DRAMATIC CHANGE IS HARDLY A FEATURE OF WEST GERMAN politics. The signals are usually visible well in advance — but gradual change also means that the wider significance of particular developments may be overlooked. A cursory examination of the political scene in the wake of the election held in January 1987 may fail to reveal much that is new since the success of the Christian Democrats in 1983. Thus, despite the sharp fall in the CDU vote, the coalition with the Free Democrats was comfortably confirmed in office. At the same time, the haemorrhage of SPD support—although partially staunched — still continued, with the inability to make a recovery in the intervening years the haunting question for the party. Chiefly at the expense of the SPD, the Greens have now anchored themselves in the party system. Their presence on the federal stage since 1983, and earlier in the Länder, has gingered up political debate and forced issues on to the agenda that otherwise would have been neglected. There are signs of change, but how are they to be interpreted?

THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURE OF THE COMMUNITY IS ITS institutional system. The establishment of that system and the changes and distortions it has undergone have very much moulded its development. But the Community is also a complex ongoing process: the institutional side alone does not give the full picture. The economic, the financial and the institutional aspects are closely interwoven, and together determine the course of its affairs. I propose to consider the state of the Community today, its current crisis and the outlook for the years ahead from both these angles.

Dramatic Change is Hardly a Feature of West German politics. The signals are usually visible well in advance — but gradual change also means that the wider significance of particular developments may be overlooked. A cursory examination of the political scene in the wake of the election held in January 1987 may fail to reveal much that is new since the success of the Christian Democrats in 1983. Thus, despite the sharp fall in the CDU vote, the coalition with the Free Democrats was comfortably confirmed in office. At the same time, the haemorrhage of SPD support — although partially staunched — still continued, with the inability to .make a recovery in the intervening years the haunting question for the party.’ Chiefly at the expense of the SPD, the Greens have now anchored themselves in the party system. Their presence on the federal stage since 1983, and earlier in the Länder, has gingered up political debate and forced issues on to the agenda that otherwise would have been neglected. There are signs of change, but how are they to be interpreted?

ON 22 JUNE 1986, THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE) achieved a remarkable triumph in the Spanish general elections. Hard on the heels of his success in the highly controversial and close-run referendum on Spain's NATO membership, the Prime Minister, Felipe González, managed to consolidate the PSOE's hold on political power by winning an absolute majority in both the Cortes and the Senate. At the age of 44, with his ability to confound the sceptics seemingly still intact, González appeared to be the most firmly ensconced head of government in Western Europe. Moreover, to underline the magnitude of his achievement, the Socialist leader had reached this position against the prevailing trend of a resurgent Right evident in much of the rest of Europe. Whereas the PSOE's counterparts in Britain, Germany, France and Portugal had suffered a series of demoralizing electoral defeats throughout the 1980s, the Spanish Socialists, with overwhelming successes in 1982 and 1986, seemed set fair to remain in power until the next century.

EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA, TWO SOCIETIES WHICH HAVE recently experienced revolutionary conflict, have also embarked upon electoral processes. The US government cdls El Salvador's regime ‘democratic’ and aids its fight against leftist revolutionaries, while calling Nicaragua's regime ‘totalitarian’ and its elections a sham. What would democracy in these countries require and what are democracy's prospects?

One criterion of democracy, opposition or competitiveness, is insufficient because it says nothing about the social bases of competing elites. In order to provide some guarantee that a regime will be responsive to politicized social needs, we must stress the criterion of participation or inclusiveness as a necessary condition for democracy. In a context of intense conflict a democratic regime must allow all sectors – or rather their representatives chosen in competitive elections – to participate in decisions which will affect them. Such a regime's prospects for success are further enhanced by pacts of mutual guarantees of security among the contending actors, as in the consociational democracies.

ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE French political scene since the Left's historic victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981 has been the spectacular emergence of former Prime Minister Raymond Barre as both a powerful contender for the ‘leadership’ of the Right and for the French presidency. His emergence raises a number of interrelated issues which are likely to have a profound impact in France over the next few years.

First, it has brought to the fore questions about the nature and perhaps even the very future of the Fifth Republic. The insistent refusal by Barre and his supporters to countenance cohabitation has elevated to the top of the political agenda the perennial issue of constitutional interpretation. What happens when the President of the Republic and the majority in the National Assembly are of opposed political persuasions? This has ceased to be a question of interest only to constitutional scholars but has become a reality after the March 1986 legislative elections resulted in a narrow victory for the RPR-UDF alliance. How Barre and his supporters behave in such a delicate situation is of crucial importance.

One of the Most Remarkable Developments on the French political scene since the Left’s historic victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981 has been the spectacular emergence of former Prime Minister Raymond Barre as both a powerful contender for the ‘leadership’ of the Right and for the French presidency. His emergence raises a number of interrelated issues which are likely to have a profound impact in France over the next few years.

HAVING JUST RETURNED TO THIS COUNTRY AFTER SERVING as British Ambassador to Washington, I have a distinct impression that modern America is not properly understood by many sectors of public opinion in the United Kingdom. An example of this misunderstanding is given by a recent public opinion poll which rated the USSR and the United States as equal threats to peace. Obviously, this is not the case.

We should really try to understand the United States. Some of us at least, certainly enough of us to make a difference to the general perception of the United States in Britain as reflected in the bizarre verdict of that public opinion poll, should acquire some measure of understanding, since American commitment in NATO to the defence of Europe has kept us at peace for the last 40 years. The American commitment in the GATT to the free world's open trading system is the best guarantee we have of prosperity in the future. That the Free world exists, that we have a Free World to talk about, is largely thanks to the existence of the United States.

AS SOON AS ONE ELECTION IS OVER PREPARATIONS BEGIN FOR the next. Governments shape their programmes with an eye to what will retain and enhance their popularity, while their opponents seek to discredit them and parade their own more superior wares. Although' at times parties become enmeshed in internal wrangles that damage their standing, and even proclaim their attachment to policies which alienate potential support, as the day of the election draws near they concentrate their attention on winning. Internal disputes are set aside, unpopular policies dropped and attractive ones highlighted.

An election was not needed until June 1988, five years after the first meeting of the current Parliament, but during 1986 the signs were that the government was clearing the way for an election in 1987 if the auspices were favourable. The Queen's Speech of 1986 was light in its legislative proposals, and controversial and complicated measures that would have bogged down parliamentary proceedings, such as the privatization of water or compelling local authorities to put a range of their functions out to competitive tender, were postponed. During the spring of 1987 the government increased the production of decisions to court the voters.

Having Just Returned to this Country after Serving as British Ambassador to Washington, I have a distinct impression that modern America is not properly understood by many sectors of public opinion in the United Kingdom. An example of this misunderstanding is given by a recent public opinion poll which rated the USSR and the United States as equal threats to peace. Obviously, this is not the case.

COMPARATIVE EXERCISES BETWEEN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS of countries with little obvious common ground may not lead to convergences being discovered, but may be useful in bringing out, by the decorator's well known principle of contrast, the strongest and most salient features of each. It is in this spirit that the present essay has been undertaken, for the author would not seek to claim any evident link or close comparative yield from examination of these two countries.

They do, however, have more basic characteristics in common than might be imagined, at first sight. First, they both fall into the category of ‘small democracies’. Certainly Belgium with a population of 9.9 million is considerably larger than Denmark with its 5.1 million, but Belgium remains nevertheless in both world and even European Community terms a ‘small state’.

ITALIAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD ON 14-15 JUNE 1987. They were unexpected as was the resignation of the Prime Minister. It is not easy to explain why Bettino Craxi had to resign as Prime Minister of Italy in March 1987. This is why it will be helpful to review the achievements, crises and unrealised goals of the final years of his government.

Craxi's electoral platform in June 1983 was essentially one of institutional reform and economic recovery. He believed that only in this way would it be possible to create the conditions for the ‘governability’ of Italy and overcome the chronic political instability.

While States Have Always Been in Competition, modern states are in competition in an historically unique way. Only since the Second World War has it become generally appreciated that the mastery of technical change is vital to economic success, to such military security as is available, and, in short, to political achievement in a world in which expectations are un-precedentedly high. Since the political system of a state is inescapably a major factor in that state’s overall performance, it follows that the efficiency and effectiveness of the world’s various political systems are now, in an important sense, under long-term test. Whether over time most systems will tend to an asymptotic common performance, or whether some will reveal themselves as objectively ‘better’ than others is thus, really for the first time, a meaningful issue, and one which each succeeding generation can be expected to do a little more to resolve. In this context particular interest attaches in the immediate future to the relative performances of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Western Europe, the latter considered both as separate states and collectively. This article is concerned only with the United States, but a reference frame of permanent international competition, in accommodating to and capitalizing upon technical change, needs to be borne in mind throughout.

WHILE STATES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN COMPETITION, modern states are in competition in an historically unique way. Only since the Second world War has it become generally appreciated that the mastery of technical change is vital to economic success, to such military security as is available, and, in short, to political achievement in a world in which expectations are unprecedentedly high. Since the political system of a state is inescapably a major factor in that state's overall performance, it follows that the efficiency and effectiveness of the world's various political systems are now, in an important sense, under long-term test. Whether over time most systems will tend to an asymptotic common performance, or whether some will reveal themselves as objectively ‘better’ than others is thus, really for the first time, a meaningful issue, and one which each succeeding generation can be expected to do a little more to resolve. In this context particular interest attaches in the immediate future to the relative performances of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Western Europe, the latter considered both as separate states and collectively. This article is concerned only with the United States, but a reference frame of permanent international competition, in accommodating to and capitalizing upon technical change, needs to be borne in mind throughout.

THE 1960s APPEAR IN RETROSPECT AS THE BELLE ÉPOQUE of the postwar era. The IMF— a Cinderella while convertibility remained limited to the EPU-area—came into its own, as did the GATT with the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds. There were plenty of storm clouds, however. The monetary system, for one, was built on the shakiest of foundations. The gold/dollar parity had been fixed by an Act of Congress at $35 in 1933, a quarter century before convertibility became a reality. Four years after convertibility, in 1962, the gold pool had to be set up: a massive commodity agreement between the six richest countries, with the Bank of England as the buffer stock manager. That agreement limped on to the mid-1960s by the grace of the Russians, whose bad harvests forced them into substantial gold sales. After that, the combined effects of American arm twisting and the hubris of highly dirigiste central bankers shored up the system, until its final collapse in 1971.

ON 11 JULY 1987 THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP) WAS returned, with an increased majority, to an unprecedented third term in federal government. The election result was doubly remarkable. First, the ALP has traditionally been unable to gain more than two terms in office. Schisms and factional conflict have generally ruined Labor's chances of a third period in office, as in 1949, when Ben Chifley failed to gain a third term, and in 1975, when the same fate befell Gough Whitlam, following a constitutional crisis. Secondly, the party retained office during a period of economic crisis unprecedented in Australia's modern history, a crisis which might have been expected to sweep the opposition Liberal–National coalition to power.

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT INTENDED AS A VALUE-FREE SURVEY of American conservatism today. Less clear, perhaps, will be my general approval of this revolt, although that will emerge soon enough. It remains to announce that I want to offer some friendly advice to American conservatism regarding pride and interest and to recommend to its attention the American Constitution, which so beautifully combines them. American conservatives, perhaps because of the manipulations of American liberals, have lost some of their attachment to the Constitution, and much of their understanding of it.

Recently I overheard someone say that Harvard University was wrong to have invited Ronald Reagan to its 350th anniversary in 1986, because of Reagan's ‘anti-intellectualism’. What could this have meant? Reagan has reduced student loan programmes and university research programmes, and wants to cut them further. He invites many actors and very few professors to his White House dinners. He himself should have been, and probably was, a C student in college, like the Democratic president he frequently praises — the one who began the practice of using ghost-writers for his speeches — Franklin D. Roosevelt. In sum, Reagan doesn't sufficiently respect the intellect.

THE SHOCK INDUCED IN SWEDEN BY OLOF PALME'S assassination was not translated into any dramatic political consequences. In the absence of any identifiable culprit or motive Swedes could do little more than speculate inconclusively whether responsibility might lie in a vendetta against Palme pursued by some foreign agency or, less likely but more insidious, in some unsuspected pathology within their own society. The assassination served no obvious political purpose. It could only be registered, therefore, as signifying that Sweden, no less than countries with a tradition of political violence, was subject to the ‘sleep of reason’. In a mood of sad resignation the country sought to resume normal politics.

The Following is not Intended as a Value-Free Survey of American conservatism today. Less clear, perhaps, will be my general approval of this revolt, although that will emerge soon enough. It remains to announce that I want to offer some friendly advice to American conservatism regarding pride and interest and to recommend to its attention the American Constitution, which so beautifully combines them. American conservatives, perhaps because of the manipulations of American liberals, have lost some of their attachment to the Constitution, and much of their understanding of it.