International efforts to codify the law on trafficking in persons have been evolving since the early twentieth century. This paper re-examines this journey of law and divides the existing international and domestic legal regimes into three categories: the rescue model, quasi-curative model, and curative model. The study proposes the development of an effective legal model, which may rest on the twin pillars of shared state responsibility and long-term assistance to trafficking victims. In this model, it is argued that the enunciated principles of prosecution, protection, and prevention to combat human trafficking should not be dealt with in isolation, but in combination with the concepts of state responsibility and international financial co-operation to provide long-term assistance to the victims. My central argument focuses on the suitable legal regime in which the prosecution strategy is to successfully prosecute traffickers in person, improve survivors’ protection, and reinvigorate obligations imposed on the states.

This paper examines the evolution of expropriation provisions contained in Singapore’s bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements from the 1970s until now. It will be seen that whilst earlier treaties contained skeletal expropriation provisions, the later treaties have sought to guide the exercise of tribunals’ discretion by providing a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account when indirect expropriation is alleged. The consequences of this evolution in Singapore’s treaty-making practice are considered in the light of customary international law. The paper postulates a framework for analyzing Singapore’s treaty practice and this author concludes by submitting that the later treaties arguably go one step further in limiting the scope of indirect expropriation.

This paper aims to examine the legitimacy of Ryukyuans/Okinawans’1 right to self-determination (RSD) under international human rights law. To this end, it first details the evolution of the RSD from the traditional right to independence for colonial peoples, to the continuing right to self-governance for wider groups of peoples, which is followed by an analysis of holders of the RSD. The paper then turns to Ryukyu/Okinawa to discuss the RSD of its peoples. Three historical events, the Disposition of Ryukyu, the Treaty of San Francisco, and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, are analysed from a legal perspective, followed by an examination of the peoplehood of Ryukyuans/Okinawans. These lead to the conclusion that the Ryukyuans/Okinawans may legitimately claim that they possess the “unexercised” RSD as a quasi-non-self-governing people, and that they are entitled to claim the RSD as a “people” under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and other United Nations declarations.

South Asia, as a region, consists of several stateless groups as well as groups at the risk of statelessness. However, none of the South Asian states are parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, thus these states do not have specific obligations arising from this Convention to avoid, reduce, or prevent statelessness in the region. In this context, this article ascertains that despite the prevalence of statelessness, there exists state practice and opinio juris in South Asia that point to an emerging customary international law obligation to avoid, reduce, or prevent statelessness.

The Philippines v. China arbitration award has been praised as a landmark victory setting forth illuminating jurisprudence interpreting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], but it has also been repeatedly excoriated as an “unenforceable” decision—a Pyrrhic victory—due to China’s repeated refusal to date to acknowledge the binding effect of the award. China’s withdrawal from Scarborough Shoal—hailed by the new Duterte government as a hallmark of its diplomatic efforts—is one instance of state practice that still remains equivocal on the opinio juris of China’s acceptance (or rejection) of the arbitration award.

The Chinese traditional maritime boundary line (U-line) in the South China Sea (SCS) and its validity under international law have been challenged by bordering states and some scholars. In 2012, Franckx and Benatar questioned the validity of the U-line in view of factors such as the intent of the state reflected by the map, the cartographer's neutrality, technical accuracy, consistency of the cartographic material, and recognition and acquiescence by the international community. This paper points out that the SCS U-line drawn by the Chinese government in 1947, at the median position between China's SCS islands and reefs, and the coastlines of bordering states, reflects the scope of China's claims and intent. The consistency of the claims has been maintained by the PRC after 1949, and the claims have been recognised or acquiesced to by bordering states over quite a long period. Therefore, the U-line has probative force under international law.

Ever since the beginning of the “Asian Values” debate in the early 1990s, there have been efforts on the part of many societal actors to establish distinctively Asian human rights norms that integrate local customary values and international human rights norms. This article presents the claim that National Human Rights Commissions in Asia are well placed to play an important role in this effort to develop localized human rights norms because of their close links with local civil actors, along with their independence from government control, pluralistic make-up, and ability to address complex rights issues in detail. The article also presents a study of how the National Human Rights Commission of Korea has used its powers to prioritize and promote a particularly Korean version of the human rights of the elderly.

Sui generis hybrid international criminal tribunals must conduct business without institutional memory and are only as effective or fair as their constitutive documents allow. The sparse guidance provided for the international crimes court in Cambodia creates uncertainty and arguably ambiguous standards that infringe upon the legality principle and undermine efforts for nulla poena sine lege.

This paper relies on archival research to rediscover Chen Tiqiang's study of public international law at Tsinghua University and Oxford University with James Brierly. Particular attention is directed to Brierly's profound influence on Chen's approach to researching the doctrine of recognition and his remarkable performance at his oral examination before Humphrey Waldock and Robert Y. Jennings. In addition to providing an abbreviated overview of the international legal community's overwhelmingly favourable reactions to the publication of Chen's dissertation in 1951, it argues that Chen's experience and accomplishments provide some evidence that China's teaching and scholarship of international law attained an unprecedented milestone in the late 1930s and 1940s.

This paper brings forward Justice Pal's dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Tribunal to add to Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) literature on international criminal law and the rules of evidence and procedure. It is part of a TWAIL effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through procedural and evidentiary rules. By locating and situating Justice Pal's reasoning within the broader academic literature on dissents in international criminal law, it is possible to illustrate how and why Justice Pal's views were obscured as a relevant dissent. From this vantage point, this paper pursues Justice Pal's legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and procedure in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend these rules, and examines the impact of these decisions on the everyday functions of the tribunals and how truth is determined.

Asian governments tend to be more sensitive about their sovereignty than governments in the contemporary West. Therefore, when differences occur and disputes arise, Asian governments tend to insist that they be resolved through bilateral consultations and negotiations. The reality is that, very often, the differences and disputes remain unresolved after years and even decades of negotiations. When left unresolved, some of these disputes have a tendency to contaminate the bilateral relationship as a whole. This is a great pity, because the disputes may revolve around relatively minor issues compared to the many other areas in which the two countries have convergent interests. Asian governments should therefore consider resolving such disputes by other peaceful means.

What are other modalities for the peaceful resolution of disputes? They are: (i) conciliation; (ii) mediation; (iii) fact-finding; (iv) arbitration; and (v) adjudication.