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Rationalization of emotion is also rational

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Peter Railton*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI48109-1003. [email protected]://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/faculty/prailton.html

Abstract

Cushman seeks to explain rationalization in terms of fundamental mental processes, and he hypotheses a selected-for function: information exchange between “rational” and “non-rational” processes in the brain. While this is plausible, his account overlooks the importance – and information value – of rationalizing the emotions of ourselves and others. Incorporating such rationalization would help explain the effectiveness of rationalization and its connection with valuation, as well as raise a challenge to his way of bifurcating “rational” and “non-rational” processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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