The idea of international society is an essential element in the study of international relations. International society is the core concept of the English school and has not yet been systematically integrated with American-originated structural realism and regime theory. This article brings together these three bodies of theory and shows how they complement and strengthen each other. It uses structural realism to show that international society is, like balance of power, a natural product of anarchic international relations and not, as some in the English school assume, only a result of exceptional historical circumstances. This line of analysis establishes definitional criteria for international society that enable a clear boundary to be drawn between international systems with and without international societies. It also shows how state-based international society relates to individual-based world society and supports an argument that in advanced systems, this relationship becomes complementary, not contradictory. The resulting theoretical synthesis provides an essential historical and political-legal foundation for regime theory, showing that international society is both the intellectual forebear and the necessary condition for the development of regimes. Connection strengthens all three bodies of theory and opens up useful channels that connect realist and liberal thinking. One result is that international society can be used both to conceptualize the complexities of a contemporary global international system, with its network of regimes ordered in terms of concentric circles, and to sketch out a policy-relevant research agenda for understanding it.

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.

A new dialogue is beginning between students of international law and international relations scholars concerning compliance with international agreements. This article advances some basic propositions to frame that dialogue. First, it proposes that the level of compliance with international agreements in general is inherently unverifiable by empirical procedures. That nations generally comply with their international agreements, on the one hand, or that they violate them whenever it is in their interest to do so, on the other, are not statements of fact or even hypotheses to be tested. Instead, they are competing heuristic assumptions. Some reasons why the background assumption of a propensity to comply is plausible and useful are given. Second, compliance problems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of advantage. The article proposes a variety of other reasons why states may deviate from treaty obligations and why in many circumstances those reasons are properly accepted by others as justifying apparent departures from treaty norms. Third, the treaty regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is "acceptable" in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. How the acceptable level is determined and adjusted is considered.

Europeans evaluate the European Community (EC) according to its economic performance, political salience, and role in international relations. During the last two decades their measured attitudes toward European integration warmed especially when inflation rates fell, as the EC share of the country's trade expanded, when EC elections and referenda increased attention to the community, and to some extend during periods when East-West relations were relaxed. Europeans did not vary their support according to their countries' shares of the Brussels budget. Thus, notwithstanding Denmark's 1992 rejection of the Maastricht treaty and the end of the cold war, recent EC reforms that increase monetary stability, intra-European trade and political attention are all likely to maintain or increase citizen support for the EC. These findings result from a model that blends comparative political economy with international relations in one of the first applications of pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis to the comparative study of public opinion.

Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms requires shifting economic resources to the military. Forming alliances requires abandoning interests that conflict with those of the ally. Each of these strategies produces domestic opposition. A nation's response to a threat to its security must weigh the relative attractiveness of arms versus allies, both in terms of their effects on internal politics and on their external benefits. Three cases are examined in the light of this argument. The response of Austria and France to the unification of Germany in the 1860s is the central case. Theories of alliance formation based on neorealism and the offense-defense balance predict that Austria and France should have allied against the mutual threat of Prussia. This article argues that they did not form an alliance because arming separately presented lower political costs. World Wars I and II likewise are analyzed from the perspective of the argument above.

The European Court of Justice has been the dark horse of European integration, quietly transforming the Treaty of Rome into a European Community (EC) constitution and steadily increasing the impact and scope of EC law. While legal scholars have tended to take the Court's power for granted, political scientists have overlooked it entirely. This article develops a first-stage theory of community law and politics that marries the insights of legal scholars with a theoretical framework developed by political scientists. Neofunctionalism, the theory that dominated regional integration studies in the 1960s, offers a set of independent variables that convincingly and parsimoniously explain the process of legal integration in the EC. Just as neofunctionalism predicts, the principal forces behind that process are supranational and subnational actors pursuing their own self-interests within a politically insulated sphere. Its distinctive features include a widening of the ambit of successive legal decisions according to a functional logic, a gradual shift in the expectations of both government institutions and private actors participating in the legal system, and the strategic subordination of immediate individual interests of member states to postulated collective interests over the long term. Law functions as a mask for politics, precisely the role neofunctionalists originally forecast for economics. Paradoxically, however, the success of legal institutions in performing that function rests on their self-conscious preservation of the autonomy of law.

One of the strengths of Robert Putnam's two-level bargaining game model is its ability to capture how international negotiations make it possible for negotiators to pursue synergistic strategies aimed at improving their prospects for a favorable deal by reshaping politics in both their own and their counterparts' domestic arenas. While reaffirming the utility of this approach, this article argues that Putnam describes only some of the synergistic strategies available to negotiators. In addition to “reverberation” and “synergistic linkage,” a negotiator can also reshape politics in his or her counterpart's domestic arena in two other ways: (1) by transforming decision making in ways that expand elite participation and bring the weight of public opinion to bear on policies that were previously dictated by small groups of privileged domestic actors and (2) by influencing the way in which policy alternatives are considered in the decisionmaking process. Through an examination of the Structural Impediments Initiative, a set of negotiations through which the United States applied a great deal of foreign pressure (gaiaisu) on Japan, the article makes the case for the above modifications to the Putnam model and argues that “participation expansion” strategies are most likely to be successful when involvement in decision making (before foreign intervention) is limited and latent support for foreign demands exists outside the privileged elite, while “alternative specification” is most likely to work when opportunities exist to link favored policy proposals to already recognized domestic problems.

Ronald Rogowski's work offers valuable insight into the impact of changing trade exposure on domestic politics. Exploring the political implications of the well-known factor endowments model of international trade theory, Rogowski argues that owners of relatively abundant productive factors will form a free-trading coalition against owners of relatively scarce productive factors, who will align in favor of protection. Rogowski's parsimonious three-factor version of the factor endowments theory—although offering valuable insight into the politics of less developed economies, including today's developed economies in earlier centuries—produces significant anomalies when applied to advanced economies. Intuitive logic and empirical research, especially the Leontief paradox, suggest that the highly complex division of labor found in developed countries will confound the simplicity of the three-factor model. Edward Learner's multifactor model suggests solutions to the anomalies that afflict Rogowski's simpler model when applied to recent politics in the United States and Europe.

The literature on international economic cooperation has devoted relatively little attention to domestic bargaining tactics and their determinants. Recent scholarship has tended to stress the utility and frequency of side-payments while discounting other prominent bargaining tactics and a broader understanding of tactical choice. This article argues that policymakers choose among domestic bargaining tactics to garner support when faced with situations in which other government officials or societal interest groups block the ratification of international economic agreements. Focusing on offers of side-payments and attempts at issue redefinition, the article's findings suggest that differences in domestic resistance to proposals of material compensation and in external security threat may explain choices between those tactics in domestic bargaining.

Most explanations for the creation of new state institutions locate the cause of change in the conditions or characteristics of the states themselves. Some aspect of a state's economic, social, political, or military situation is said to create a functional need for the new bureaucracy which then is taken up by one or more domestic groups who succeed in changing the state apparatus. However, changes in state structure may be prompted not only by changing conditions of individual states but also by socialization and conformance with international norms. In the case of one organizational innovation recently adopted by states across the international system, namely, science policy bureaucracies, indicators of state conditions and functional need for these entities are not correlated with the pattern for their adoption. Instead, adoption was prompted by the activities of an international organization which “taught” states the value of science policy organizations and established the coordination of science as an appropriate, and even a necessary, role for states. This finding lends support to constructivist or reflective theories that treat states as social entities shaped by international social action, as opposed to more conventional treatments of states as autonomous international agents.

National welfare programs are importantly affected by models of welfare activity institutionalized at the global level. This article examines the impact of the welfare regime advocated by and within the International Labor Organization (ILO). Countries that have recently ratified ILO conventions related to welfare show increased growth in spending, net of national characteristics. Subanalyses show that the effects of ILO ratification are strong in the industrialized capitalist democracies, particularly where prior welfare spending is low and the working class has a weakly institutionalized role in policymaking. ILO ratification seems disconnected from spending in the less developed countries. Legislative case studies point to similar patterns. These findings suggest that international norms contribute to policy where they offer compelling models that powerful actors can use to legitimate policy innovation.

In spite of its widespread use, no one has ever stated clearly what the distinction between bipolar and multipolar systems refers to. Moreover, some common definitions of “bipolarity” imply behavior that is inconsistent with the behavior of states during the cold war. This article argues that the distinctive feature of post–World War II international politics was not that two states were more powerful than the others, as the literature on bipolarity would suggest, but that one state, the Soviet Union, occupied in peacetime a position of near-dominance on the Eurasian continent, a position that states in the past had been able to achieve only after a series of military victories. This fact explains the behavior that others have sought to explain by bipolarity, as well as behavior that is inconsistent with what common definitions of bipolarity would lead us to expect. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the argument for structural theories of international politics and controversies about what lies ahead.

International relations theorists have devoted insufficient attention to the processes through which state sovereignty is being transformed in the modern world. The human rights issue offers a case study of a gradual and significant reconceptualization of state sovereignty. In the human rights issue-area, the primary movers behind the international actions leading to changing understandings of sovereignty are transnational nonstate actors organized in a principled issue-network, including international and domestic nongovernmental organizations, parts of global and regional intergovernmental organizations, and private foundations. These networks differ from other forms of transnational relations in that they are driven primarily by shared values or principled ideas. Through a comparative study of the impact of international human rights pressures on Argentina and Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s, this article explores the emergence and the nature of the principled human rights issue-network and the conditions under which it can contribute to changing both state understandings about sovereignty and state human rights practices.

Levels of macropolitical consensus and sectoral institutional autonomy both influence industrial policy. Different combinations of high or low consensus and autonomy help anticipate the respective explanatory relevance of generic industrial models, sectoral agencies' trajectories, and bureaucratic politics. Industrial policy choices thus are not always determined by international market opportunities, relevant domestic endowments, or the political strength of industrial entrepreneurs. The nuclear sectors in Brazil and Argentina are examined in light of this argument. A relatively strong consensus over the generic industrial model and a centralized decision-making process explain state entrepreneurship and foreign technology in Brazil. In contrast, Argentina's emphasis on domestic private entrepreneurial and technical resources can be traced to an absence of macropolitical consensus and to sectoral institutional autonomy. These differences had implications for the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers. Levels of consensus and autonomy influence the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers through their impact on the size of domestic win-sets, on risks of involuntary defection, on credibility of commitments, and on reduction of uncertainties.

Two rounds of stagnation and reform in Russia have occurred: from Nicholas I to Alexander II (1825–81) and from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (1964–90). A comparison between them reveals striking similarities in the sources of stagnation, the approach to reform, and the international and domestic consequences of the reforms. What emerges in particular is a pattern wherein international stability, Russian conservatism, and expanding Russian power in the international system (all of which describe developments during the regimes of Nicholas I and Brezhnev) give way to instability in Europe, liberalization of Russian politics, and Russian downward mobility in the international system (the pattern exhibited during the Alexandrine and Gorbachev eras). These similarities suggest at the very least that we should question the common assumptions about the unique properties of the postwar order, Soviet socialism, and Gorbachev's revolution. The parallels also imply certain revisions in our understanding of the relationship between domestic and international change, the nature of the European order in the nineteenth century, and the determinants of state power in the international system.

The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation.

The concept of territoriality has been studied surprisingly little by students of international politics. Yet, territoriality most distinctively defines modernity in international politics, and changes in few other factors can so powerfully transform the modern world polity. This article seeks to frame the study of the possible transformation of modern territoriality by examining how that system of relations was instituted in the first place. The historical analysis suggests that “unbundled” territoriality is a useful terrain for exploring the condition of postmodernity in international politics and suggests some ways in which that exploration might proceed. The emergence of multiperspectival institutional forms is identified as a key dimension of the condition of postmodernity in international politics.

Several member states of the European Free Trade Association have applied for admission into the European Community (EC). Paradoxically, enlarging the EC in this way will expand the voting power of Luxembourg, the smallest EC member state, in the EC Council of Ministers but diminish the power of the other states. In an EC with more members, voting by unanimity increasingly becomes an impractical decision-making procedure. As the Single European Act and possibly also the Treaty on European Union are being implemented, the distribution of EC council voting power takes on growing importance, since the range of issues to be decided by qualified majority votes increases considerably. Moreover, there are tendencies within the EC to render decision making more transparent and to publish member states' positions taken in majority votes. Thus, the distribution of voting power will increasingly be a crucial aspect for the EC.

The domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes, few countries will offer more than token support. Domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence. Domestic politics also influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements. Case studies of U.S. and Japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system, the division of powers in the government, and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes.

Realism explains the ruling of the international system through the underlying distribution of power among states. Increasingly, analysts have found this power analysis inadequate, and they have developed new concepts, most prominently structural power. The usage of structural power actually entails three different meanings, namely indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal power. Only the first, however, is compatible with the current neorealist choice-theoretical mode of explanation. This is the basic paradox of recent power approaches: by wanting to retain the central role of power, some international relations and international political economy theory is compelled to expand that concept and to move away from the very theory that claims to be based on power. Neorealism does not take power seriously enough. At the same time, these extensions of the concept are themselves partly fallacious. To account simultaneously for the different meanings of structural power and to avoid a conceptual overload, this article proposes that any power analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance. Finally, it sketches some consequences of those concepts for international theory.