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Rationalization as representational exchange: Scope and mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Fiery Cushman Open the ORCID record for Fiery Cushman [Opens in a new window]
Fiery Cushman*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, [email protected]://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu
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Abstract

The commentaries suggest many important improvements to the target article. They clearly distinguish two varieties of rationalization – the traditional “motivated reasoning” model, and the proposed representational exchange model – and show that they have distinct functions and consequences. They describe how representational exchange occurs not only by post hoc rationalization but also by ex ante rationalization and other more dynamic processes. They argue that the social benefits of representational exchange are at least as important as its direct personal benefits. Finally, they construe our search for meaning, purpose, and narrative – both individually and collectively – as a variety of representational exchange. The result is a theory of rationalization as representational exchange both wider in scope and better defined in mechanism.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e55
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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