In the context of declining relative output and productivity there have been increasing calls for the American government to play a greater role in industrial policy in recent years. Traditionally, however, US government intervention has been ad hoc and reactive rather than planned and strategic. Regulation policy has rarely been linked to economic growth, and most recently has evolved in a policy context separate from and largely antagonistic to business. Direct and indirect government aid is largely a result of the lobbying activities of diverse economic interests operating in an open but fragmented policy system. Of the various industrial policy options open to federal governments only one, facilitative or positive adjustment policy, is politically and ideologically possible. Even this, however, will be difficult to implement in a pluralistic and fragmented political system.

Ambiguity – the capacity to have multiple meanings – is endemic to politics. Ambiguity creates political opportunities, structures debates and provides leeway for political entrepreneurs to advance their interests. I use the 2012 passage and 2014 rollback of reforms to the National Flood Insurance Program to show how ambiguity enables political entrepreneurship. In this puzzling case, Congress enacted and rolled back changes that threatened to impose politically unpalatable costs. Using semi-structured interviews and congressional testimony, I show how political entrepreneurs engaged with ambiguity in the buildup to the reforms’ passage. They used information strategically to interpret problems, solutions, rules, and goals; shape legislators’ perceptions of the reforms’ political implications; and adapt their arguments to the policy windows that opened. The case shows that ambiguity facilitates policy reform, but the direction of change depends on the priorities that are salient when a policy window opens and on the interests of political entrepreneurs.

Research into the detection of fraud and corruption has brought many new insights in recent decades, partly thanks to a decrease in the costs of data collection and processing. However, access to data often remains an issue, especially when fraud or corruption seems to be present. This article applies a simple detection method focussing on possible manipulations in the car registration process in the Czech Republic, where car registration plates are allegedly assigned in random order. As access to official data was denied, we collected data in the field for a random sample of 5,000 cars, and used this to examine the existence of statistical relationships between the cars’ estimated price at registration and their registration plate numbers. The results show that cars with intuitively appealing registration plates are on average significantly more expensive than other cars. Moreover, this price difference corresponds to the relative scarcity of the given type of registration plate number, which could be a sign of discretionary behaviour in the allocation of such plates.

The paper considers the size and the implications of the errors made by the British Treasury in forecasting the budget over the period 1951–84. On average the Treasury underestimated the public sector fiscal deficit by 0.5 per cent of GDP; this is about half the average amount by which Chancellors attempted to change aggregate demand by means of their budgets. The general pattern was for tax revenue to be under-predicted, but for public expenditure to be under-predicted by even more. The government's fiscal deficit and thus the reflationary effect of government policy was therefore greater than the Treasury intended.

A decomposition exercise carried out on the Treasury's own model for the fiscal year 1980/81 suggests that only about half of this error is due to errors in the specification of the model; the other half is due to errors in data estimation and in forecasting exogenous variables. Hence, the scope for improving forecasts by improvements to the model is limited. The paper considers three alternative methods by which forecasts could be improved: the application of realisation functions relating forecast to actual values; more frequent budgeting; and an attempt to derive more tax revenue from those categories (such as excise duties on alcohol, petrol and tobacco) whose yield is easiest to predict.

Drawing primarily from the Turkish example, this essay examines the fit of the input-output policy model, widely used in West, to less developed countries (LDCs). Three hypotheses are explored. In LDCs, compared to the West: (1) Policy patterns are more subject to political penetration; (2) once implemented, policies have a higher probability of penetrating social conditions; and (3) implementation structures and practices are less penetrable by policy directives.

The major bottleneck to innovative policy formation and delivery in LDCs is the implementation process. Bureaucratic resistance and hesitancy to innovate are due to a control rather than service orientation, stemming from the peculiar sequencing of development of state apparatuses vis-a-vis the marketplace. These historical-institutional peculiarities do not appear to detract from the input-output model's ability to spot targets of opportunity for useful policy inquiry in LDCs.

Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a holdover official is important as it can determine whether a board is functional or inoperable. In this article, we examine how the presence of holdover provisions within such commissions alters confirmation dynamics and vacancy rates. Evidence suggests that holdover provisions lead to quicker confirmation on nominations as well as fewer complete vacancies. Such structures thus help mitigate the short-term problems stemming from staffing independent regulatory boards, especially given the tendency towards obstruction in the US Senate.

In the literature on the role of agency in the policy process, relatively little attention has been devoted to how agents define policy problems. This article helps to address this gap by asking when and how policy entrepreneurs are successful in defining problems. The article rests on a framework that shows how policy entrepreneurs holding specific ideas and given a propitious socioeconomic context are able to define problems, translate those problems into new frames, and draw on those frames, while using their personal skills and political and institutional resources, to help build supportive coalitions in favor of policy change. Illustrated by a puzzling case in the field of European mobility policy, the article offers a new perspective on the role of ideas at the problem definition stage of the policy process, while providing a richer understanding of the policy entrepreneur as a driver of policy change.

Inflation targeting is the monetary strategy of all EU member states; whether in the euro area, the two euro-outs, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The latter are now faced with two alternatives to achieve price stability: either remain outside the euro area or join it as full-fledged members. This paper examines this policy choice starting from the views of Knut Wicksell, who considered it in his 1920s analysis of an international monetary system based on price level targeting. Price stability could be achieved either within every country by maintaining flexible exchange rates or jointly on a global scale through a system of fixed exchange rates, that is through a monetary union. To him this was a choice between two ‘evils’: fluctuating price levels in the member states of a global monetary union while the average price level is maintained constant versus fluctuating exchange rates in the absence of a monetary union. To Wicksell, the choice of the proper route towards price stability was less complicated than today because he analysed it solely in monetary terms. The current choice for Sweden and the United Kingdom involves other crucial dimensions, such as the existence of nominal rigidities, and the politics of domestically issued money. Political aspects concerning the euro will be the ultimate determinants of the future monetary path for both countries.

An important issue in the discussion of fiscal policy is the contention that the public sector could expand only at the expense of the private sector, which must contract to provide the necessary room. This paper is concerned with ‘financial’ crowding out, which relates to the financing of public expenditure, rather than resource crowding out, which relates to the size of public expenditure. The paper attempts to determine empirically, using the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) macroeconomic model of the UK economy, whether fiscal actions under different modes of finance affect some strategic economic variables. The paper utilises techniques of optimal control, which are considered superior to simulation. The main conclusion of the paper is that there is no significant crowding out in the NIESR model; it is, nevertheless, important to distinguish between money-financed and bond-financed increases in government expenditure.

Studies of multi-level blame avoidance strategies generally assume that (1) governments prefer to shift responsibility to other levels and (2) an unclear distribution of formal responsibilities complicates blame allocation to a single actor. Considering the temporal location of such strategies – in anticipation or as a reaction to adverse events – the article tests these assumptions. Drawing on the case of air quality policy in Mexico City, the article uses causal process tracing to develop the mechanism leading to an anticipatory strategy and its unfolding. If the distribution of responsibilities on connected policy instruments is clear and major political actors share power, then government levels from different parties engage in a joint anticipatory strategy to avoid crisis and keep stability. The mechanism breakdown leads to reactive behaviour and policy change. Contextual changes redistributing power can destabilise the arrangements, leading to reactive blame games, fostering policy change.

Strong climate policy is vital to tackling climate change, but even the best proposals can get watered down when lobbying occurs. This article analyses which interest groups lobby on EU climate policies and under which conditions these groups achieve their policy goals. We expect that both economic and political resources are important. Economic resources give groups the capacity to mobilise expertise, but an interest group’s success also depends on its congruence with public opinion, especially in a politicised area such as EU climate policy. To test our hypotheses, we focus on six EU climate policy issues for which we conducted expert surveys with lobbyists and a content analysis of 737 media statements in eight European news outlets, combined with Eurobarometer data. Our results show that interest groups with higher economic resources and with public opinion on their side are more likely to achieve their preferences on EU climate policy issues.

Although the amount of policy-relevant academic research has grown in recent years, studies still find that policy practitioners seldom employ such research in their decisionmaking. This study considers potential methods for increasing government officials’ use of academic studies (impact evidence). We investigate how administrative accountability mechanisms as suggested by principal-agent approaches – screening, monitoring, autonomy and sanctions – correlate with practitioner engagement with impact evidence. Original survey data from 300 government officials in two developing countries, Peru and India, suggest that all four mechanisms are correlated with self-reported interest in or use of impact evidence. When we measured the actual use of such evidence on a website we created to facilitate that outcome; however, we found that only sanctions (income) correlate with actual use. These findings highlight the potential of administrative accountability to increase bureaucrats’ use of impact evidence but also warn of possible limitations.

The dramatic overseas expansion of Japanese banks during the 1980s provoked major policy debates within the European Community. Fears that Japanese firms in the banking industry might replicate earlier successes in other industries, together with charges that Japan did not grant reciprocal access to European banks, raised important questions for EC member states committed to the implementation of common banking policies. Adoption of the crucially important Second Banking Coordination Directive and other public measures enabled the Community flexibly to impose strong controls on Japanese banks in the region. The nature of these public measures toward Japanese firms in the Community's banking industry, together with related EC policies toward local Japanese competition in other industries, suggested the emergence of a more general EC policy model for confronting the vaunted ‘Japanese challenge.’