Andreas Wirsching has written an ambitious paper about the rise of the ‘consumer society’ in the twentieth century and its implications for historical research. I should say at the outset that I am sympathetic to his warnings against a Whig history. The career of the ‘consumer society’ needs to be historicised. My main problem is that ‘the consumer society’ is used in multiple, slippery ways in this article which moves back and forth between treating it as an ideological construct, an analytical concept and as a material reality of how people live their lives. It sometimes appears as ‘paradigm’, yet at other times it is the real thing, ‘a burgeoning consumer society’.

This essay deals with the ambiguous and contradictory relationship between labour, consumption and individuality in modern mass culture. This relationship has been conceptualised rather differently in American and European visions of individuality. In recent years, the long-lasting tradition of European (and especially German) scepticism towards the consumer society, which was nourished by conservative, (neo)liberal and Marxist influences, has retreated in favour of a more general acceptance of modern consumerism. While labour has not been replaced as the most important means of economic and cultural participation, the social construction of personal individuality is seen to take place through an ever-increasing multitude of means of consumption. The article analyses this profound process of cultural change and at the same time reflects upon the opportunities and limits of the current scholarly paradigm concerning the consumer society.

In ‘Interpretations’ the editors invite scholars to explore and debate central issues or concepts encountered in the study of contemporary European history. Recent sections have dealt with ‘political religion’ (18:4) and political violence (14:1). Here, Andreas Wirsching discusses the changing relationship between labour, consumption and individuality in the twentieth century, Frank Trentmann comments on the difficulties of the term ‘consumer society’, and Andreas Wirsching has provided a final rejoinder.

Frank Trentmann is not very happy with my article, for the following three main reasons: First: the term ‘consumer society’ is applied too extensively and is not sufficiently defined. Second, my parameters of space and time are unclear, with the result that I neglect the differences in consumption and ‘consumer society’ in different parts of the world and at different periods. Furthermore, I do not establish a clear chronology with respect to the historical relationship between work and consumption. On this basis, third, Trentmann remains unconvinced by my critical remarks on the problems of individuality, citizenship and the pitfalls of historical teleology.

David Roberts has published widely on Italian fascism and more recently a significant comparative study of totalitarianism in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. The short essay published here is a useful compression of the arguments presented in the longer work. Unfortunately, this piece represents all that is problematic and frustrating in totalitarian/political religion studies. Roberts gives us a useful review of the growth and evolution of totalitarianism and political religion from the inter-war period through the Cold War until we reach the sunny postmodern uplands of the cultural turn. A review of the arguments of Gentile, Griffin, Morgan, Kershaw, Eatwell, Payne, Burrin and Voegelin is helpful to the reader who is unfamiliar with a series of complex arguments, which straddle decades.

In ‘Interpretations’ the editors invite scholars to explore and debate central issues or concepts encountered in the study of contemporary European history. Recent sections have dealt with political violence (14:1), Europe and its historians (12:3) and fascist-era dictatorships (11:3). Here, David Roberts discusses the merits of the term ‘political religion’, and Carl Levy has responded. Although authors have the right of reply, David Roberts has declined to do so on this occasion.

This article seeks to clarify the uses and disadvantages of the concept of ‘political religion’, which has recently returned to currency, especially to account for the liturgy and the sense of world-historical mission central to Italian fascism, German Nazism and Soviet communism. But the category leads us to inflate abiding, suprahistorical impulses at the expense of historical specificity and novelty. And by making the phenomena in question seem relatively familiar, it diverts us from the deeper challenge they constitute. Still, the objections of critics often miss dimensions that ‘political religion’ at least approximates. Essential to the requisite synthesis is a recast notion of totalitarianism, understood as a novel frame of mind leading to a new mode of collective action.