This paper examines how firm characteristics, legal rules, and financial development affect corporate finance decisions. In contrast to the existing literature, I use data on unlisted companies to show that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems. In particular, I find that in countries with good creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. The protection of creditor rights is also important for ensuring access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less developed. Unlisted firms appear more indebted than listed companies even after controlling for firm characteristics such as profitability, size, and the ability to provide collateral. Finally, institutions that favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement not only are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.

This paper examines the pricing of exchange rate risk in the U.S. stock market, using two factor and multi-factor arbitrage pricing models. Evidence is presented that the relation between stock returns and the value of the dollar differs systematically across industries. The empirical results, however, do not suggest that exchange risk is priced in the stock market. The unconditional risk premium attached to foreign currency exposure appears to be small and never significant. As a result, active hedging policies by financial managers cannot affect the cost of capital, and other reasons must explain why firms decide to hedge.

We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. This finding is robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital measure and incremental to the effects of religiosity, corporate social responsibility, and tax avoidance. We identify the causal relation using companies with a social-capital-changing headquarters relocation. We also find that high-social-capital firms face loosened nonprice loan terms, incur lower at-issue bond spreads, and prefer public bonds over bank loans. We conclude that debt holders perceive social capital as providing environmental pressure that constrains opportunistic firm behaviors in debt contracting.

This paper investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm value across a sample of 5,284 firm years of China's partially privatized former state–owned enterprises (SOE) from 1991–2001. We find that state and institutional shares are significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q, and that significant convex relations exist between Q and state shares, as well as between Q and institutional shares. We also find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to Tobin's Q. We test for potential endogeneity of ownership, and find that Q and state/foreign ownership are not jointly determined. We also test for time-series, industry, and geo-economic location effects, and find our results to be robust.

This study assesses trade execution costs and market quality for NYSE and Nasdaq stocks before and after the 2001 change to decimal pricing. Several theoretical predictions are confirmed. Quoted bid-ask spreads declined substantially on each market, with the largest declines for heavily traded stocks. The percentage of shares receiving price improvement increased on the NYSE, but not on Nasdaq. However, those trades completed at prices within or outside the quotes were improved or disimproved by smaller amounts after decimalization, and trades completed outside the quotes saw the largest reductions in trade execution costs, as a class. Effective bid-ask spreads as a percentage of share price, arguably the most relevant measure of execution costs for smaller trades, averaged 0.33% on a volume-weighted basis after decimalization for both NYSE and Nasdaq stocks. There is no evidence of systematic intraday reversals of quote changes on either market, as would be expected if decimalization had damaged liquidity supply.

Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s.

Since hedge funds specify significant lock-up periods, we investigate persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi-period framework in which the likelihood of observing persistence by chance is lower than in the traditional two-period framework. Under the null hypothesis of no manager skill (no persistence), the theoretical distribution of observing wins or losses follows a binormial distribution. We test this hypothesis using the traditional two-period framework and compare the findings with the results obtained using our multi-period framework. We examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals by using quarterly, half-yearly and yearly returns. We find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon indicating that presistence among hedge fund managers is short term in nature.

The convertible bond is a hybrid security which, while retaining most of the characteristics of straight debt, offers, in addition, the upside potential associated with theunderlying common stock. As a quid pro quo for the upside potential the convertible bond is typically subordinated to other corporate debt and carries a lower coupon rate than would an otherwise equivalent straight bond.

This paper studies the efficacy of pension fund activism by examining all firms targeted by nine major funds from 1987 to 1993. I document a movement away from takeover-related proxy proposal targetings in the late 1980s to governance-related proxy proposal and nonproxy proposal targetings in the 1990s. For the vast majority of firms, there are no significant abnormal returns at the time of targeting. The subset of firms subject to nonproxy proposal targeting, however, experiences a significant positive wealth effect. There is no evidence of significant long-term improvement in either stock price or accounting measures of performance in the post-targeting period. Collectively, these results cast doubt on the effectiveness of pension fund activism as a substitute for an active market for corporate control.

We examine the extent to which offer prices reflect public information for 3,325 IPOs over the period 1990–1999. We focus primarily on four variables: share overhang, file range amendments, venture capital backing, and previous issue underpricing. We show that 35%–50% of the variation in IPO underpricing can be predicted using public information known before the offer date and therefore conclude that IPO offer prices underadjust to widely available public information to a much greater extent than previously documented.

This study develops and empirically tests a number of methods of analyzing financial ratios to predict small business failure. Although not all of the methods and ratios are predictors of failure, many ratio variables are found which do predict failure of Small Business Administration borrowers and guarantee recipients. Using step-wise multiple discriminant analysis with a restriction on the simple correlation of the entering variable with the included variables, a function of independent ratio variables, which is highly accurate in classifying borrowers in the test sample, is developed. Methods of analysis found useful are (1) classification of a borrower's ratio into quartiles relative to other borrowers in the sample, (2) observation of an up- or down-trend for a three-year period, (3) combinatorial analysis of a ratio's trend and recent level, (A) calculation of the three-year average, and (5) division of a ratio by its respective RMA industry average ratio. The discriminant function demonstrates an ability as great as those functions recently estimated for much larger firms. However, the small business function fails to discriminate when only one statement is available, whereas Altman [1] and Beaver [4, 5] show that one financial statement is sufficient for a highly discriminant function for large businesses. This leads the author to qualify his conclusion above with the provision that at least three consecutive financial statements be available for analysis of a small business.

The capital asset pricing model postulates that the equilibrium return on any risky security is equal to the sum of the risk-free rate of return and a risk premium measured by the product of the market price of risk and the security's systematic risk. In the capital asset pricing model, beta as an index of systematic risk is the only security-specific parameter that affects the equilibrium return on a risky security.

This paper examines the relation between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. Using data on corporate lobbying expenses between 1998 and 2004, and a sample of large frauds detected during the same period, we find that firms’ lobbying activities make a significant difference in fraud detection: Compared to nonlobbying firms, on average, firms that lobby have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators. In addition, fraudulent firms on average spend 77% more on lobbying than nonfraudulent firms, and they spend 29% more on lobbying during their fraudulent periods than during nonfraudulent periods. The delay in detection leads to a greater distortion in resource allocation during fraudulent periods. It also allows managers to sell more of their shares.

In the last several years, there has been increased theoretical emphasis on the agent-principal problem as it applies to corporate finance. This paper is an attempt to empirically test for the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of corporations. We find that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower insider ownership, which may be explained by the agency costs of debt and/or the agency costs of equity. Other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal relationships put forth by Myers. We find that high-growth firms use less debt rather than more debt, high-operating-risk firms use more debt rather than less debt, and firm size appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt.

Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.

We investigate the empirical relation between corporate governance and stock market liquidity. We find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading. In addition, we show that changes in our liquidity measures are significantly related to changes in the governance index over time. These results suggest that firms may alleviate information-based trading and improve stock market liquidity by adopting corporate governance standards that mitigate informational asymmetries. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, across exchanges, and to different measures of liquidity.

This paper examines the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments. We attempt to distinguish between two competing hypotheses: the “active monitoring hypothesis” and the “passive voting hypothesis.” We find a statistically significant positive relation between institutional ownership and the stockholder wealth effects of various types of amendments, after controlling for ownership concentration among institutions, managerial ownership, and firm size. Our empirical evidence lends support to the “active monitoring hypothesis” proposed by Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that the existence of large shareholders leads to better monitoring of managers.

Analysis of a worldwide sample of sudden deaths of politicians reveals a market-adjusted 1.7% decline in the value of companies headquartered in the politician's hometown. The decline in value is followed by a drop in the rate of growth in sales and access to credit. Our results are particularly pronounced for family firms, firms with high growth prospects, firms in industries over which the politician has jurisdiction, and firms headquartered in highly corrupt countries.

This study shows that international firms listing their shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the London Stock Exchange (LSE) experience a significant increase in visibility, as proxied by analyst coverage and print media attention (The Wall Street Journal or Financial Times). The increase in analyst following is also associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital after the listing event in a way consistent with Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Our results are stronger for NYSE listing firms than for LSE listing firms. This may partially compensate firms for the higher costs associated with NYSE listing (compared to LSE listing).

Researchers are increasingly using data from the Nasdaq market to examine pricing behavior, market design, and other microstructure phenomena. The validity of any study that classifies trades as buys or sells depends on the accuracy of the classification method. Using a Nasdaq proprietary data set that identifies trade direction, we examine the validity of several trade classification algorithms. We find that the quote rule, the tick rule, and the Lee and Ready (1991) rule correctly classify 76.4%, 77.66%, and 81.05% of the trades, respectively. However, all classification rules have only a very limited success in classifying trades executed inside the quotes, introducing a bias in the accuracy of classifying large trades, trades during high volume periods, and ECN trades. We also find that extant algorithms do a mediocre job when used for calculating effective spreads. For Nasdaq trades, we propose a new and simple classification algorithm that improves over extant algorithms.