In the Journal for May 1980, Adlard Coles, author of Heavy Weather Sailingand an Institute Gold Medallist, gave an account of his own investigation into the weather situation which decimated the ocean racing fleet during the Fastnet Race of 1979. Neither the formal report of the Fastnet Race inquiry nor the official meteorological analysis seemed entirely to explain what had happened. Alan Watts, a meteorologist particularly concerned with small craft navigation, from his own analysis of meteorological factors, including the barometric readings of many of the competitors, here suggests an explanation for the particular violence of the seas which was responsible for most of the damage.

To fulfill any specific task a certain navigation accuracy is in general required. If this requirement can be achieved by different systems the cost effectiveness will be decisive. Apart from missions which allow large position errors, medium or high navigation accuracies will normally be desired, obtained either by high technological standards or by an unsophisticated system with an updating procedure. The cost of highly sophisticated systems increases exponentially with increasing accuracy, so that our object was to find an appropriate updating system.

Inadequate human actions are still the main cause of all reported accidents and incidents on board ships. The aim of this study is to explore the influence of safety resource activities and other exploratory variables on seafarers’ safety behaviour. For this study, a series of open-ended interviews were conducted to gain insight into how shipping organisations struggle with this issue. Following the interviews, a questionnaire was prepared and distributed to professional seafarers. Two exploratory factor analyses were conducted to identify the underlying factor structure and five factors emerged. Furthermore, three hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the influence of the factors obtained, namely, Company safety orientation and Additional safety incentives on seafarers’ perceived Safety awareness, Job satisfaction, Risk acceptance and other exploratory variables. The study shows that the perceived resource-related activities of the organisation and the demographic characteristics of the respondents can influence the safety behaviour of seafarers.

D. H. Lewis, in his article ‘Ara Moana: Stars of the Sea Road’ in the July 1964 issue of the Journal of the Institute of Navigation (pp. 278–88), speculates on how the Polynesians could have navigated to known distant destinations, but does not explain how the knowledge of die distant destinations on which he relies for his theories was gained by the supposed navigators. Before anybody can navigate to somewhere, someone must first have gone there and come back. Lewis does not tell us how the Polynesians gained their knowledge of the existence, location and size of New Zealand and Hawaii, and of the currents on these courses, on their outward voyages of discovery, and then used this knowledge to get home again. His statement that ‘it seems probable that the Polynesians steered by horizon stars until the zenith star showed that they had reached the right latitude, and then turned east or west’, obviously has no application to voyages of discovery which by definition were made without prior knowledge of the existence, latitude or size of the objectives. The alternative supposition that the discoverers were able to keep account of their courses from bearings on stars which were reputedly aligned with the destinations and the home islands overlooks the fact that such star bearings gave no clue whatever to longitudinal displacement. There was no practicable method whereby the discoverers could have known the longitudinal relationships of their discoveries and their home islands.

In his detailed and valuable account of the history of the Log (this Journal, 9, 70) Commander Waters is surely at fault as regards the part he ascribes to the Gresham Professor, Gunter. This eminent mathematician delighted in designing instruments with engraved scales, and at first issued the customary Description and Use in Latin, a sufficient indication that he wrote only for fellow scholars. Importuned probably by the instrument-makers, he later published English versions of the tracts (in 1623), and among the numerous ‘uses’ included a couple of chapters on those for navigational purposes.

Acoustic transponders are employed in underwater navigation in situations in which a high degree of accuracy is required. Typical applications include underwater search, mapping, photography by a submersible or a towed vehicle and positioning of underwater work systems. The network of transponders, of which there may be only two or three, or which may be very extensive, is implanted by a support ship or by a submersible. The network can be located geographically by a satellite navigation equipment to an accuracy of 0·25 nm. This accuracy (or even accuracy within ± 1 mile) is sufficient to locate the network after a period of disuse. Acoustic navigation of a vehicle is accomplished relative to the network, to accuracies of the order of several feet.

At 2215 hours GMT on 21 September 1947 the U.S.A.A.F. All-Weather Flying Centre's Automatic C54 took off automatically from Stephenville, Newfoundland, and twelve hours and five minutes later landed at Brize Norton, England. Neither pilot nor navigator had interfered with the automatic equipment during the entire flight. What, briefly, is the navigation equipment and procedure employed on such a flight?

Equipment. The navigation equipment consists of three magnetic heading selectors, two air log units or AMUS and a radio compass which will automatically switch to a number of preselected frequencies.

British Airways was recently granted permission for its fleet of Boeing 747-400 and 767 aircraft to operate using automatic landing systems in Category IIIB conditions; that is, decision height lower than 50 ft and a runway visual range of less than 200 m. This development might lead some people to think that the weather is no longer a significant factor in aviation operations. However, while these developments are taking place one sees reports such as ‘departure delays are still on the increase’; ‘poor weather slowed airport operations’; ‘BA flight from Singapore delayed by strong winds was five minutes from declaring an emergency’; ‘heavy rain might reduce wing lift when an airliner most needs it’. These reports confirm the realistic state of affairs that the weather, despite the introduction of modern avionics on board the aircraft, and automated instrumentation on the ground assisting aerodrome operations, is still a vital part of aircraft operations decision-making, affecting the safety and efficiency of flying.

Europe is moving towards a more closely integrated air traffic management system through the European ATC Harmonization and Integration Programme (EATCHIP). This paper explains the need for such an approach and how it was brought about by capacity limitations in the current European air traffic system. It describes the key strategy of progressive harmonization and integration by the various States, examines the roles of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), EUROCONTROL and the European Commission in the management of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) development programmes. It also reviews the longer-term planning of a future system with an enhanced relationship between the air and the ground, and addresses the navigation aspects of ATM systems.

The problem of collision avoidance at sea would be an important one even if accidents were rare, but the evidence suggests that they are much more common than one might expect. In the eight years leading up to May 1963 there were 60 collisions in the English Channel area and in the following eight years the number increased to 94. With the development of navigational aids such as radar one might have hoped for a decrease. The suggestion that the increase is quite likely attributable to the possession of radar is ironic indeed. It would appear that having the use of this ‘safety’ equipment allows the mariner to take greater risks, but that the risks which are in fact taken are greater than the equipment allows. We would do better to go back to fog horns alone. Even if over-confidence is not the only factor responsible for the increase in accidents, it does, nevertheless, illustrate the importance of the psychological variable in any man–machine system.

Collisions at sea, however, are not simply due to errors in a man–machine system, It is, of course, the hardware that actually collides, but the cause of the interaction lies in the decisions and indecisions of the two human agents controlling the vessels. It is essentially a social encounter. It is for this reason that the work initiated by Captain Kemp is greatly to be welcomed.

During the last few years much has been learned about the navigational developments and techniques of the English pioneers of colonization in the New World. This has been made possible in some measure by the formation in America of a private library of the books relating to the art of navigation as practised by the Elizabethan and early Stuart seamen. It was in the course of forming his remarkable collection of early Americana that Mr. Henry C. Taylor of New York, purchased copies of Captain John Smith's An Accidence or The Pathway to Experience. Necessary for all Young Sea-men, or those that are desirous to goe to Sea … first published in London in 1626, and A Sea Grammar, with The Plaine Exposition of Smiths Accidence for Young Sea-men, enlarged … first published in London in 1627, subsequent editions of this latter work being entitled The Sea-mans Grammar, etc.

The United States Maritime Administration recently published the results of a study, undertaken by the Norden Division of the United Aircraft Corporation, on automation and the operation of merchant ships. Mr. Clayton, the author of this important report, described the findings of this investigation, in so far as they affect navigation, to an Institute Meeting held in London on 16 November 1962. The paper, which is presented here, was written in association with Mr. Kurz of the U.S. Maritime Administration. It describes navigation systems for partially and fully automated vessels, and discusses the basic system requirements, accuracy and reliability criteria. A command philosophy for automated ships is developed, and finally a marine course computer, which is the first component of a partially automated navigating system already manufactured, is described. This is the first of several equipments being manufactured under contract to the Maritime Administration.

In early 1959 United Aircraft Corporation, led by its Norden Division as systems manager, undertook a company-sponsored study of the technical feasibility of operating merchant ships automatically. The results of this study were circulated throughout the industry. In April 1960 the Maritime Administration awarded a contract to Norden to study the economic and technical feasibility of automating merchant ships. The principal objective of the study was to develop a consistent series of planned, orderly, and reasonable steps towards completely automatic ship operation. The technical feasibility and economic advantage for each significant advance would be thoroughly established and then presented in a form suitable for selective application according to the particular requirements of individual ship operators.

For more than a century and a quarter ships' crews of the world's voluntary observing fleet have made meteorological and surface current observations. Those observations recorded in the ships' logbooks are the backbone of the Marine Archive now held in the Meteorological Office, Bracknell, UK. Much use is made of computer processing for providing suitable statistical data which form the basis of maps and current roses. This article outlines the method of processing used in the Netherlands, illustrating various situations the observer at sea may encounter. The supposition that the use of modern navigation equipment could hamper the making of current observations is discussed, and situations that could cause the reduction of accuracy and reliability of current mean values are mentioned. In essence: how reliable are surface current observations from ships collected in the past few years, and particularly those that will be collected in the years to come?

1. INTRODUCTION. The North Atlantic air traffic system is the busiest and most important long-range system in operation today with a current total of 127 000 flights“annum. The combined effects of the total flight time and the difference in time zones on either side of the Atlantic makes it desirable for most passengers to fly westward in the day-time. Conversely, it is most convenient (or least inconvenient!) to fly eastbound during the hours of darkness. Thus the Atlantic traffic system is strongly tidal with the flow predominantly (though not entirely) westbound during the day and eastbound overnight. Currently the central core of the traffic in the busiest hours is organised into a parallel track structure – the Organized Track Structure (OTS), though nearly half the aircraft operate so-called random routes clear of the OTS.

A great deal has been written, especially in the last few years, on the subject of collision at sea. The increase, however, in the speed of ships and in the density of traffic so magnifies the complexity of the problem that even closer and more earnest study is still called for. Three fields of inquiry demand our attention: technical advances, procedure, and the human factor. Of these, the widest and most promising might seem to be the first. Its importance is undeniable, and I am by no means the only one to have pointed out that with the new difficulties it raises it supplies also the appropriate solution. Even wider, however, and more complex is the field of human study; this covers both the others, for in this the final objective is to enable men to master what they have won for themselves, and this they cannot do—here we meet the familiar problems of philosophy, ethics and religion—unless they first learn to master themselves.

Compared with these two fields, the technical and the human, that of procedure must at first seem quite insignificant. Can one seriously imagine that there is in fact some new method of avoiding collisions, so abstruse that no one has yet been able to discover it? In my small book on the use of radar I wrote: ‘The Regulations envisage two ways of avoiding collision:

1. A movement carried out in concert with the other vessel.

2. A reduction of speed, if necessary to zero.

When the Society for Nautical Research was founded in 1910, one of its objects was to work for the foundation of a National Maritime Museum. To many this must have seemed an unattainable star on which to focus their hopes, especially when a few years later the First World War broke out. However, fortune changed, and in 1928 the great Macpherson Collection of maritime prints and drawings came on the market. A fund was started to purchase it for the nation, but Sir James Caird, a wealthy shipowner, stepped in and bought the entire collection. Matters now really began to move. The Admiralty was anxious for more space in the Royal Naval College at Greenwich and this could only be obtained by removing the Royal Naval Museum, which had been transferred from Somerset House, and the Greenwich Hospital collection of paintings, which had been started in the Painted Hall in 1824. A new home was needed for these and for the Macpherson Collection, and then in 1933 the Greenwich Hospital School was moved to Holbrook, and the great range of buildings just across the road from the Royal Naval College became available. In the next year the National Maritime Museum was established by Act of Parliament and the conversion of the buildings was begun; but already fresh acquisitions had begun to come in. Sir James Caird bought such treasures as came on the market and, capably advised by the distinguished naval historian, Sir Geoffrey Callender, who was to become the first director of the museum, laid the foundations of a collection which has become the envy and admiration of maritime nations.

Most collisions on inland waterways occur in daylight and in good visibility and it is here there is most scope for improvement. Elaborate traffic control schemes such as that planned for the Panama Canal may not be suitable on European rivers where the density of shipping is very high and the nature of the traffic mixed. Local control may be feasible, but between control areas vessels will have to rely on self-contained aids, ship-to-ship communications and local navigational rules to avoid collision. The congestion of traffic, particularly at Customs clearance points, must be relieved.

The paper discusses various aids to river-radar navigation, which are making fundamental changes in the methods on European inland waters.

It would be interesting and profitable to look back to see how closely the applications of science to the sea had followed its developments and technical achievements ashore. In contrast to the wealth of literature on the classical geography of the oceans and the achievements of the early voyagers there is no balanced account of the scientific investigation. Such an account would include the work of men like Boyle, who, in his observations and experiments about the saltness of the sea (1672), gave the first satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon, and showed th at it would be necessary to make a great number of observations in different climates and different parts of the world to determine the degrees of saltness with any certainty. He arranged for travellers to collect samples for him. Lavoisier (1772) and Bergman (1777) analysed samples of sea water and named the principal dissolved salts. In 1812, Alexander Marcet, a London physician, made the remarkable discovery that although the total amount of salt varied from place to place according to the balance of evaporation and precipitation, the principal constituents were always present in the same proportions. Although this was almost a premonition based on the analysis of not more than fourteen samples from different parts of the Atlantic Ocean, it has stood the test of time.