growing body of research connects Christian nationalism—a preference for a religiously conservative political regime—to social and political beliefs. This paper raises questions about the validity of a popular scale used to measure those attitudes. I begin by exploring the factor structure of the six-item Christian nationalism index. I then show how semi-supervised machine learning can be used to illustrate classification problems within that scale. Finally, I demonstrate that this index performs poorly at the interval level, a combination of measurement error and the sorting out of religious and political preferences. These attitudes have become so bound up in conventional politics that they often exhibit a threshold rather than a linear relationship to political preferences. I conclude with an appeal for care in matching theory to empirics: Christian nationalism is a prominent political theology, but research must grapple with the limitations of prevailing measurement tools when operationalizing it.

This article examines relationships between religion and racial intolerance across 47 countries by applying multilevel modeling to European survey data and is the first in-depth analysis of moderation of these relationships by European national contexts. The analysis distinguishes a believing, belonging, and practice dimension of religiosity. The results yield little evidence of a link between denominational belonging, religious practice, and racial intolerance. The religiosity dimension that matters most for racial intolerance in Europe is believing: believers in a traditional God and believers in a Spirit/Life Force are decidedly less likely, and fundamentalists are more likely than non-believers to be racially intolerant. National contexts also matter greatly: individuals living in Europe's most religious countries, countries with legacies of ethnic-religious conflict and countries with low GDP are significantly more likely to be racially intolerant than those living in wealthier, secular and politically stable countries. This is especially the case for the religiously devout.

The subjective correlates of abortion attitudes for six different religious traditions (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam). For all six groups, attitudes toward sexual morality exhibit the strongest relationship with abortion attitudes, followed by the effects of attitudes toward human life. Gender role attitudes are much less powerful predictors of abortion attitudes. Further, the multivariate models which explain abortion attitudes are remarkably similar across religious traditions, with inter-religious differences largely being attributable to differences in the marginal distributions of the independent variables.

The exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.

This article argues that the relationship between democracy and the separation of religion and state needs to be reexamined. We argue that previous studies have misconceptualized the impact that a lack of church-state separation can have on democracy, or have taken a narrow focus by concentrating on specific cases. We use principal component analysis and a large-n data set covering 125 countries to show that the separation of religion and state should be conceptualized multi-dimensionally and that it should be considered a component of democracy. Our findings show that as separation of religion and state increases, the level of democracy also increases.

While our intuition is that religious elites influence the political behavior of their audiences, just how that influence takes place is essentially unknown. Among many possible mechanisms, we investigate a new one: the effects of the decision-making process information that is included in elite statements. We believe that “process cues” paralleling those preferred by respondents bolster trust in the source and augment the ability to form determined attitudes. We test this proposition in the context of a survey experiment that focuses on environmental racism. We present competing arguments provided by a reverend and a professor, variably assigning the arguments and presence of elite process cues. We find that process cues do affect trust and attitudinal ambivalence, but in ways that challenge some pervasive assumptions about the integrity and importance of religious groups in politics.

The cultural prerequisites of democracy have been receiving considerable attention over the past decades. Confucian values are regarded as incompatible with liberal democracy and are considered to impede democratization. This article explores the effect of Confucian values on the commitment of ordinary Chinese people to democracy. Support for democracy is divided into attachment to democracy and adherence to liberal democratic values. Attachment to democracy indicates explicit support for democracy, while adherence to liberal democratic values reflects implicit support for democracy. This study examines the impacts of Confucian values on each of these areas. The results show that there was no evidence that Confucian values inhibit the Chinese public's support for democracy in a democratic transition, but they are negatively connected to liberal democratic values, which are fundamental to the resilience and consolidation of a fledgling democracy. However, liberal democratic values are prone to increase with the generational shift.

This article examines the determinants of trust in religious institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia — three countries with low levels of religiosity as measured by attendance, prayer and fasting, yet high levels of trust in religious institutions. The analysis employs individual-level survey data and uses ordinary least squares regression to show that while religious practices do not determine trust in religious institutions, the importance of religion in one's daily life is a strong indicator of trust in religious institutions in each country. The results also show some differences among these countries with regard to two types of control variables — trust in secular institutions and socioeconomic factors. In Georgia, interpersonal trust is a significant indicator of trust in religious institutions. Residence in the capital is only significant in Azerbaijan. Finally, both education and age are significant in Armenia. Additionally, two theories of trust in institutions are tested. First, a cultural theory of interpersonal trust proves ambiguous in the region. Second, the presence of both low religious practice and high trust in religious institutions in these countries challenges reformulated secularization theories that consider declining religious authority — measured by trust in religious institutions — as a form of secularization.

Bangladesh, one of the world's largest Muslim countries, is generally viewed as a success story with a strong tradition of secular democracy. Unfortunately, this assertion rests on a weak empirical foundation. Since becoming independent from Pakistan in 1971, democracy and secularism have been consistently undermined. Moreover, since 2000 Bangladesh has experienced more than 100 incidents of Islamist terrorism. More recently, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent have assaulted religious and ethnic minorities as well as secular and liberal activists. While these turns of events are alarming, Islamist militancy in Bangladesh remains understudied. In this article, we address this lacuna by undertaking regression analysis of recent Pew Research Center survey data to exposit the determinants of popular support of Islamist terrorism. With this study, we hope other scholars will be motivated to turn their attention to this increasingly important state.

Most of the research on the effects of direct democracy on minority rights is empirically limited to the direct effects of direct democracy. This article takes the issue a step further and examines both direct and indirect effects by investigating the rights of religious minorities in Switzerland. The analysis provides two main insights: all direct effects are negative and can be observed when the rights of out-groups like Islamic minorities are at stake. Second, indirect effects on the parliamentary process can be observed, too: parliaments make laws more restrictive toward Islamic minorities if they fear a popular vote. However, they develop strategies to enforce their liberal interests, as shown by the fact that extensions of the rights of religious minorities are passed in total revisions.

Efforts by anti-abortion advocates to introduce “personhood” initiatives, which state that human life begins at fertilization, have prompted concern among infertility specialists that these initiatives would hinder access to in vitro fertilization (IVF). Yet, our understanding of public opinion about IVF is limited. It remains unclear whether attitudes about this technology are consistent with opinions about other issues related to human embryos, particularly abortion and embryonic stem cell (ESC) research. Using data from a nationally representative survey, I fill this gap by exploring the role that religion plays in shaping attitudes about a range of embryonic politics issues. I find that religiosity, income, and ideology strongly influence whether individuals view these issues in moral terms. Respondents who are most devout and Evangelical Protestants are most likely to consistently oppose all three embryonic politics issues. Yet, the relationship between religion and attitudes about the morality of each procedure is also influenced by the procedure's outcome, with religion most influential with respect to abortion attitudes and least influential in the case of IVF. Additionally, women are less likely than men to describe IVF as morally wrong, while, in comparison to non-Hispanic whites, Latino respondents are more likely to do so.

Replication Data. Replication data is publicly available on the website of the Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life Project.

In the United States, Evangelical Protestants' political attitudes have been attributed to their conservative theological beliefs. As this religion's membership has increased around the world, other Evangelicals would logically be expected to demonstrate a similar conservatism in their political views. And yet, this anticipated result does not hold. In Brazil, for example, Evangelicals maintain moderate-to-liberal attitudes on several issues. To address this anomaly, this article relies on the Pew Forum's Multi-Country Religion Survey to examine the impact of religion on Evangelicals' ideology as well as attitudes on moral and economic issues in the United States and Brazil. While doctrinal orthodoxy predicts Evangelicals' moral conservatism, neither religious component examined significantly predicts Brazilian Evangelicals' ideology or economic attitudes. Significant differences in Brazilian and American attitudes on these dimensions in general suggest that the political environment plays a much larger role in whether — and how — religion influences these political attitudes.

How can we explain the neoliberal orientation of Islamist movements in the Middle East? This paper attempts to answer this question by exploring the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It analyzes in depth the Brotherhood's socio-economic vision and policies when it was in power between 2012 and 2013. It argues that the Brotherhood adopted a market-oriented vision, which encouraged the private sector, liberalized the economy, and appealed to foreign investments. As a socio-political movement, the Brotherhood attempted to strike a balance between its constituency, which is rooted in the lower, middle, and upper-middle classes, and its commitment to neoliberal policies. However, this paradoxical balance burdened the movement and affected its popularity. The article also contends that the Brotherhood's neoliberal leanings can be explained by three key factors: the movement's pragmatism, its “devout” bourgeoisie, and the appeal for international acceptance and recognition.

This study uses data from the Religion and State Round 2 dataset to examine the trends in religious discrimination and religious support between 1990 and 2008, finding a statistically significant increase in both variables. These findings are based on a longer time span and more comprehensive variables than previous studies, remain constant when controlling for world region and majority religion, and predate the events of September 11, 2001. This undermines the aspects of secularization theory which predict a decline in religion's public influence. Furthermore, economic development, one of the processes predicted by secularization theory decrease religion's public influence, is correlated with increased religious discrimination and support.

This article makes a case for the nexus between water resources and terrorism. Using Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad region, I question the conventional arguments linking religion to the root cause of terrorism. I argue that there is an economic dimension of Boko Haram terrorism, which is based on two interrelated indicators: the attack on the Nigerian oil exploration team in the Lake Chad basin, and the continuous exploitation of oil and gas by Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the region. Building on economic incentives and natural resources theoretical debates along with a historical enquiry into Boko Haram, the article concludes that economic interests, rather than religion, are partly the impetus to the activities of Boko Haram. The findings have significant implications for both the security of the Lake Chad region and counterterrorism at large.

The political liberalism of American Jews is puzzling because it contradicts the assumption that economic self-interest drives political behavior. Attempts to solve this puzzle with “Judaic” explanations compound the problem by offering theories that are static and universal while American Jewish political behavior is dynamic and situational. Using both historical and behavioral data, I argue that the solution to these puzzles is found in the overriding concern of American Jews with maintaining their equal citizenship in a society with a classic liberal regime of religion and state. This situational model also helps integrate work on Jewish political studies with theories and concepts commonly used by political scientists to explain mass political behavior.

Studies of religious violence have established that when states restrict religious freedom, the probability of religious violence increases. Conventional wisdom holds that religious violence is primarily a result of religious grievances. When religious groups are denied religious freedom, they seek to revise the status quo in their favor though the use of violence. This study challenges this narrative. It finds, rather than being caused only by grievances, religious violence is also fueled by moments of opportunity. Utilizing cross-national data for the years 2008 and 2001–2005, it is found that religious violence occurs most frequently in anocratic regimes marked by weak and decaying state institutions. Hence, the current narrative is incomplete. Studies analyzing religious violence need to consider how various regimes provide or stifle the opportunity for religious actors to engage in violence as well as how those regimes fuel religious violence through restricting religious freedom and increasing religious grievances.