Christian megachurches have been growing in members, organization, and financial resources in the large cities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and in Singapore. However, they remain as religious minorities facing an asymmetrical balance of political power due to the Islamization of politics, strong state secularism, or the close entanglement of the political elites with majority Catholicism. We propose a framework of minoritarian politics to understand the actions adopted by the churches to defend and advance their interests. While the scholarship on religion and politics tends to focus on churches' direct engagement with political elites and the mobilization of grassroots movements, we argue that the megachurches prefer to minister to the middle by forging outreach networks to accumulate social capital with a broad range of intermediaries. This is not just due to theological conservatism, but also because ministering to the middle has been the effective strategy given the political circumstances.

In 2005, the European Commission formally inaugurated a “structured dialogue” between European institutions and major faith traditions and non-confessional bodies in Europe. The provision for dialogue was envisaged ostensibly as a mechanism to include religious and non-confessional perspectives in the ongoing construction of the wider European project. The language of “dialogue,” consensus-seeking, and mutual learning dominates both religious and political justification for this formalized provision. Analysis considers emerging praxis in the intervening period (2005–2010) to determine the extent to which consensus-seeking has prevailed over the role of power and interests. Findings indicate that a number of elements relative to the configuration of dialogue praxis have severely inhibited the communicative potential of the provision enshrined in Article 17.

What is the nature of church–state relations in countries where politics is restrictive, religious autonomy is limited, and Christians tend to be viewed as existential threats by those in power? This article examines the highly securitized environment for Catholics and Protestants in China and the evolving government strategies used to regulate religious life. We argue that these efforts—ranging from channeling Christians into state-sponsored institutions, promoting patriotism in seminaries, and compelling churches to Sinicize—not only extends the reach of the party-state into Christian communities, but also puts the Party at the center of religious life. There are several implications from this analysis. One is that it documents how authoritarian regimes attempt to “domesticate” religion using multi-dimensional and long-term strategies of control. A second demonstrates how strong states, like China, seek to cultivate patriotic clergy and orient them favorably toward the regime. A third shows how Christians navigate restrictive environments.

European political parties, particularly radical right parties (RRPs), increasingly use religious symbols during elections. Despite the prevalence of these symbols, evidence on the association between religion and far-right vote share is mixed. We compare two leading arguments explaining the relationship between religion and RRPs. We hypothesize that the number of religious buildings, identifiable as Islamic or Catholic, will be associated with higher RRP support. We test this as a most likely crucial case using results from the French 2017 presidential election. Controlling for other demographic factors, more Catholic buildings in a commune are associated with a decrease in votes for the Front Nationale (FN). An increase in the number of mosques in non-urban communes is associated with increased support for FN. We argue these findings are evidence that RRPs use religious symbolism to draw on nativist or anti-Islamic support rather than traditional religious support.

In this article, we discuss the relation between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its jurisprudence and social mobilizations around the place of religion in the society. We focus on the struggles to define the intersection of religion and public education in Romania after the fall of communism. We show that secularist and counter-secularist civil society activists contending for the place of religion in public education in this country have made strategic use of the ECtHR and its case law, both in legal battles and in debates within the national public sphere. We argue that, since references to the ECtHR and its jurisprudence can be used in discursive battles as a form of symbolic “capital”, the strategies of mobilizing actors are at times more important than the strict doctrinal content of the ECtHR's judgments for understanding if and how the ECtHR's “shadow” is cast over religion-related mobilizations.

Recent political science literature notes that the relationship between religion and politics is not a one-way interaction: religion influences political beliefs and political beliefs influence religious practices. Most of these studies, however, have relied on aggregate or indirect methods of assessing individual-level religious decisions of where to attend worship services. This paper utilizes an original, nationally representative survey conducted through YouGov to directly ask about respondents' views on politics in church and how it influences their religious behaviors. We find that many respondents admit church shopping, both inside and outside of their denomination, and that politics influences their choice of congregation to attend. After examining the demographics of those who church shops for political reasons, we conclude by discussing the implications of religiopolitical sorting for tolerance and partisan reinforcement.

This article examines one aspect of current disagreements over immigration reform — Anglo-Saxon nativist rhetoric — through the lens of civil religion. It argues that the idea of America as a “New Jerusalem” can sometimes take on a nativist and even ethno-centric cast. The analysis uses two case studies to articulate the ways in which this nativism can play out in terms of civil religion: Patrick J. Buchanan's folding of immigration concerns into his culture wars rhetoric and some of the far-right rhetoric coming out of the 2016 presidential race in America. This sort of rhetoric can also be found surrounding President Obama's executive action on immigration. The analysis shows that these fears combine a view of American “chosenness” with a sense of existential threat generated by rapid demographic changes. However, while this rhetoric is grounded in civil religion, it is also a symptom of the corruption of the prophetic core of American civil religion.

In recent years, the welfare state literature has been witnessing a “religious turn,” (re)reminding us the pivotal role of religion in shaping the modern welfare state. Notwithstanding its theoretical importance, this turn has been largely confined to European, North American, and antipodean settings. By drawing upon the historical case of Israeli burial services, this study seeks to make a modest step in closing this theoretical and empirical gap. Specifically, its findings point to the historical role of the Judaism in establishing universal burial services, funded by the state and operated almost exclusively by religious burial societies. Moreover, this policy legacy, which already had its roots in the British Mandate rule, is still at work, even in an era of “permanent austerity.” These findings problematize mainstream historical observations, which view the Israeli welfare state as a secular project, by suggesting a more nuanced and progressive role for Judaism in its history.

A long line of research has established that Americans who subscribe to Christian nationalism have a preference for those inside their group and animosity toward those outside their group. These beliefs may impede the equal application of the rule of law, a link that has been suggested but not formally tested. Utilizing experimental data from a survey conducted in fall 2021, we assess the equal application of the rule of law for in and outgroup members conditional on Christian nationalism and belief in Christian persecution. We suggest that ingroup love may move distinctly from outgroup hate. Our results suggest that Christian nationalists have a preference for the ingroup, but do not automatically denigrate outgroups. However, belief in Christian persecution drives animosity toward outgroups, while not elevating the ingroup. Christian nationalist outgroup hatred must be triggered by threat, which has been the project of movement and party elites.

Understanding the social dynamics of public opposition to religious symbols is a pressing issue. This research finds that stereotypes of how committed group members are to the national community shape support for the right to wear religious symbols in various settings. These social perceptions are particularly influential in determining support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols. Drawing on data from a national survey experiment (N = 974) conducted in Canada, the results show Christians benefit from a particularly strong perceived commitment to the nation, while religious minorities are stereotyped as less committed and identified to the country than the average Canadian. As the perceived national commitment of religious minorities increases, however, the gap in support shown for the rights of Christians over religious minorities disappears and may lead to particularly strong support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols in public when perceptions of national commitment are high.

Using two national general population and one clergy survey, we examined racial differences in the association between religious theology and health care policy attitudes. We find that controlling for religious faith, political partisanship, and social-demographic characteristics, religious theology more strongly associates with White health care policy attitudes than it is for Blacks and Hispanics. Whereas theologically liberal Whites are more likely than their conservative counterparts to support universal healthcare and/or Obamacare, we observed no such relationship among Blacks and Hispanics. This is true of both the general population and clergy.

How do we measure religious violence? This study is focused on utilizing new methodological approaches and data sources to measure religiously motivated violence. Previous attempts to measure religious violence concentrated on coding U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom reports or utilizing existing datasets on armed conflict/civil wars. These previous attempts provided state-level data of the levels of religiously motivated violence, but due to data limitations cannot provide more fine-grained measures of specific acts of violence tied to religious motivation. In particular, accounting for varying levels of intensity especially in regards to non-lethal acts of religiously motivated violence is missing. This study builds upon previous attempts focusing on the creation of more fine-grained measures and accounting for its variation at the sub-national level utilizing natural language processing. The data generated are used to examine incidences of reported religious violence in India from 2000 to 2015.

The introductory paper of this symposium compares the impact of “political secular” governing regimes in the countries of both the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe. The overall objective is to assess the impact of political secularism in both regions, as a key component of inter-religious and cultural discord and contention with significant political ramifications. The concept of “political secularism,” a contentious term, often lacking in analytical clarity, is briefly assessed. That is, what does “political secularism” mean and what does it look like both within and across Europe and the MENA? Opinions differ from scholar to scholar. As there is no consensus regarding the meaning of the term “political secular,” a core contribution of this introduction is to examine what the term means analytically in the contexts of the MENA and Western Europe.

While the role of theology in Jefferson's political thought and its implications for how we should understand the role of “Nature's God” in grounding natural-rights republicanism are topics of ongoing scholarly interest, scholars have missed important continuities between Jefferson's natural-law theory and that of classical, theistic natural-law. Many scholars who have considered Jefferson in this light have emphasized Jefferson's discontinuity and even subversion of that tradition. In critical dialogue with this vein of scholarship, we argue that Jefferson espouses a creational metaphysics and a natural-law theory of morality that has surprising continuities with classical natural-law. We seek to shed new light on Jefferson's theory of the moral sense and his the earth belongs to the living principle, which we contend encapsulates his theistic understanding of equality and property.