Nearly twenty-five hundred years ago, Aristotle first elucidated his theory of morality in the Nicomachean Ethics by systematically examining and analyzing the virtues which he felt were necessary for the attainment of the Good in the here and now. One of the most controversial and perhaps least understood portions of this magnum opus are those that pertain to the now famous building blocks of legal philosophy: corrective and distributive justice. These terms remain as relevant today as when they were first “discovered” in large part due to modern legal theory’s increasing tendency to rely on Aristotle’s corrective and distributive ideas as the organizing and distinguishing principles of the private and public law, respectively. If corrective justice is to define the limits and form of the private law, however, a blind reliance on Aristotle’s interpretation is mistaken. An examination of Aristotle’s corrective justice shows that his legal philosophy is incomplete and often paradoxical—asserting premises that are irreconcilable on a plain reading of Aristotelian texts. In order to demonstrate these inconsistencies, this paper will first distinguish between corrective and distributive justice. It will then examine three of the most difficult and least understood aspects of corrective justice: namely, Aristotle’s conception of equality, reciprocity, and correlativity in gain and loss.

Should poverty be a mitigating factor, if it affects neither the strength of temptations to commit a crime an offender faced nor his mental capacity to refrain from committing the crime? I argue that it should, because of distributive justice. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I argue that we can improve distributive justice by mitigating poor offenders. Second, I argue that there are no strong objections against taking into account considerations of distributive justice in the sentencing process. I also compare my argument with an argument made by Jeffrie Murphy and explain how some objections against Murphy’s argument do not apply against my argument.

While Rawls himself put contractualism to work at the national level, his more cosmopolitan followers have argued that the full requirements of international justice can be reached only by way of a global contractualist argument. Both positions neglect a resource from within the contractualist tradition, The need for iteration of the nation-level contract gives rise to strong and reasonably definite moral requirements. A good-faith adoption of the contractual argument entails, first, a duty to assist those whose potential recourse to just arrangements is blocked by tyranny or political collapse. Second, understood as a net risk-reducing project, a nation-level contract entails a duty not to impede the iterated risk-reduction projects of other national soceties. Envisaging the duty in this contractualist way avoids problems that beset both "natural duty" and "interactionist" approaches to international justice. The non-impedance requirement bears especially on international economic arrangements. The institutional representation of those affected by such arrangements would connect this abstract requirement with practical conclusions.

The right of national groups to self-government should be universally conceived of in sub-statist forms. Instead of interpreting the right to national self-determination in terms of independent statehood, it should in all cases be conceived of as a package of privileges to which each national group is entitled in its main geographic location, normally within the state that coincides with its homeland. According to this sub-statist conception, self-determination is not a right of majority nations within states vis-a-vis national minorities, but rather a right of homeland groups vis-a-vis non-homeland groups. It is a right to which each national group in the world is entitled, and which must be realized in at least one place.

The international law of war limits the use of violence, largely through protections afforded to civilians. However, the law provides no principled limit on the taking of combatant life — soldiers may be killed even if to do so would contribute absolutely no military advantage. This permissive approach to unnecessary killing has deep historical roots in the philosophy of the law of war. Three justifications for unnecessary killing have been advanced: a robust notion of sovereignty that views the soldier as a disposable molecule of a greater being; the idea that soldiers are ‘guilty’ and deserve what befalls them in war; and a pragmatic approach holding that limits on gratuitous violence are both impossible to implement in practice as well as harmful. None of these arguments are persuasive in light of the contemporary consensus that there is a human right to life that ought to be respected at all times, even in war. A rule of “combatant proportionality” should therefore be formally incorporated into the law of war.

Focusing on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Eldred v. Ashcroft, which held that the U.S. Congress acted constitutionally when it extended copyright terms by twenty years, this article argues that copyright law in the United States for the most part responds to pragmatic imperatives. The article examines the theoretic/pragmatic distinction at an institutional level and argues that intellectual property lawmaking is at its most pragmatic in the legislative realm. While there is greater potential for theoretical concerns to influence intellectual property law-making in the judicial review context, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court declined to allow grand intellectual property theories to dictate the freedom Congress enjoys to craft copyright legislation in the light of its rational view of the best (pragmatic) cultural and economic policies. The article concludes that in Eldred v. Ashcroft there can be detected an ontological approach to the “Copyright Clause” in the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s role is to ensure that Congress acts consistently with what copyright “is”; that is, a vehicle for motivating the “creative spark” of authorship. Congress has relatively free rein to determine what copyright should “do”. Moreover, any limitations on what copyright is meant to achieve are certainly not to be determined by theoretical concerns. Even the Court’s ontological approach to copyright law should be regarded as “modest,” however, given the Court’s general deference to the policy and cultural choices legislators make in the copyright field.

Wittgenstein’s writings on “rule-following” remain an important—and sharply contested—part of his later thought. The reference to “rules” in those writings was both broader and more basic than the use of that term in most discussions of practical reasoning or legal theory. Wittgenstein’s use of “rule” refers to all normative constraints which apply over an indefinite variety of cases, to practices where our actions might be said to be guided, to situations where characterizing actions as “correct” or “incorrect” makes sense. However, “[h]e aimed not to write a book on rules but to examine specific problems arising out of insights into the normative nature of a language, of logic and of reasoning.” He focused in particular on normative practices that on the surface do not seem troubling or difficult to understand: for example, using a word correctly, understanding a signpost, and continuing a simple mathematical series. In such examples, the interesting question is not whether a particular response or continuation is right or wrong; Wittgenstein specifically chose examples where there would be consensus on that issue. Wittgenstein’s question is what is it about the rule or about ourselves which makes our responses right or wrong (or which justifies us in reaching that evaluation)?

This article examines the work of Martin Loughlin, a prominent public lawyer who works in the leftwing tradition of political and legal theory, often associated with the London School of Economics and Political Science. It argues that tensions in Loughlin’s work exemplify certain trends within the left, the result of the left having lost faith in its positive political programme, one which was supposed to be delivered by Parliament. What remains once this faith is lost is a traditional hostility to liberalism and judicial review in combination with a sense that the realm of politics-the political-is valuable. This combination explains the turn taken by certain leftwing theorists to Carl Schmitt’s authoritarian understanding of politics and to a kind of romanticism about tradition. Given the risks inherent in this turn, would be better for the left both to return to its roots in a positive programme. This move would require the left to engage properly in the contemporary debate about the normativity of law.

This article considers the use of cultural analysis by tax academics, particularly as it concerns comparative tax issues. While various authors have used the terms “culture” and “cultural” in tax scholarship, it is not clear that they have ascribed the same meanings to these terms, and their approaches have (with rare exceptions) not yet been systematic. In particular there is a division between those scholars who have used the term to indicate broad national characteristics, such as the American ambivalence toward wealth or the Italian tolerance for tax evasion, and those who have considered the beliefs and practices of tax professionals or administrators--what might better be called the tax anthropology or sociology of a given country or region. The author considers these issues in the context of two specific problems: the issue of progressivity and tax reform, and the narrower issue of statutory interpretation and tax shelter limitations. The author concludes that cross-cultural comparisons hold substantial promise in the tax field, but are likely to be most productive when focused on specific, well-defined problems and when the author is clear as to what definition of culture he or she is concerned with.

We are experiencing a transitional moment in international law. What once seemed to be an unstoppable evolution toward cosmopolitan constitutionalism now appears as a fragile and easily reversible trend, threatened both by the imperial disregard of international legality by recent U.S. administrations and by the disinterest or active opposition of a group of states that was classified as ‘uncivilized’ in nineteenth century international law. A powerful account of the differences between these states -- former colonies and satellites of great powers – and the predominantly western states whose publics take for granted human rights culture has captured the imagination of international elites. The contemporary account of the differences between western European-descended political communities and the ‘others’ focuses on democratic governance, human rights, and human security. One important element of this narrative is the emerging international legal concept of the ‘responsibility to protect,’ often promoted as a means of securing the preceding three goods. This paper considers the recommendations of the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) concerning a subsidiary element of the responsibility to protect termed the ‘responsibility to prevent.’ It argues that the prescriptions associated with the responsibility to prevent rest upon a set of prevailing assumptions about the root causes of threats to human security that are not tenable or not proven, and which both rely upon and reinforce the dualistic narrative of lawful and outlaw states that now dominates international public policy-making in western countries. Further, it shows how the model of legalization of humanitarian intervention proposed by ICISS is susceptible to cooptation by the democracy promotion project frequently associated with the liberal peace thesis. Finally, the paper recommends that only a stripped-down version of the ICISS recommendations, limited to the ‘responsibility to react,’ should be legalized, primarily because of the current absence of a reasonable degree of intercultural agreement on a substantive grounding for a muscular interpretation of a responsibility to prevent that includes root cause prevention.

The essay considers whether there are necessary truths about rights. The existence of rights is contingent, but our practices involving rights rest upon fundamental conceptual assumptions necessary to their coherence. Hohfeld’s analysis is proffered as the embodiment of those assumptions. An examination of the concept of necessity shows how those assumptions can be necessary truths about rights without being logically necessary.

Scott Shapiro offers an elaboration and defense of “legal positivism,” in which the official acceptance of a plan figures as the central explanatory notion. Rich in both ambition and insight, Legality casts an edifying new light on the structure of positive law and its officialdom. As a defense of positivism, however, it exhibits the odd feature that its main claims will prove quite acceptable to the natural lawyer. Perhaps this betokens – what many have begun to suspect anyway – that our usual tests for classifying legal theories (as positivist or not) are, in the present state of discussion, no longer credible. In any case, my hope in the following remarks is to suggest how certain ambiguities in Legality might easily be resolved in favor of Planning Natural Law. The Planning Theory of Law, in other words, is not proprietary to positivism.

This paper suggests that Canadian common law doctrine, according to which businesses providing goods and services to the public at large are allowed to refuse service because of a customer’s group-based characteristics such as race, is inconsistent with previous case law as well as with the underlying reason-based structure of the common law. After suggesting that the common law has not been fully displaced by human rights legislation, the paper demonstrates that the common law contains three concrete articulations of a duty to provide equal service. It argues that at the core of the rationale that best fits these bodies of case law is a status-based demand placed on those interacting in their capacity as members of an impersonal profession to refrain from taking into account any personal or group-based characteristics beyond those relevant to the provision of goods and services around which the profession is organized.

This article revisits Hegel’s writings on punishment to reconstruct from them a justification for the imposition of real-world penal sanctions. Tracing Hegel’s argumentative path from a bare retributive principle to his mature justification of state punishment, it argues that Hegel offers us convincing reasons for endorsing, in broad shape, the distinctive penal institutions and practices of a modern nation-state. Hegel is also right to stress that punishment is – not merely conceptually, but also in the reality of our social world – a recognition of an offender’s status as a bearer of rights and participant in a system of mutual recognition that allows us to collectively build and maintain an order of freedom. This understanding of punishment sets significant limits to punishment’s permissible forms, particularly – but not only – with regard to the death penalty. By focusing on what it means to honour an offender through punishment and by drawing attention to what legal punishment has in common with reactions to transgressions by the will more generally, I question whether the infliction of penal suffering can, as such, be a legitimate aim of penal agents. In conclusion, I argue that only a commitment to penal minimalism, developable from Hegel’s thought, can give those subjected to real-world penal sanctions a complete answer to the question why they should accept their punishment as justified.

Ronald Dworkin and Duncan Kennedy represent arguably two opposing poles in legal theory. This paper offers a novel frame for reading their respective legal theories which reconceptualizes the traditional way in which they were opposed, and new ways to compare them, to understand their commonalities and their differences.

While Dworkin is taken to be a champion of a theory of rights, he is also associated with a certain theory of interpretation which holds that even in hard cases judges have limited discretion and a right answer to every legal question we might reasonably encounter. Kennedy, in contrast, seems to disagree with Dworkin in every conceivable respect such as the nature of law and legal reasoning, the role of right, the relation of law to its outsides (politics/ideology), thus questioning the objectivity and neutrality of legal reasoning, and he seems to be advocating what could be termed as a “radical indeterminacy” thesis.

The paper attempts reading Dworkin and Kennedy alongside each other, rather than in opposition, and so it deploys two interrelated strategies to establish such frame. One is concerned softening what appear to be rigid opposition through scrutinizing their writings, whereas the other takes stock of the common themes, presuppositions, images of law, and sensibilities that both share either explicitly or implicitly. This double strategy reveals the arguments that are attributed to them and which they themselves deny they are making. To that end, the paper unveils an unacknowledged shift toward phenomenology in legal theory that took place in the last few decades.

There are a set of wrongs that are normatively distinct as ‘criminal wrongs’, and yet, there is disagreement as to ‘the basic features of criminal liability’ that explain this normative distinctiveness. The only consensus has been that criminal wrongs are ‘public wrongs’. For some, they are public wrongs in the sense that they infringe the values and interests for which the community has a shared and mutual concern. For others, they are public wrongs in the sense that they are the wrongs that public officials are responsible for punishing. A third view is that they are public wrongs in the sense that there are procedural advantages of having public officials empowered to address the wrongdoing. I argue here that the first two views are analytically inseparable: the considerations that explain the wrongs that merit social prohibition are the same considerations that explain the censuring and punitive response of the criminal law. I also argue here that, contrary to the third view, the powers of public officials in criminal law procedures follow from, rather than explain, the concept of a crime being a public wrong. Procedural advantages can explain how criminal wrongs are public wrongs, but they cannot explain why criminal wrongs are public wrongs.

Over the last two decades, legal scholarship has been catching up with the more than century old calls by black Americans for reparations.1 Tax scholar Boris Bittker (in)famously launched the viability of black reparations into legal scholarship with his now classic monograph, The Case for Black Reparations.2 However, it would take more than twenty years for mainstream legal scholarship to take up the robust and wide-ranging set of questions raised by the possibility of reparations for American slavery.3 In the late 1990s private law scholars leapt into the debate, discussing unjust enrichment and torts-based models of black reparations.4 While these scholars made a variety of distinct arguments, collectively, their model rested on the contention that America had wrongfully expropriated the labor of generations of enslaved African Americans and the result had been systemic unjust enrichment, or a species of mass torts. Grounded in various conceptions of corrective justice, these models conceive black reparations as a set of claims that would be litigated through the courts. Over the ensuing two decades, the private law model has become somewhat of an outlier in reparations discussions, largely set aside in favor of broader, more explicitly political approaches.

The law uses ‘discrimination’ to denote practices of exclusion and distinction that are wrongful from a legal point of view. Anti-discrimination doctrines around the world use the concept of ‘wrongful distinctions’ to enumerate the ways in which irrelevant distinctions between individuals or groups are made and to explain their illegality. But how should the term ‘irrelevant’ be understood in this context? Most legal systems around the world use the term ‘irrelevant’ only in denunciation of distinctions based on ‘common,’ ‘classic,’ or ‘suspicious’ grounds, such as race-based or sex-based distinctions.

Individuals sometimes do things that they know will violate the terms of a statute. Most scholars deny that such actions are always morally wrong, but a coherent theoretical account of the relationships between 1) moral obligation, 2) legal obligation, and 3) criminal wrongdoing that can robustly classify hard cases has been elusive. This article starts with a Kantian account of the relationship between law and morality, and it proposes two closely related standards: one for legal obligation, and another for criminal wrongdoing. It then tests the plausibility and resilience of these standards by using them to generate illuminating new analyses of classic hypothetical cases involving alleged crimes committed under circumstances of necessity. These analyses offer reason to believe that the standards proposed in this article can anchor a Kantian theory of criminal responsibility that is simultaneously rigorous and humane.