Over the last decade, and throughout the Americas, evangelicals have strongly mobilized in defense of socially conservative agendas or against so-called “gender ideology,” sparking general and academic interest. Much less is known about progressive evangelicals. Using the unique juncture presented by the constitutional process in Chile, we study the politicization of a progressive evangelical identity and ask when these religious groups mobilize. We argue that intra-denominational competition for evangelical identity has played an important role in progressive evangelical mobilization, and more specifically the wish to differentiate themselves from conservative evangelicals, introduce a distance from the political right, and show the internal diversity of the community. This process occurs in response to an initial (conservative) politicization of religion. Drawing on campaign materials, surveys, and interviews, we provide evidence for this argument highlighting that policy preferences and theological interpretations are core differences among both groups, sparking countermobilization.

Political mobilizations for and against legal abortions are cyclical entities. Studies on people who joined pro-life movements in the peak of abortion protests (1980s) are relatively common but recent critical studies of right-to-life activists are almost non-existent. To address this lack of recent research, this work combines “political resource” theories and feminist scholarship to explain why certain people are involved in anti-abortion social movements. After analyzing data from the 2010–12 version of the American National Election Surveys (n = 3,860), this study concludes that pro-life activism was primarily driven by absolutist stances on abortion, the minimization of perceived sexism in society, being exposed to religious conversations about politics, and membership in explicitly political groups. The study also found that people's gender, social class, and educational levels failed to predict their pro-life political behaviors.

Since the 2005 Jyllands-Posten controversy, both far right and Islamist actors have employed Muhammed cartoons to construct a radical frontier between Muslims and non-Muslims. This article aims to provide a better understanding of the linkages between two opposing forms of popular identification by looking at the utilization of the Muhammed cartoons to crystallize a multitude of (conflicting) subjects, affects, and demands. Following a vantage point of mutual relations, the article investigates the discursive performances of the Dutch branch of the transnational Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir and the far right Party for Freedom with respect to the Jyllands-Posten affair, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, and the 2020 killing of a French schoolteacher. Considering its cultural and political foundations of mutual respect and tolerance, the Dutch case is pertinent for examining the tension between the right to free speech and support for extremist and popular forms of (far right and Islamist) identification.

We employ regression analysis of 2017 survey data from 4,067 Bangladeshis to exposit the lineaments of individual support for domestic Islamist violence. Our dependent variables derive from measures of public support for the stated goals and violent means of three Bangladeshi Islamist terrorist groups. Our study variables include participation in communal Friday prayer; indexed measures of other pietic practices; preferences for Shari'a and secularism; and gender. We include several well-established control variables. We find that participation in communal Friday prayers significantly correlates with diminished support for militant groups while having no effect upon support for their violent means. In four (of 10) models, we find that respondents who view Shari'a as being coterminous with scriptural literalism and harsh physical punishments are significantly more likely to support the groups' goals. Finally, we find women to be consistently more likely to support the goals and means of the militant groups.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, United States Muslims have been increasingly targeted as “others,” accused of holding dual-loyalties, and seen as potentially subversive. Nevertheless, Muslim American interest groups have not recoiled from foreign policy engagement. I argue that this is because mobilizing around symbolic foreign policy issues provides them with an opportunity to access the policy dialogue as a minority group making rights claims. To illustrate this argument, I conduct a discourse analysis of Muslim American policy engagement toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I rely on primary documents produced by the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the two leading United States Muslims organizations, as well as interviews conducted with institutional elites. I find that, through their policy advocacy, these organizations are framing their demands around United States interests and minority group rights, while positioning themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Muslim American community.

What is the appropriate place for religious argument in the public realm of a liberal-democratic polity? The primary competing positions have been a “liberal” account and a “revisionist” response arguing for a greater role for religious argument in liberal democracy than the liberal position is ordinarily understood to allow. Liberals and their revisionist critics disagree about whether restraints on religious arguments and justifications are justified and desirable. Jürgen Habermas has intervened in this debate with a provocative account of the place of religion in the public sphere. Habermas presents his account as an alternative to both the liberal and the revisionist perspectives, and purports to do justice to the legitimate claims of each without falling prey to the failings of either. This article critically analyzes Habermas's interesting proposal and argues that it does not succeed.

Jews and Jewish institutions have suffered the majority of reported religion-motivated hate crimes in the United States for nearly two decades. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 2014 the 609 reported anti-Semitic incidents made up 59% of all religious bias hate crimes alone. Rates of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes vary considerably over the course of a year. Yet, little scholarly attention has been given to what factors cause reported anti-Semitic hate crimes to fluctuate so substantially in the United States. This paper hypothesizes that violent Israeli military engagements are critical in explaining weekly surges of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes. Utilizing FBI hate crime data from 2001 to 2014 and fixed effects negative binomial regression models, consistent findings underscore that violent Israeli military engagements significantly increase the likelihood of a state reporting anti-Semitic hate crime. Most dramatically, their occurrence increases the likelihood of reported hate crime intimidating individuals or characterized as violent by nearly 35%. This paper underscores that homeland perpetrated violence can directly impact the security of diaspora communities.

The article examines the development of state-paid salaries for the clergy introduced by the Communists in Czechoslovakia from their institution in 1949 until they were removed in a major change of church-state relations in 2012. In the initial years of Communist rule, it appears that the salaries were part of a “carrot and stick” strategy aiming to subject churches to the state. Later, the real value of salaries steadily decreased, leaving priests marginalized in the economic structure. Following the collapse of the Communist regime, the salaries of the clergy were significantly increased; although, in subsequent years, they followed a trend similar to the pre-1989 period. The similarity in the development of salaries in the Communist and post-Communist period and the reluctance to restitute the church property after 1989 reflects the attitudes of the Czech population and the political representation toward organized religion and the transition from assertive to passive secularism.

What are the consequences of state support for, and official recognition of, one religion or religious institution over all others in the state? Previous studies have focused on the impact of a state's religion policies on overall religiosity in that state. In contrast, I argue that state support will have markedly different consequences for (1) the favored religious firm and (2) all other religious institutions. Similar to religious market theory, I expect that dependence on state support creates disincentives for the favored religious organization to attract adherents. However, I theorize that the weaknesses that state-backed favoritism engenders in the favored religion should create opportunities for other religious firms to compete and thrive. I conduct a multivariate quantitative analysis of changes in religious affiliation in 174 states between 1990 and 2010, controlling for factors like existential security, regime type, net migration, post-Communist background, and major religious traditions. My findings suggest that, consistent with my expectations, religious institutions that receive favorable treatment from the state lose ground relative to those that do not.

The recent Arab revolutions/rebellions/protests have raised once again an old question: what features should the Arab political systems ideally have? Inescapably, perhaps, the case of Turkey frequently appears as a model to be emulated in the Arab world. A variety of actors, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, from Rashid Ganouchi to Hillary Clinton has in fact viewed Turkey in that role. Even though, many intellectuals and academics usually raise doubts about the suitability of Turkish model for the Arab world (see, for example, Mamedov and Makarov 2011), it may still prove fruitful to consider the case of Turkey more seriously.

The relationship between religion and immigrant political participation has not been rigorously investigated in the literature set in Australia. In this study, I test whether religious attendance influences electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants. Drawing on data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, I demonstrate that the impact of religious attendance on political participation may be overstated. I find that religious attendance is not significantly related to electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants in Australia. This result may relate to three factors: the ability of religious attendance to affect immigrants’ key political resources; competition between religious and secular organizations; and the political salience of particular religious denominations within the Australian context. This study does not provide the much sought-after empirical confirmation to associational theories of political participation, but instead sounds a note of caution about the universal applicability of such theories.

As religiousness is declining across democracies, scientific interest in secular orientations and their political implications is growing. One specific and particularly important aspect of secular attitudes is political secularism. Political secularism is not merely the absence of religiousness, but rather a world view which holds that religious beliefs should play no role in politics. While there are hundreds of survey instruments that measure the strength and content of religiousness, there is no comparable measure that taps into political secularism. In this research note, I briefly review the concept of political secularism and present a cluster of items which target it. Utilizing data from four large population representative samples taken from the eastern and western states of Germany, I use confirmatory factor analysis to show that these items form a short but internally consistent scale. This scale also displays convergent and discriminant validity. It may be readily used in future surveys.

For the past century, the expansion of free speech rights has been the domain of liberals. Recently, however, conservatives have become advocates for expanded free speech rights. For Evangelicals Protestants, this advocacy would have been highly controversial only a generation ago, offending the base's ordered liberty sentiments. I suggest that abortion politics is a primary contributor to the evangelical free speech advocacy shift. Using a variety of data, I detail the evangelical shift toward expanded free speech by exploring the topics of radical protest, campaign finance, and obscenity. While rank-and-file evangelicals are less supportive of free speech than the general-public, elites have routinely used abortion politics to frame the shift toward individual free speech rights. Elites have diverged from their constituents to support a higher-priority issue (abortion), and the constituents have been supportive. Abortion politics has come to dominate evangelical advocacy decisions and has cultivated an evangelical rights culture.

Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically communitarian and politically illiberal, since individuals are seen as embedded within a larger community that places a premium on social order. Yet most studies have ignored the potential of Islam as an ideological platform for political reformers. Religion in general and Islam in particular has mostly been treated as a predictor rather than a derivative of political-economic preferences. This article suggests that, in the absence of credible secular political ideologies and representative political mechanisms, reformist-minded individuals are likely to use religion as a political platform for change. When Muslims are a minority in a repressive non-Muslim society, Islamic orthodoxy can serve as a political platform for politically and economically liberal forces. We test these conjectures with original micro-level data from the Russian North Caucasus and find strong support for them.

Since Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), federal and state religious freedom restoration acts now extend the right to free exercise of religion to businesses. But what does it mean for businesses to have such a right? In this paper, I identify three implications of these new rights: they shift the burden for fulfilling the right to private citizens, and they conflict with businesses’ both commercial and democratic obligations. To illustrate how they become problematic, I draw on the case of In re Wathen (2015) where the owners of a bed and breakfast cited their business's religion as their reason for refusing to host a wedding reception for a same-sex couple, even though state law specifically prohibited commercial businesses from discriminating based on sexual orientation.

The political practice of consociational democracies to take religion off the political agenda has led to the idea that religious issues only play a marginal role in the left-right ideological framework. This study demonstrates that religion has more than a marginal effect on the left-right placement of parties and thus on the space of competition. The analysis shows that voters for secular parties and voters for religious parties have different motives and beliefs on which they base the orderings of parties on the left-right scale. In other words, each group of voters defines its own left-right scale. These different left-right scales are individually single-peaked but there is no collective transitivity of orderings of parties. The intransitivity is a clear violation of Downs' condition for placing all parties on a single line in a manner agreed upon by all voters. Instead of having one left-right dimension as some sort of “super issue,” there are at least two left-right scales, one for voters for secular parties and one for voters for religious parties.

This article argues that a new form of religious freedom is emerging within the contentious field of United States politics today. Despite the commitment to separating church and state that is characteristic of American secularism, implementation of the new religious freedom appears likely to contribute to processes that are actively reshaping religious and political landscapes. Recent US Supreme Court cases such as Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. present clear examples and this article uses the former case to bring the dynamics of the new religious freedom to light. The push for religious freedom in contemporary United States law and politics should be assessed in terms of its transformative consequences in both “religious” and “political” spheres. These consequences include refashioning religious communities as increasingly hierarchical and isolated enclaves, undermining the rights and freedoms of citizens, and further fracturing the public sphere.

Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from literate merchants, government officials, and professionals who lacked political representation. We test these claims with a unique tranche of microlevel data drawn from a Muslim Brotherhood petition campaign in interwar Egypt. Matching the occupations of over 2,500 Brotherhood supporters to contemporaneous census data, we show that Egyptians employed in commerce, public administration, and the professions were more likely to sign the movement's petitions. The movement's supporters were also overwhelmingly literate. Contrary to expectations, the early Brotherhood also attracted support from Egyptians employed in agriculture, albeit less than we would expect given the prevalence of agrarian workers in the population. A case study tracing Muslim Brotherhood branch formation and petition activism in a Nile Delta village illustrates how literate, socially mobile agrarian families were key to the propagation of the movement in rural areas.