The question of how to balance free data flows and national policy objectives, especially data privacy and security, is key to advancing the benefits of the digital economy. After establishing that new digital technologies have further integrated physical and digital activities, and thus, more and more of our social interactions are being sensed and datafied, Chapter 6 argues that innovative regulatory approaches are needed to respond to the impact of big data analytics on existing privacy and cybersecurity regimes. At the crossroads, where multistakeholderism meets multilateralism, the roles of the public and private sectors should be reconfigured for a datafied world. Looking to the future, rapid technological developments and market changes call for further public–private convergence in data governance, allowing both public authorities and private actors to jointly reshape the norms of cross-border data flows. Under such an umbrella, the appropriate role of multilateral, state-based norm-setting in Internet governance includes the oversight of the balance between the free flow of data and other legitimate public policies, as well as engagement in the coordination of international standards.

Along the path of datafication, the probability of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure increases as well. The weaponization of 5G networks has brought about further challenges to international economic legal order. Major geopolitical players have adopted comprehensive security measures at home and have also strengthened cooperation with geopolitical allies to protect and enhance the resilience of ICT ecosystems. In this regard, the more recent iterations of international trade agreements are equipped with “modernized” security exceptions to ensure that the exceptions to international trade rules are aligned with the policy needs of the data-driven economy. Innovative exception clauses have been incorporated into FTAs to reconcile conflicts between (digital) trade and (cyber) security, which, overall, grant a dramatically expansive scope and excessively unfettered discretion to states when it comes to “national security.” Questions as to what constitutes “critical infrastructure” and how it should be designated, however, require due process mechanisms to constrain discretionary abuse. Chapter 2 contends that a consensus concerning the scope of “critical infrastructure” would be politically and economically valuable to filter out overgeneralizations of national security claims.

Today’s platformization of services was an “unforeseen” phenomenon when the WTO was established. However, through the pro-liberalization WTO jurisprudence developed in past decades, the GATS market access commitments have played more than a marginal role in the story of the emergence of datafication, leaving the door open for big tech companies. Without question, platforms’ associated datafication practices influence human society, in terms of their beauty as well as their peril. The perilous side therefore calls into question whether international trade commitments negotiated in the pre-digital age should be sustained in this datafied world. In the FTA context, Chapter 3 argues that listing nonconforming measures under the Cross-Border Trade in Services Chapter represents the most critical step in reserving a state’s “digital sovereignty.” Such inscriptions ensure that a state does not risk committing to future services and associated delivery means that did not exist at the time of treaty negotiations. Nonetheless, market access obligations do not prevent states from adopting domestic regulations in pursuit of legitimate national policies. Digital trade liberalization must be accompanied by the introduction of data regulations to address the potential risks and harms.

In order to analyze the relationship between international, EU and national law properly, this chapter establishes a working hypothesis: a common denominator of international, EU and national law. Analogous to the historical idea of social contract theory, this common denominator is consensus. After revisiting the major criticism of consent as a (moral) obligation to obey the law, the chapter elaborates on the moral duty to adhere to the pacta sunt servanda principle. After discussing the thesis of an innate Universal Moral Grammar (UMG) that relies on an analogy to the thesis of a universal grammar of the human faculty of language in linguistics, this chapter submits that Colwyn Trevarthen’s concept of primary, secondary and tertiary intersubjectivity is more suitable for conceptualizing the origins and development of the biological setup of human morality. This chapter refers to intersubjectivity, as the decisive concept to align morality and its development with core concepts of (developmental) psychology in order to lay bare the origins of moral normativity, which is essential for us as a basis for the pacta sunt servanda principle.

Most writings about treaty interpretation in international law are about how treaty interpretation should proceed and how treaty interpreters are constrained by various rules that discipline the interpretive exercise. Chapter 1 showed why rules by themselves cannot determine what treaty interpretation is and how it should proceed. This does not mean, however, that international lawyers are wrong in their self-perception that treaty interpretation is a constrained activity. This chapter argues that international lawyers have been looking for the source of interpretative constraints in the wrong place and that the actual interpretive constraints come from the fact that treaty interpretation is never the work of an isolated interpreter, but an exercise performed by a member of an interpretive community that determines what counts as a legitimate interpretation.

The relationship between international and national law has been debated for centuries. Generally, the floor has been divided between two approaches: dualism and monism, mostly as advocated by Hans Kelsen. I argue that, in the light of major developments since their inception, such as the establishment of the European Union (EU), these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international, EU and national law. While dualism as developed by Heinrich Triepel liberated the international legal order from an overly dominant national perspective some 125 years ago, it is not well equipped to accommodate the massive overlaps between international, EU and Member State legal orders today. In Hans Kelsen’s version, monism is an epistemological theory about what the law might be. It does not provide satisfactory guidance for the doctrinal solution of norm conflicts between international, EU and Member State law. Thus, a key focus of this book is to reconceptualize the theoretical relationship between legal orders. Even though some scholars have doubted the relevance of theoretical inquiries such as dualistic or monistic analyses of the relationship between legal orders, I cannot agree with those who trivialize this theoretical discussion by saying it would be “unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point.”1 If we continue reading Fitzmaurice’s view, it becomes clear that this is simply a dualistic argument. Yet current developments, fundamental changes and new phenomena such as the massive increase in international institutions, actors, norms and tribunals as well as adjudicators make it imperative to seek new theoretical concepts. The so-called globalization of law2 as framed in the famous constitutionalization of international law3 may be mentioned, among other developments, to elucidate the ever-growing importance of the debate on whether international, EU or national law has the final say.4