In this paper I take seriously Rawls’s characterization of his The Law of Peoples as carrying forward the project of Political Liberalism. The latter articulates Rawls’s reworking of the stability argument from Part III of A Theory of Justice to better square it with the permanent fact of reasonable doctrinal pluralism under conditions of freedom and right. As presented in Theory the stability argument is an argument from moral psychology. This moral psychology structures the problem generated by doctrinal pluralism in both Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, each of which sets out a consistent principled liberal response to it, the former in the domestic, and the latter in the international, context. Bringing this moral psychology to the surface sheds considerable light on Rawls’s attempt to vindicate the possibility of world hospitable to enduring just and stable constitutional liberal democracies governed by legitimate law.

It has always been the rule in Anglo-American common law that there is no general duty to come to the aid of strangers, no matter how great the need or how easily the aid could be given. The rule is based upon the fundamental distinction between misfeasance — active misconduct that causes positive injury to another — and nonfeasance — inaction that represents a failure to take positive steps to benefit another. Courts have consistently held that the common law of private obligations does not impose affirmative duties simply on the basis of one party’s need and another’s capacity to fulfill that need. In this century, the courts have with increasing frequency avoided the most morally offensive applications of this general rule by basing affirmative duties to render aid upon various “special relationships” found to exist between potential rescuers who failed to act and the victims they failed to save.

Disputes over the scope of specific rights, e.g., over the right to free speech, the right to property, or the right to equality, often originate in differing assumptions concerning the reasons that justify the protection of these rights. Thus, those who believe that reasons of autonomy justify the right to free speech will identify the scope of this right differently from those who justify this protection through, say, appeal to the marketplace of ideas. Despite the diverse subject matter of these disputes, there is a uniform structure characterizing them. Some supporters of rights, call them “traditionalists,” locate the reasons that justify the protection of rights within individualistic concerns. Others, call them “revisionists,” deny this traditional claim and argue that rights can be partially or exclusively grounded in societal interests.

Traditionalism’ and ‘revisionism’ are terms stipulated to clarify the conceptual difference between two different understandings of rights. These understandings are often implicit in the way the term ‘rights’ is used in political or legal debates concerning the scope of particular rights. At other times, these implicit understandings of the term ‘rights’ are articulated more or less explicitly by moral or political philosophers investigating the nature of rights. Thus, when the terms ‘revisionist’ or ‘traditionalist’ are used in this article, they are used in two different ways. Sometimes, they denote implicit fundamental presuppositions about the nature of rights—presuppositions which underlie many of the contemporary debates over the scope of particular rights. At other times, they denote philosophical theories exploring systematically the nature of rights and the reasons underlying them.

Virtually all liberal egalitarian advocates of redistributive taxation support an income tax, believing that consumption taxes fail to reach capital and its yield. But this is not true under progressive rates. There are two forms of consumption tax, prepaid and postpaid. A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax reaches the yield to capital in just those cases in which ordinary moral intuitions want it to be reached: when savings are used to finance a “better,” more expensive, lifestyle. Such a tax stands between an income tax, which double taxes all savings, come what may, and a prepaid consumption tax, which never taxes savings. It is the last, best hope for some semblance of redistribution via tax on earth.

Kant described the ability to move from theory to practice, to subsume particular facts under general principles, as “judgment”:

But Kant had little to say by way of guidance for the exercise of judgment, because, in his view, judgment itself could not be completely theorized:

Legal ethics theories give competing and exclusive accounts of the ethical foundations of the lawyer’s role. They disagree about the relationship between morality and law, about the content of the lawyer’s central ethical duties and about how specific ethical problems should be resolved. Each theoretical account asserts that the others are mistaken in some fundamental way. Yet all legal ethics theories are theories of action; legal ethics theorists do not seek merely to enlighten, they also seek to influence how lawyers and the legal profession respond to ethical issues. This creates a problem of disagreement: the problem created by the divergent but exclusive claims made by different ethical theories at the point when those theories are to be translated into action. This paper considers how, given the problem of disagreement, legal ethics theories can have any impact on individual ethical decision-making or public policy. Specifically, it considers how theories can have any impact given a) that they fundamentally disagree; and b) what experimental psychology tells us about how people make ethical decisions in fact, and the nature of lawyer regulation.

This paper concerns the role of property theory in explaining why so many people around the world control their assets informally, without recourse to the state. According to one influential view, owners and their assets are driven to the informal sector because of deficiencies in the form of ownership on offer in the formal sphere. Where too many people have the power to veto the optimal use of a resource, we have a form of ownership, an anticommons, that is deficient. But this account of informality proceeds from an overly capacious theory of ownership. On this view, an owner’s position is incomplete if she lacks the requisite inputs for a project that represents the optimal use of an object. Further, a person counts as an “owner,” albeit one locked in an anticommons, merely if she has the power to block the ends that others are able to achieve with an object. I argue that this view of ownership leaves us unable to see that owners are in a radically different position vis-à-vis other owners with the same authority over an object than they are vis-à-vis the state or other non-owners who may be in a position to block an owner’s valuable ends. The integrity of the concept of the anticommons is undermined if we define it in terms of veto-power over the ends for which a resource is optimally suited.

In this paper, I situate the concept of the anticommons within a larger theory of ownership as agenda-setting authority. Seen this way, what is important about an anticommons is its effect on an owner’s means rather than her ends. Whereas owners of private property are never guaranteed the ability to achieve their ends, owners in an anticommons are not even guaranteed the ability to exercise their very means, their agenda-setting authority. From this revised and much narrower concept of the anticommons, what follows is that talk of “gridlock” in the formal sphere makes sense just as a normative argument about the best distribution of ownership and regulatory authority rather than a conceptual argument rooted in the idea of ownership.

This paper critically examines prevailing egalitarian theories (which assess inequality between two individuals on the basis of their lifetime experience). The paper proposes an alternative theoretical framework: the Dignified Lives Approach. This theoretical framework, which rests on deontological foundations, considers all human beings as of equal moral worth, and advocates treating each individual with equal concern and respect at any given time. The paper articulates five essential principles of equality founded in the notion of equal concern and respect: the principle of individual assessment, the principle of equal influence, the principle of sufficiency, the principle of social inclusion, and the principle of autonomy. Focusing on senior workers, the paper reveals that age discrimination may be as unjust as other forms of discrimination. It therefore articulates a strong, moral case for eradicating age discrimination which is well supported by recent judicial developments.

In most Common-Law jurisdictions, deceptive sexual relations are criminalized with the same offence that is used to criminalize coercive sexual relations. This trend is strongly supported by feminist scholars like Susan Estrich, who regard deceptive sexual relations as being as wrongful as coercive. Others conflate coercion and deception, going as far to consider deception to be a form of coercion. Against this trend, the present paper argues firstly that deceptive sexual relations are analytically distinct from both coercive and consensual: secondly that, to the extent that cases of deception should be criminalized, this should be done by using an offence distinct from, and less grave than, the offence applicable to coercive sexual relations. To support the latter conclusion this paper suggests a novel argument for why coercive sexual relations are more wrongful than deceptive. The coercer's conduct is more wrongful because it involves typical wrongmaking features that deception lacks: the coercer cruelly proceeds with the coercion while faced with the victim’s suffering and they dismissively disregard negative reactive attitudes such as resentment and anger that the victim forms and expresses toward them. It is then argued that this difference in wrongfulness serves as a reason for criminalizing coercion and deception in separate offences, the former graver than the latter.

In debates over rights, as much as, or perhaps more than, in any philosophical debate, it is important to see the wood from the trees. A little while ago, new life was breathed into debates over rights, as a new candidate theory emerged to rival the extant options. More specifically, Gopal Sreenivasan’s hybrid theory of (claim-) rights emerged to rival both will theory and interest theory. This new hybrid theory underwent a series of skirmishes with the interest theory. Moving from the wood, one principal ground over which battle ensued is the so-called third party beneficiary issue. And, more specifically still, descending into the trees, a particular problem within the foregoing third party beneficiary debate centred on what I shall dub Gopal’s Granny, a case wielded by Gopal Sreenivasan, particularly against one of the foremost defenders of the interest theory, Matthew Kramer.

Given the unwittingness of negligence, personal responsibility for negligent conduct is puzzling. After all, how is it that one is responsible for what one did not intend to do or was unaware that one was doing? How, therefore, is one’s agency involved with one’s negligence so as to ground one’s responsibility for it? Negligence is an unwitting failure in agency to meet a standard requiring conduct that falls within one’s competency. Accordingly, negligent conduct involves agency in that negligence is a manifestation of agency failure. Now, nobody’s perfect. Human agency is innately fallible, and a measure of agency failure is, therefore, unavoidable. The more one’s negligence manifests failure in one’s agency as an individual, the more one is responsible for it. In contrast, the more one’s negligence involves the shortcomings innate to all human agency the less responsible one becomes, because one’s agency as an individual is less and less involved in one’s failure. Determinative of the measure of individual and of human failings mixed into an instance of negligent phi-ing is the background quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency at phi-ing. That is, how able one is at delivering on what one is able to competently do. The more able, the less one’s occasional instances of negligence involve manifestations of failures of one’s agency as an individual—nobody’s perfect—and are more manifestations of one’s agency’s innate human fallibility, making one less and less responsible for one’s negligence.

This Article explores the different intellectual and socio-political contexts that attended the emergence of the French, German, and English legal systems with a view to understanding French, German, and English private law from the perspective of the participants in these systems. The French legal system is a child of the Cartesian dualism that marked the Age of Reason, according to which the material world can and ought to be fully dominated by the human intellect. This conception of the relation of facts to ideas arguably is reflected in the structure and design of the French civil code, in such institutional features as the French conception of the role of the judge, as well as in the tendency of French jurists to view contractual consent subjectively. In contrast, the German legal system congealed at a time when Cartesian dualism was losing ground to German idealism. The dialectic conception of facts and ideas favoured by the German idealists arguably made its way into several institutional features of the German legal system, including the content of the BGB, the codification process, the conception of the role of the judge, the style of judicial decisions, and the greater inter-penetration of public and private law. It may also partly explain why German jurists have tended to view contractual consent as simultaneously objective and subjective. Finally, whereas both the French and the German legal systems emerged from highly intellectual contexts, the English legal system grew from a maize of pragmatic political and administrative considerations that left little room for explicit ideas. The emphasis on hard facts still is palpable in many aspects of contemporary English law, in particular, the doctrine of stare decisis, the conception of the judicial function, and the mode of reasoning by analogy. It arguably also is reflected in the tendency of English judges to privilege the objective conception of contractual consent.

At its most basic level, autonomy is self direction or self rule. Let us take this as a rough working definition. Thus, anyone else who has (other than advisory) authority over one’s actions would seem to violate or be in a position to violate one’s autonomy. Yet, authority differs from power in that it is legitimized; so that violation is justified (if it is a “violation” at all). Put most simply, either you are autonomous and direct yourself or you yield to authority and surrender your autonomy.

Recent U.S. tax cuts, to the extent that they involved a principled, long-term policy view, seem to have been aimed at shrinking the size of government. The idea apparently was to force eventual spending discipline, even (or perhaps especially) with respect to Social Security and Medicare, by turning reduced tax revenues into a political fact on the ground that would be difficult to reverse. In fact, however, the idea that the tax cuts would make the government smaller seems to have rested on spending illusion, or confusion between the actual size of government, in terms of its allocative and distributional effects, and the observed dollar flows that are denominated ‘taxes’ and ‘spending’.

Given the long-term budget constraint, which holds that government inflows and outlays must ultimately be equal in present value, and the huge preexisting fiscal imbalance, the tax cuts are likely to be paid for, in the main, through some combination of future tax increases and cuts to Social Security and Medicare. (Other government spending cuts, relative to the case where the tax cuts were not enacted, are likely as well, but cannot contribute nearly enough.) To the extent that the 2001 through 2003 tax cuts lead to future tax increases, the combined effect is likely to make the government bigger both allocatively and distributionally. To the extent that Social Security and Medicare spending bear the brunt, the government still gets larger in the sense of increasing redistribution from younger to older generations, although Medicare cuts might decrease the size of government allocatively.

A consensus has long been established that adherents of the Critical Legal School (and to a lesser extent, Legal Realism) exaggerated their claims of law’s indeterminacy. This paper however, attempts to resurrect the indeterminacy debate by articulating, developing and elevating a particular strand of it; namely, the use of unrestrained time frames in factual construction. This claims that factual construction in adjudication is, in part, contingent on the time frames adopted—though absent some metaprinciple on whether to adopt broad or narrow time frames—indeterminacy rears its head. The paper primarily argues that time frame indeterminacy is important as it actually underwrites the attacks levelled by both Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and American Legal Realism (ALR) on legal liberalism. It nourishes ALR critiques by enriching the strict and loose articulations of precedent authored by Karl Llewellyn, and also connects some of the definitive themes that underline the CLS literature, specifically the rules-standards and free will-determinism contradictions in legal liberal discourse.

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the ideas of equality underlying section 15 claims for benefits such as welfare and health care; I use the name ‘economic rights claims’ for these types of claims. I adopt Joseph Raz’s division of equality claims into rhetorical egalitarian claims, which are based in a failure to equally respect a universal claim (and typically take a form such as, ‘All Fs have a right to G’), and strict egalitarian claims, which are based on an actually existing unequal distribution of resources (and take the form, ‘All Fs who do not have G have a right to G if some Fs have G’). I show how the dignity-based approach to equality stemming from Law v. Canada is an example of a rhetorical egalitarian claim. With this groundwork set, I turn my attention to the economic rights claims. I survey three reasons for thinking that an unequal distribution of some benefit might, even absent any failure to respect or recognize the dignity of those at the losing end, be thought of as wrong or unjust. The first two reasons - an appeal to an idea of sufficiency, and the fear that some stigma might be associated with the inequality - I reject in favour of the third, which is that in a situation in which all the participants have some equal claim to a benefit, a fair procedure will result in their benefiting equally. Following John Rawls, I suggest that our society, as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, creates in its members at least a prima facie equal claim to share in the society’s benefits. The economic rights claims, then, are claims that this prima facie equal claim has not been respected. But the benefits being claimed for, as benefits created by the society, are not benefits automatically due to everyone just in virtue of their humanity, instead they are due to the worst-off once the best off have come to be able to benefit from them. Thus they take a strict egalitarian form - once some members of our society benefit in a certain way, then the equality of all members as contributors to the cooperative venture for mutual advantage implies that the other members of our society gain a claim to that benefit. The fact that these economic rights claims are strict egalitarian claims means they cannot be grounded in arguments about dignity, as dignity-based claims are rhetorical egalitarian claims for benefits due to all in virtue of their universal human dignity. I conclude by returning to Law to highlight a passage which I believe provides a grounding for a recognition of economic rights in line with my argument; I also make some brief comments on the need for a stricter division of labour between section 15 and section 1 in the context of economic rights claims and on the effect of this argument on Canadian federal law more generally.

This article provides an explanatory framework of the spontaneous lawmaking (“SL”) process in the area of private law. To illuminate the process of the spontaneous emergence of private law, this paper focuses on three issues: (1) the conditions under which SL is likely to generate efficient norms, (2) the mechanisms that explain the emergence of norms in the absence of centralized enforcing institutions, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages in terms of the efficiency of SL compared to public centralized lawmaking processes. This discussion is organized as follows. Section I defines the scope of the analysis. Section II introduces the relevant analytical tools offered by game theory and transaction-cost economics. Section III identifies the conditions for the spontaneous emergence of efficient norms. Section IV identifies three alternative mechanisms that explain the spontaneous emergence of norms. Section V examines the limitations of SL processes. Finally, Section VI provides examples of SL in the area of private law to demonstrate concretely the analytical potential of the proposed framework.

I argue in this article for the use of a dialogical approach to cost-benefit analysis, which is identified here as a process that rationalizes cross-cultural judging. Weighing in on the Kahan-Sunstein debate about the effect of culture on risk perception, I use economic valuations of Indigenous sacred sites to demonstrate how cost-benefit analysis can misrepresent loss. I identify the way cost-benefit analysis operationalizes preferences that have little relevance for perceptions of substitutability, property, or harm related to sacred sites held by some Indigenous peoples. In doing so, I problematize the use of cost-benefit analysis as a method for ascertaining loss and contextualize risk in the social context in which it is perceived. In order to further procedural justice, I recommend valuation of loss that allows for epistemological disparities in determining rationality. This dialogical approach expects to maximize the accuracy of cost benefit analysis so as to create greater accountability for loss valuation and destabilize formulations of culturally determined preferences as bounded but corrected by expert knowledge.

According to a widely-shared view, human rights encompass a very limited range of ethical concerns: not all human interests, only urgent interests;1 not our preferences, only our needs;2 not all wrongs, only severe injustices;3 not a good life in the fullest sense, but only a minimally decent or autonomous life.4 In short, human rights are not about realizing the best, they are about shielding us from the worst. I will call this general theoretical stance Minimalism.

This paper intends to throw light upon some aspects of the debate on the characterization of legal principles and on their differences when compared to rules. Particularly, this analysis proposes differentiating principles from rules by considering the functions they perform in law instead of their structural differences. To achieve this, we distinguish between the functions of guidance and justification that legal principles fulfill. From that distinction, we observe that the attempt to characterize legal principles based on the way in which they guide conduct does not seem to be the most appropriate either. In contrast, this paper tries to show that all the different types of precepts known as principles perform a justifying function in legal reasoning.