Modern work life is characterized by constant change, reorganizations, and requirements of efficiency, which make the distribution of resources and obligations, as well as justice in decisionmaking, highly important. In the work life context, it is a question not only of distributing resources and obligations, but also of the procedures and rules that guide the decisionmaking in the organization. Studies of these rules and procedures have provided the basis for a new line of research that evaluates leadership and social relationships in working communities; that is, distributive, procedural, and relational justice. This review follows the development of research on organizational justice from its origins in early social and motivational psychological theories to its establishment as a major line of research in modern work and organizational psychology. The adverse consequences of injustice include poor team climate, reduced productivity and well-being, and work-related illnesses.

Although national guidelines exist for evaluating the eligibility of potential living donors and for procuring their informed consent, no special protections or considerations exist for potential living donors who are incarcerated. Human research subject protections in the United States are codified in the Federal Regulations, 45 CFR 46, and special protections are given to prisoners. Living donor transplantation has parallels with human subject research in that both activities are performed with the primary goal of benefiting third parties. In this article, we describe what special considerations should be provided to prisoners as potential living donors using a vulnerabilities approach adapted from the human research subject protection literature.

This article considers recent ethical topics in Australia relating to the health rights of children in the contexts of (1) detention centers, (2) vaccination, and (3) procreative liberty, within a wider framework of discussion of the competing rights of society, parents, the child, and future generations.

Neuroscientific interventions are increasingly proposed as solutions for social problems, beyond their application in biomedicine. For example, there is increasing interest, particularly from outside commentators, in harnessing neuroscientific advances as an alternative method of punishing criminal offenders. Such neuropunishments are seen as a potentially more effective, less costly, and more humane alternative to incarceration, with overall better results for offender, communities, and societies. This article considers whether neuroscience as a field should engage more actively with such proposals, and whether more research should be done to explore the use of neurointerventions for punishment. It concludes that neuroscientists and those working at the intersection of neuroscience and the clinic should actively shape these debates.

A new generation of implantable brain–computer interfaces (BCI) devices have been tested for the first time in a human clinical trial, with significant success. These intelligent implants detect specific neuronal activity patterns, such as an epileptic seizure, and provide information to help patients to respond to the upcoming neuronal events. By forecasting a seizure, the technology keeps patients in the decisional loop; the device gives control to patients on how to respond and decide on a therapeutic course ahead of time. Being kept in the decisional loop can positively increase patients’ quality of life; however, doing so does not come free of ethical concerns. There is currently a lack of evidence concerning the various impacts of closed-loop system BCIs on patients’ decisionmaking processes, especially how being in the decisional loop impacts patients’ sense of autonomy. This article addresses these gaps by providing data that we obtained from a first-in-human clinical trial involving patients implanted with advisory brain devices. This article explores ethical issues related to the risks involved in being kept in the decisional loop.

Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are driven essentially by algorithms; however, the ethical role of such algorithms has so far been neglected in the ethical assessment of BCIs. The goal of this article is therefore twofold: First, it aims to offer insights into whether (and how) the problems related to the ethics of BCIs (e.g., responsibility) can be better grasped with the help of already existing work on the ethics of algorithms. As a second goal, the article explores what kinds of solutions are available in that body of scholarship, and how these solutions relate to some of the ethical questions around BCIs. In short, the article asks what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs from looking at the ethics of algorithms. To achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief introduction into the algorithmic background of BCIs is given. Second, the debate about epistemic concerns and the ethics of algorithms is sketched. Finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs.

China’s current basic health insurance reform aims at promoting equity in the economic accessibility of health services for all citizens, to better ensure healthcare justice. Therefore, it is important to assess equity not only from a socioeconomic perspective but also from an ethical angle. This article investigates the basic health insurance system of Hunan Province in China by focusing on insurance types as well as their classification standards, mechanisms, and utilization according to local policy documents and data. This study demonstrates the reforming achievements and the inequity of institutional design according to two interrelated dimensions: equal opportunity of access to healthcare insurance and reducing inequality in insurance benefits. The article concludes that to achieve opportunity equity and outcome fairness, the reform should focus on designing the system to promote equity with respect to procedures and rules and to be more attentive to the interests of vulnerable groups and especially to rural residents.

This article reexamines the “prostitution objection” to paid surrogacy, and argues that rebuttals to this objection fail to focus on surrogates as embodied persons. This failure is based on the false distinction between “selling one’s reproductive services” and “selling one’s body.” To ground the analysis of humans as embodied persons, this article uses Kant’s late ethical theory, which develops the conceptual framework for understanding human beings as embodied selves. Literature on surrogacy commonly emphasizes that all Kantian duties heed to the categorical prohibition to treat persons as mere means. What this literature leaves out is that this imperative commands us more specifically to engage ourselves and others as embodied persons. This article aims to relate this point to a specific issue in assisted reproduction. It argues that a Kantian account of human beings as embodied persons prohibits paid surrogacy on exactly the same grounds as it prohibits prostitution.

The aim of this section is to expand and accelerate advances in curriculum developments and in methods of teaching bioethics.

Recent highly publicized privacy breaches in healthcare and genomics research have led many to question whether current standards of data protection are adequate. Improvements in de-identification techniques, combined with pervasive data sharing, have increased the likelihood that external parties can track individuals across multiple databases. This article focuses on the communication of identifiability risks in the process of obtaining consent for donation and research. Most ethical discussions of identifiability risks have focused on the severity of the risk and how it might be mitigated, and what precisely is at stake in pervasive data sharing. However, there has been little discussion of whether and how to communicate the risk to potential donors. We review the ethical arguments behind favoring different types of risk communication in the consent process, and outline how identifiability concerns can be incorporated into either a detailed or a simplified method of communicating risks during the consent process.

Research participants are entitled to many rights that may easily come into conflict. The most important ones are that researchers respect their autonomy as persons and act on the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Since 2014, research subjects from numerous states in the United States of America also have a legal “right to try” that allows them, under certain circumstances, to receive experimental (i.e., preliminarily tested) interventions, including medical devices, before official approval from the United States Food and Drug Administration. In the context of experimental interventions, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Alzheimer’s disease, this article argues that research participants ought never to have a legal “right to try” without a corresponding “right to be sure.” The latter refers to external epistemic justification construed in terms of reliance on reliable evidence. This article demonstrates that the mere complexity of intervention ensembles, as in the case of DBS for Alzheimer’s disease which serves as a paradigm example, illustrate how unanswered and/or unasked open questions give rise to a “combinatorial explosion” of uncertainties that require epistemic responses that no single research team alone is likely able to provide. From this assessment, several epistemic asymmetrical relations between researchers and participants are developed. By elucidating these epistemic asymmetries, this article unravels the reasons why open science, transparent exhaustive data reporting, preregistration, and continued constant critical appraisal via pre- and postpublication peer review are not scientific virtues of moral excellence but rather ordinary obligations of the scientific work routine required to increase reliability and strength of evidence.

Since 1997, execution in China has been increasingly performed by lethal injection. The current criteria for determination of death for execution by lethal injection (cessation of heartbeat, cessation of respiration, and dilated pupils) neither conform to current medical science nor to any standard of medical ethics. In practice, death is pronounced in China within tens of seconds after starting the lethal injection. At this stage, however, neither the common criteria for cardiopulmonary death (irreversible cessation of heartbeat and breathing) nor that of brain death (irreversible cessation of brain functions) have been met. To declare a still-living person dead is incompatible with human dignity, regardless of the processes following death pronouncement. This ethical concern is further aggravated if organs are procured from the prisoners. Analysis of postmortem blood thiopental level data from the United States indicates that thiopental, as used, may not provide sufficient surgical anesthesia. The dose of thiopental used in China is kept secret. It cannot be excluded that some of the organ explantation surgeries on prisoners subjected to lethal injection are performed under insufficient anesthesia in China. In such cases, the inmate may potentially experience asphyxiation and pain. Yet this can be easily overlooked by the medical professionals performing the explantation surgery because pancuronium prevents muscle responses to pain, resulting in an extremely inhumane situation. We call for an immediate revision of the death determination criteria in execution by lethal injection in China. Biological death must be ensured before death pronouncement, regardless of whether organ procurement is involved or not.

Against the contemporary debates on techniques of “moral enhancement,” this article reviews the interpretation and methods of moral enhancement during the Stalin years in Russia: (1) the GULAG and (2) the abuse of psychiatry. The article serves as a cautionary tale for today’s policy debates, from the personal experiences of the author.

Palliative care has had a long-standing commitment to teaching medical students and other medical professionals about pain management, communication, supporting patients in their decisions, and providing compassionate end-of-life care. Palliative care programs also have a critical role in helping patients understand medical conditions, and in supporting them in dealing with pain, fear of dying, and the experiences of the terminal phase of their lives. We applaud their efforts to provide that critical training and fully support their continued important work in meeting the needs of patients and families. Although we appreciate the contributions of palliative care services, we have noted a problem involving some palliative care professionals’ attitudes, methods of decisionmaking, and use of language. In this article we explain these problems by discussing two cases that we encountered.

This section focuses on the ethical, legal, social, and policy questions arising from research involving human and animal subjects.

Brain–computer interface (BCI) is a promising technology for restoring communication in individuals with locked-in syndrome (LIS). BCI technology offers a potential tool for individuals with impaired or absent means of effective communication to use brain activity to control an output device such as a computer keyboard. Exploratory studies of BCI devices for communication in people with LIS are underway. Research with individuals with LIS presents not only technological challenges, but ethical challenges as well. Whereas recent attention has been focused on ethical issues that arise at the initiation of studies, such as how to obtain valid consent, relatively little attention has been given to issues at the conclusion of studies. BCI research in LIS highlights one such challenge: How to decide when an exploratory BCI research study should end. In this article, we present the case of an individual with presumed LIS enrolled in an exploratory BCI study. We consider whether two common ethical frameworks for stopping randomized clinical trials—equipoise and nonexploitation—can be usefully applied to elucidating researcher obligations to end exploratory BCI research. We argue that neither framework is a good fit for exploratory BCI research. Instead, we apply recent work on clinician-researcher fiduciary obligations and in turn offer some preliminary recommendations for BCI researchers on how to end exploratory BCI studies.

This article describes the well-developed and long-standing medical ethics teaching programs in both of New Zealand’s medical schools at the University of Otago and the University of Auckland. The programs reflect the awareness that has been increasing as to the important role that ethics education plays in contributing to the “professionalism” and “professional development” in medical curricula.

Some authors have questioned the moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in cases in which it is not clear if the author of the AD is identical to the person to whom it later applies. This article focuses on the question of whether the latest results of neuroimaging studies have moral significance with regard to the moral authority of ADs in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Some neuroimaging findings could provide novel insights into the question of whether patients with DOCs exhibit sufficient psychological continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. If those studies were to indicate that psychological continuity is present, they could justify the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs. This holds at least if respect for self-determination is considered as the foundation for the moral authority of ADs. The non-identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be applied, in line with clinical and social practice.

Fear of life, fear of death, and fear of causing death form a combination that prevents reasoned changes in laws concerning end-of-life situations. This is shown systematically in this article using the methods of conceptual analysis. Prevalent fears are explicated and interpreted to see how their meanings differ depending on the chosen normative stance. When the meanings have been clarified, the impact of the fears on the motivations and justifications of potential legislative reforms are assessed. Two main normative stances are evoked. The first makes an appeal to individual self-determination, or autonomy, and the second to the traditional professional ethics of physicians. These views partly share qualifying elements, including incurability and irreversibility of the patient’s medical condition, proximity of death, the unbearable nature of suffering, and issues of voluntariness further shade the matter. The conclusion is that although many motives to change end-of-life laws are admirable, they are partly contradictory, as are calls for autonomy and appeals to professional ethics; to a degree that good, principled legislative solutions remain improbable in the foreseeable future.