The article starts with an analysis of minority protection in Tito's Yugoslavia, and points out the merits and the shortcomings of this system. It has been suggested that after the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia the standard was lost, and there were no more confines halting the escalation of ethnic hatred and violence. In this situation, setting new standards deserves an utmost priority. The article suggests some starting points for new standards. In doing so, an endeavour has been made to define the notion of minorities on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. The article also pleads for the recognition of collective minority rights in addition to individual human rights. Suggestions are made regarding appropriate internal and international legal mechanisms for the protection of minority rights.

This paper critically discusses different philosophical conceptions of laws of nature by examining how putative laws are treated in physical theorizing. These different conceptions are, first, views that take laws to be metaphysically basic; second, Humean views, which take laws to be reducible to patterns of instantiations of non-modal properties; and, third, a cluster of conventionalist or instrumentalist views that understand laws as part of the epistemic toolkit for building models and a reflection of a particular perspective of investigation. I argue that scientific practice best supports a moderate version of the third view: while the laws of physics do not form a single tightly organized axiomatic structure and there exists a multiplicity of frameworks in which putative laws are justified by their predictive use and relevance in a particular context, general overarching principles nevertheless play an important role in physics and provide some integration of different domains.

This article is an attempt to clarify the effects of the German labour market reforms, commonly known as the Hartz reforms. Competing arguments were used to identify the welfare implications for German society and the German economy in order to explore whether or not such labour market reforms might provide another German answer, following fiscal discipline, to the EU’s post-euro-crisis management. This paper confirms that the Hartz reforms effectively reduced German unemployment, but they did not fundamentally solve the problem. Moreover, such effects appeared to propagate an increase in size of the low-paid sector, declining wages and increasing income inequality. The reforms were not welfare-enhancing for individuals because of increased poverty levels in employment and unemployment, which further implied a counter-productive risk for the German economy because of the contraction of domestic consumption, and potential social instability for German society because of rising inequality and deteriorating living standards. Therefore, Hartz-style reforms are neither a desirable model for other EU countries, nor the answer to Europe’s post-euro-crisis management in a time of fiscal austerity and negative interest rates. The real danger to European integration, as argued in this article, is not the challenge from high unemployment, but from Germany’s complacency of a one-size-fits-all thinking and, being the EU’s leading country, its double standards towards and ignorance of the differential nature and contexts of the European unemployment issue compared with the German one. This article warns that the mishandling of labour market reforms could result in the collapse of the already fragile public confidence in European integration.

Vitis vinifera was first planted in South Africa by the Dutchman Jan van Riebeeck in 1655. The first wine farms, in which the French Huguenots participated – were land grants given by another Dutchman, Simon Van der Stel. He also established (for himself) the Constantia estate. The Constantia wine later became one of the most celebrated wines in the world. The decline of the South African wine industry in the late 1800s was caused by the combination of natural disasters (mildew, phylloxera) and the consequences of wars and political events in Europe. Despite the reorganization imposed by the KWV cooperative, recovery was slow because of the embargo against the Apartheid regime. Since the 1990s, a large number of new wineries – often small family operations – have been created. South African wines are now available in many markets. Some of these wines can compete with the best in the world.

For most of the Middle Ages, diurnal timekeeping depended on sundials, water-clocks, and occasionally flame-clocks. However, towards the end of the thirteenth century, the mechanical clock, weight driven and regulated by a verge escapement and foliot mechanism, was developed. The earliest mechanical clocks appeared in Northern Italy but rapidly spread throughout Europe. In Jacques le Goff’s words, ‘Henceforth the clock became the measure of all things’. Early clocks were neither particularly accurate nor reliable, but the machine, because it was better than anything that had preceded it, acquired the reputation for perfect regularity and dependability. This paper seeks to show how the clock came to be regarded as a model and a reference point, invoked by writers in relation to the ordering of the universe, the nature of a well-regulated society, and as an image of proper moral behaviour.

The growth of continuously generated, large-scale datasets, and new analytics to handle them, has created expectations, in some quarters, that new insights can be generated that will help us address the biggest challenges that face us as a species and therefore can shape future societal outcomes. It is hoped that these new technologies will lead not just to new discoveries but also to new questions and thinking that will deliver significant scientific advances. Perhaps there will be some genuine scientific advances but since many of the challenges that face us reside in the human world and depend upon how humans behave, we need to turn to the humanities and the social sciences as well as the natural sciences and look at the role Big Data could play there in adding to, or shaping, our future. And here, what concerns us is not just the assumptions guiding the new analytic techniques for data mining, data merging, linking and analysis, born out of smarter AI algorithms, it is a more fundamental issue about the constraints and limitations of the kind of data inputs and outputs being appealed to in Big Data systems and whether they are well served to provide an understanding of the human world.

The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, who lived from 1872 to 1945, is considered to be one of the greatest historians of the 20th century. His work has been translated into many languages. More than 80 years after its first appearance, his most famous book, The Waning of the Middle Ages, is still read the world over and regularly reprinted. Huizinga is now mainly read and admired by historians, although his book, Homo ludens, is also appreciated by anthropologists. In the 1930s, he was even more well-known but in a different capacity: not as a cultural historian but as a cultural critic. His book, In the Shadows of Tomorrow, which appeared in 1935, was soon translated into eight languages. It was as influential as Ortega y Gasset's, The Rebellion of the Masses, and made him ‘the most famous man of the Netherlands’. This paper will describe Johan Huizinga's transition from cultural historian to cultural critic and discuss how far his cultural criticism can be seen as an example of ‘the spirit of the 1930's’.

Organisms possess an internal ‘body clock’ that measures the passage of the day, although they respond directly to the influences of the sun. The site of this clock, its properties, and its molecular and genetic mechanisms are now beginning to be discovered. In humans, the clock enables the processes required for daytime activities and nocturnal sleep to be separated; but the system can go wrong or cause difficulties, as in the blind, anybody after a time-zone transition or during night work

In 2015, French writer Michel Houellebecq’s novel Submission, which depicts a future France with a Muslim president, was repeatedly cited in political discourse about Islam, French identity, and terrorism. In the year of the novel’s publication, several Islamist terrorist attacks targeted France, and Houellebecq was often named in the debate on multiculturalism, immigration and the French secularist principle of laïcité. The reception of the novel is analysed in this article, focusing on ideological argumentation and political debate. Two opposite camps can be identified in this reception structure. Interestingly, the arguments of these camps are analogous to the arguments of the prosecutor and defence lawyer in the 1857 trial of Gustave Flaubert concerning his novel Madame Bovary. One and a half centuries after that trial, questions about the reader’s moral capacity and the author’s responsibility remain at the heart of the debate. While some liberal critics praise the ambiguities of the novel, trusting the reader’s ethical faculties, other critics condemn the novel and accuse the writer of expressing dubious values. As for the ideological homes of these critics, the liberal group represents left-wing, right-wing, and uncertain ideologies, whereas the gatekeeping group largely consists of left-leaning agents. The division into two reception groups and their respective discursive patterns and practices are analysed using the Bovary trial as a basis for comparison. It is concluded that in the anxious political climate of 2015 when terror, migration, and Islam were attracting considerable attention and when the populist right was on the rise, Houellebecq’s novel functioned as a political vehicle in government-sympathetic opinion making and as a practical tool for critics who positioned themselves as safeguarding generous migration and integration policies.

Numerous outbreaks of a disease whose most prominent effects were gangrene and loss of limbs occurred in Europe in the Middle Ages. Sufferers sought relief at the shrine of St Anthony at Vienne in France. Quite early, it was recognized that the disease was a poisoning due to the consumption of bread prepared from rye contaminated with the fungus ergot. Many interesting substances have been isolated from ergot, some of which are used in medicine in migraine and in childbirth, but the most dramatic substance derived from ergot is LSD. The circumstance of some of these discoveries is recounted.

Problem-based learning (PBL), besides a number of advantages, also has drawbacks. It makes it very difficult for students to identify with a good teacher, and aims, rather, at identification with a peer group. Therefore, it seems more suited for adolescents than for young adults capable of secondary identification. Furthermore, this form of staff–student contact, i.e. the teaching group, does not motivate staff to share knowledge with the students. The knowledge acquired through PBL tends to remain unorganized. It is therefore more suited for disciplines in which a compilation of factual knowledge is important (e.g. medicine) than where a systematic approach is needed (e.g. statistics).

The November 2009 Romanian presidential elections illustrate the process through which media exposure to exit polls during the election day allows strategic voting in the least expected situations (i.e. in the first round of a two-ballot setting). Organized in a two-round system in which the first two competitors qualify for the second round, these elections display one unsolved dilemma. The difference registered in elections between the two challengers is twice as large as the average support in the pre-election polls (a comparable difference was never registered in post-communist Romania). Our quantitative analysis uses election results from the past two decades and aggregated poll data from 2009 and reveals that a large share of the Romanian electorate avoids wasting votes and casts them for candidates with real winning chances. This article argues that polls presented to the voters, by the media during the elections, made the difference. They were used as electoral strategies to trigger strategic voting and thus promote specific candidates.

The end of Putin’s presidency – or at least what one could regard as the end of his presidency – was marked by several major riots between ethnic Russians and people from the Caucasus of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. ‘Caucasians’ are usually seen as awry by the majority of Russians. Chechens are often singled out as the symbol of all the negative effects that the presence of ‘Caucasians’ and, in fact, all minorities, brings with it: domination of the market, crime, and changes in the demographic/cultural balance of the country. In more general terms, ‘Caucasians,’ especially Chechens, have coalesced in the minds of many Russians as responsible for all the ills of the post-Soviet era and which have continued through Putin’s tenure. There is increasing social as well as regional division. In fact, the gap between prosperous Moscow and a few other big cities and the small towns and cities and rural areas of the Russian heartland continues to be quite wide. All of this social and social/regional tension has manifested itself not so much in social/class animus, as was the case at the beginning of the 20th century, but in increasing ethnic tension. This has led to several major ethnic riots in the last years of Putin’s tenure, with those in Kondopoga, a small city in Karelia in the northern part of European Russia, as the best known. These riots, in which hundreds of people were involved, left several dead, and many injured. They received much coverage in the Russian press and stuck in the mind of the public as few events in recent Russian history have done. While, in themselves, the Kondopoga events have not led to any major upheaval, their occurrence indicates the serious tension in Russian society, which plays an important role in the case of major crises. The Kondopoga violence also indicates that Russia has the same problems as most countries of the West, which recently have experienced changes in demographic and social/cultural composition due to waves of immigrants, mostly from non-European countries.

We live in an age where the extinction of languages has become a topic of discussion in many different circles. Opinions on whether the process should be stopped or considered profitable differ widely even in the field of linguistics, let alone in the public domain. A rational attitude presupposes the recognition that a language may constitute a value for some and that value judgements are controlled by more or less outspoken and divergent interests. In the case of a language, interest is taken in its maintenance (or suppression) at all the levels from the individual via the speech community and the scientific community up to mankind. These interests have to be made explicit before the value of a language can be assessed. Ultimately, such an evaluation must even be confronted with the costs that arise in the maintenance of a minority language or in the revitalization of a dying language.

We explain why and how the governing parties, AKP of Turkey and PT of Brazil, converged on the same path of relying on the poor as the main strategy to stay in power. With the neoliberal reorganization and internationalization of their economies, the capacity of these governments to set up developmentalist alliances with big capital, the middle classes and the organized working classes was weakened. Based on a most-different-systems design and on descriptive statistical analysis, we argue that both PT and AKP failed to build multi-class bases and thus had to mobilize the poor by using various strategies, most importantly expanding social assistance policies, which accelerated the emergence of a new welfare state.

Conformity to observations takes on a particular significance in relation to weather prediction. Day-to-day weather changes constitute the temporal evolution of a complex and highly chaotic system, and yet the accuracy of weather forecasts can be, and are, readily and regularly assessed by both practitioners and the general public. Here, the development of weather prediction is portrayed against the backcloth of the role played by the criterion of ‘conformity to observations’ in regulating progress. It has served as a crude banner for castigating an early attempt at forecasting, sustaining an empirically-based but theoretically unsupported approach, summarily dismissing some attempts and yet ignored in another. In more recent developments the criterion has been both deliberately and justifiably weakened, and even turned on its head.

The literature about global democracy deals with two different types of democratization: Type 1 is about spreading democracy across sovereign states as the basis for good governance. It focuses on the quality of the state/society-nexus: the balance between coercion, reward and identity. Type 2 is about democratizing world politics as such. In its most concrete expressions it focuses on the relationship between international society (a community of states) and world society (a community of people). The contemporary structure of multilevel governance provides the rationale behind this: national democracies are ineffective in controlling essential centres of power. This implies a need to scale up democracy to global proportions. However, in Type 1 considerations the term democracy often is an empty shell. This blinds observers for checks and balances and types of pluralism in non-democratic states. It also blinds them for misuse of democratic claims in democratic states. Aspiring global democracy in terms of Type 2 ignores that the presence of a central authority is a precondition inherent to the concept of democracy. Democratic theory cannot escape and is consequently caught up in its preconditions of a people (demos) and a government (cratos).

The fear of refugees and migrants that has flooded Europe in the last few years emphasises the threat posed to contemporary European culture by the supposedly radically different Islamic culture. However, the roots of European Islamophobia reach far beyond that, all the way back to the Crusades; while Central and parts of Eastern Europe have mostly been feeding these roots with memories of Ottoman invasions. After inspecting these roots, this article sheds light on the irrefutable Christian sources of European culture, but also exposes other influences without which the culture would not exist today – especially the antecedent Greco-Roman antiquity, and the subsequent Renaissance, Humanism and Enlightenment. This outlines modern European and Western culture, characterised mainly by secularity, which is the precondition for religious freedom of non-Christian, alternative, and ‘non-native’ religions as well. This article emphasises that it would be difficult to include Islam amongst these latter religions since it has been an important contribution to the shaping of European culture for centuries. The old antagonisms between European and Islamic cultures therefore do not stem from their irreconcilable differences but from their resemblances – in other words: in the West, we are not afraid of Muslims because they are so radically different but because they are strikingly similar. The real threat to European and Western culture is therefore not Muslim migrants but a demagogic fuelling of the fears of the supposed Islamic threat.