That the universe began in a big bang is often believed by theists to confirm divine creation ex nihilo. But Quentin Smith claims that it means God must not exist. For if he does, there is an earliest state E of the universe. God made E. E is ensured either to contain animate creatures or to lead to an animate state. For God would know that an animate universe is better than an inanimate one, and that even a minimally morally good being would be obliged to create one if he could. And God, being at least minimally mor-ally good, and all-powerful, would be able and inclined to ensure the existence of one (p. 53). But science says that E is inanimate since the big bang singularity (E) involves the life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, curvature and density; also that it is inherently unpredictable and lawless so that there is no guarantee it will emit particles that will evolve into an animate state. Thus £ is not ensured to lead to an animate state (p. 53), and thus God could not have made E. So, God does not exist (p. 54). Smith: “There are countless logically possible initial states of the universe that lead by a natural and law-like evolution to animate states and if God had created the universe he would have selected one of these” (p. 58).

La notion d'objet physique est au cceur de la problématique métaphysique du réalisme: réalistes et antiréalistes construisent habituellement leurs positions sur la base de différentes conceptions de cette notion. De façon générale, les réalistes prétendent que les objets physiques existent et possè-dent des propriétés intrinsèques les définissant indépendamment de nos facultés de perception et de conceptualisation. Par rapport à cette caractérisation, qui nous accompagnera tout au long du texte, nous nous plaçons dans le clan des antiréalistes. Toutefois, notre but présent n'est pas tant de critiquer la conception réaliste de l'objet physique que de proposer les grandes lignes d'une forme d'antiréalisme cohérente. Pour nous situer dans le débat contemporain nous contrasterons nos idées avec le réalisme interne de Putnam et le phénoménalisme, deux positions qui se rapprochent de la nôtre par leur réjet de la notion réaliste d'objet physique. Cependant, le réalisme interne et le phénoménalisme, nous le verrons, prennent souvent la forme de thèses portant sur le langage, ce que nous voudrons éviter de faire. II est à notre avis avantageux, pour répondre à la question qui sert de titre à ce texte, de ramener le débat en deçà des questions de langage, au niveau de la perception non épistémique, oùl'on peut encore, selon les termes de Dretske, voir sans croire.

In 1931, writing in a personal journal, Wittgenstein enumerated the names of those thinkers whom he deemed to have been his most important intellectual influences. He makes the strong claim that these are thinkers whose seminal ideas he has taken over, further elaborated and incorporated into his own work. Here are the names he lists in their order of appearance: Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa. At the time of the first publication of this list in Culture and Value, those familiar primarily with the most widely read and influential writings on Wittgenstein and his philosophical influences, Norman Malcolm's Memoir (including Von Wright's introduction) and Toulmin and Janik's Wittgenstein's Vienna, would most likely have been surprised by the inclusion of Spengler's name. His is the only one on the list that does not appear in either book. Every other thinker named is not only mentioned as an influence on Wittgenstein in one or the other work, but some of the purported details of that influence are offered. And the appearance of Spengler's name is doubly surprising, given the relatively low esteem in which his work is generally held. Of the others listed, perhaps only Weininger fails to emerge as a respected figure.

Ce livre prèsente les actes d'une conference qui se tenait à Vancouver en 1991 sur le thème general des aspects theoriques et philosophiques du connexionnisme. Les principaux problemes theoriques du connexionnisme y sont traités et ceci dans une certaine unité conceptuelle et argumentative. Les auteurs sont en général sympathiques à ce paradigme, mais leur contribution ne met pas moins en evidence certains problemes philosophiques importants. Sauf quelques articles techniques qui portent sur des expériences concrètes d'application, l'ensemble des textes se concentrent sur des reflexions theoriques. On y traite ainsi des questions de philosophie de l'esprit, de philosophie du langage et de psychologic Compte tenu de l'ampleur et de la diversitè de ces thèmes, cette recension prendra la forme d'une presentation thèmatique des principaux debats qui traversent l'ouvrage.

A distinctive characteristic of contemporary Hume scholarship is the attempt by scholars to read Hume both critically and sympathetically. This is itself quite encouraging, especially in view of the misinterpretations to which Hume's views have traditionally been subject. More positively, how-ever, we now have a systematic attempt, hitherto absent, to appreciate the richness and complexity of Hume's views and of the many positive things Hume has to say in philosophy.

Dans les premières années qui ont suivi la parution de son monumental A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls s'est surtout employé dans quelques articles à répondre à ses critiques, à dissiper les malentendus ainsi qu'à expliciter certains aspects de sa théorie, sans proposer de changements significatifs. À partir de la publication des Dewey Lectures (1980), sous la pression des critiques ou suivant le cours naturel de sa réflexion, Rawls a graduellement procéde à d'importantes révisions. Presque essentiellement préoccupé par la signification et la justification de sa théorie, et laissant à peu prés intacts sa structure et son contenu, Rawls a successivement élaboré une conception de la personne et de la société, développé une méthodologie contextualiste et constructiviste, limité considérablement la portée de sa théorie et finalement, pour encadrer le tout, proposé une interprétation politique de la «justice en tant qu'équité». Ces changements, que d'aucuns ont perçus comme un recul ou comme un important virage, n'ont pas toujours été, selon Rawls, bien compris. Dans son dernier ouvrage, Political Liberalism, qui, est-il besoin de le dire? était depuis longtemps attendu, Rawls rassemble et raffine ses nouvelles idées, les présente de façon systématique et, somme toute, convaincante.

Adam Morton treats decisions that are difficult because the options available serve incomparable desires. In the first part of the book he presents principles that address these dilemmas. In the second part he formulates a theory that categorizes the principles. And in the third part he applies the principles to some issues in ethics. To illustrate, let us consider one of the principles, its assignment to a category, and its application to an ethical issue.

The modern self, with its inwardness, its freedom and its individuality (p. ix), suffers, Taylor tells us, from disenchantment (p. 500, cf. pp. 17-18, 186). Moreover, disenchantment has come in spite of the advance, to which Taylor wishes to give full credit, that modernity has made in giving great value to ordinary life at work and in the family (p. 211). For religion, though still present as one layer of sentiment among many in the historical deposits that compose modern culture, has given ground to “disengaged instrumentalism” or to its antagonist, romantic “expressivism” (p. 498). Taylor, a philosopher of uncommonly generous spirit, is willing to find good in each of these orientations: the first, for example, has with utilitarianism put the relief of needless suffering at the top of the moral agenda (p. 331), along with redeeming from superstitious repression a number of innocent pleasures; the second has deepened human capacity, on the one hand by deepening emotions (both in the sense of oneself and in concern for others), on the other hand by gaining for them intellectual respect (pp. 294, 372, 419).

This is a Big Book from one of Canada's preeminent philosophers. It aims at nothing less than to define what characterizes modernity, and then to tell us what is wrong with it. Like many a Big Book, it is predictably full of interesting things, and equally predictably disappointing, not to say feeble, in some of the central theses for which it argues. But then what more, in philosophy, can we really expect? It's what we tell our students: you don't have to be right, and you don't have to make me agree with you, but you do have to produce interesting arguments and show that you have thought seriously about the issues.

These two interesting papers raise a number of important issues. I will limit myself, however, to drawing out some of the recurring questions, in order to keep myself from wandering too much down fascinating side alleys.

I cannot resist, however, beginning with what sounds like a digression. There is a lot of misunderstanding of what I was trying to say, especially in Braybrooke's paper. My author's reflex is to blame my readers. But a moment's quiet thought makes me aware of how far from totally clear I was. More than that, some of what is at issue between us is precisely the grid within which these questions should be debated. I am dissatisfied with the accepted way of putting some of these questions, and I want to propose new terms. It was inevitable that misunderstandings arise in these circumstances.

Je suis trés reconnaissant à Michel Seymour d'avoir soumis mon livre à un examen détaillé, pénétrant, et charitable et d'avoir, par ses objections, mis le doigt sur un certain nombre de présupposés des thèses défendues dans ce livre, qu'il a souvent articulés bien mieux que je n'ai été capable de le faire. Le principal de ces présupposés est mon rejet implicite de la thése quinienne de l'indétermination de la traduction, qui m'engage, selon Seymour, à défendre une conception conservatrice de la logique et à insister sur une détermination de son domaine qui lui paraît injustifiée. Seymour soutient au contraire qu'il faut admettre cette thése, qui «commande une tout autre perspective» que la mienne. Je voudrais à la fois résister à la prémisse et à la conclusion de cette inférence.