I was delighted to read this article, which provides a satisfying theoretical explanation of the lay prototype of “immorality” in Chinese. In our research on lay prototypes of “immoral behavior,” we find that puritanical factors are a feature of lay concepts of immoral behavior in both Chinese and English, though much more saliently in Chinese (Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022; Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015). Most important, Fitouchi et al.'s argument provides a theoretical basis for explaining why the Chinese word for immorality, despite excluding extremely violent behavior and emphasizing civilized moral character, can still be considered a typical example of how humans develop moral concepts to regulate social cooperation. Although I appreciate the general argument that self-discipline is relevant to improving social cooperation, I am still curious about how thinking in terms of moral character influences our “cognitive mechanisms” around morality.
Theoretical approaches to defining concepts such as moral norms may not agree with lay concepts. In our research on lay concepts of morality in Chinese and English (described in Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015 and Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022), we chose to simply use the word “immoral” itself, asking participants to give examples of immoral behaviors. This lay prototype approach offers a way of discovering aspects of concepts that academics might have missed. But although this seemed like a straightforward exercise, the results were so different in English and Chinese that the first question that came to mind was whether we had somehow chosen the wrong translation.
We found that although budaode (the official Chinese translation for “immoral”) has many content and cognitive similarities to what Western psychologists would expect if it meant “immoral,” it also seems to describe a rather different way of thinking about immorality. Budaode is more connected to whether behavior reflects a cultured character rather than whether the behavior is criminally antisocial.
For example, when asked to give examples of being immoral, “killing” was among the top 10 most frequently mentioned behaviors by both Vancouver and Melbourne respondents, but mentioned only once among the 600+ behaviors given by Shanghai and Beijing respondents (Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015). Although English speakers termed the most harmful behaviors as “immoral,” budaode behaviors were more typified by the perceived incivility of the behavior, with most criminal behaviors deemed too extreme to be called budaode. In a lay prototype and factor analysis of immoral behavior examples from Hong Kong, Mainland China, and the United States (Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022), what Fitouchi et al. term “puritanical” norms were highly apparent; but they were much more strongly emphasized in the Chinese data. All three cultures had at least one factor about sexual infidelity and promiscuity; notably, in the Hong Kong data an additional “public indecency” factor included behaviors such as swearing in public and wearing revealing clothing. In the Chinese data (but not the United States), additional prudish factors related to lacking civic virtues included unhygienic behavior (spitting on the streets, not washing hands), or rude, disruptive public behavior (e.g., talking loudly, cutting in line). Finally, although the United States prototype had two “criminal” factors including extremely violent behavior, violence was notably missing from the Chinese lay prototypes. It is also notable that all three cultures had a “bad character” factor (e.g., being selfish, uncaring, arrogant, or irresponsible).
We also went on to ask other American and Chinese participants about why different behaviors were wrong – how would they explain it to a child? In one version of these studies, we asked them to explain why it was wrong to carry out behaviors representing violations of the five moral foundations (MFT, Graham et al., Reference Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik and Ditto2013): behaviors that were harmful, unfair, disloyal, disrespectful, or disgusting. Curiously, Americans kept on returning to the theme of harmfulness when trying to explain why these were wrong; even for disgusting behaviors, they said it was wrong because it constituted self-harm. But our Chinese participants instead emphasized character traits – for example, that the behavior was disrespectful, impolite, or lacked sympathy. Even for the prototypical harmful behaviors, Hong Kong participants’ most common reason given for its wrongness was that the behavior was disrespectful.
We concluded that modern Chinese lay concepts of morality focus on behavior that reflects the degree to which one has a civilized and cultivated character – a Confucianism-infused form of the puritanical morals described by Fitouchi et al. In China, violent and criminal behaviors are also extremely wrong behaviors, but they are deemed too extremely bad to be called budaode – they have been historically regulated by law, not virtue (Head, Reference Head and Nichols2022). Despite budaode's accompanying de-emphasis on violent and criminal behavior, Fitouchi et al.'s argument helps us to explain why budaode (in Chinese) and immorality (in English) are connected psychological concepts.
A next step for moral psychologists may be to consider how morality that focuses on moral character, instead of directly on the amount of harm caused by certain behaviors, changes moral cognition. I would argue caution against taking it too literally when one says that all moral norms can be reduced to harm and fairness; in terms of lay cognition, our Chinese laypersons might conversely argue that all moral norms are reducible to lack of respect and moral character. I appreciate the argument that cooperation-focused biological systems could give rise to puritanical norms, and that in this way such “moral” norms are cognitively or biologically connected. However, what psychologists commonly call “moral cognition” – how we judge people and their behaviors, whether we consider them to be universally wrong, how we punish violators, how we educate children – could take different forms, and have different societal effects, when there is a focus on character cultivation. For example, perhaps a focus on virtue, which may set a higher standard for harmonious, cultivated, appropriate behavior, may conversely de-emphasize universal right-and-wrong judgments that require us only to consider the amount of harm to others that we cause. I look forward to seeing more research on how puritanical morality influences the moral mind.
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I was delighted to read this article, which provides a satisfying theoretical explanation of the lay prototype of “immorality” in Chinese. In our research on lay prototypes of “immoral behavior,” we find that puritanical factors are a feature of lay concepts of immoral behavior in both Chinese and English, though much more saliently in Chinese (Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022; Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015). Most important, Fitouchi et al.'s argument provides a theoretical basis for explaining why the Chinese word for immorality, despite excluding extremely violent behavior and emphasizing civilized moral character, can still be considered a typical example of how humans develop moral concepts to regulate social cooperation. Although I appreciate the general argument that self-discipline is relevant to improving social cooperation, I am still curious about how thinking in terms of moral character influences our “cognitive mechanisms” around morality.
Theoretical approaches to defining concepts such as moral norms may not agree with lay concepts. In our research on lay concepts of morality in Chinese and English (described in Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015 and Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022), we chose to simply use the word “immoral” itself, asking participants to give examples of immoral behaviors. This lay prototype approach offers a way of discovering aspects of concepts that academics might have missed. But although this seemed like a straightforward exercise, the results were so different in English and Chinese that the first question that came to mind was whether we had somehow chosen the wrong translation.
We found that although budaode (the official Chinese translation for “immoral”) has many content and cognitive similarities to what Western psychologists would expect if it meant “immoral,” it also seems to describe a rather different way of thinking about immorality. Budaode is more connected to whether behavior reflects a cultured character rather than whether the behavior is criminally antisocial.
For example, when asked to give examples of being immoral, “killing” was among the top 10 most frequently mentioned behaviors by both Vancouver and Melbourne respondents, but mentioned only once among the 600+ behaviors given by Shanghai and Beijing respondents (Buchtel et al., Reference Buchtel, Guan, Peng, Su, Sang, Chen and Bond2015). Although English speakers termed the most harmful behaviors as “immoral,” budaode behaviors were more typified by the perceived incivility of the behavior, with most criminal behaviors deemed too extreme to be called budaode. In a lay prototype and factor analysis of immoral behavior examples from Hong Kong, Mainland China, and the United States (Buchtel, Reference Buchtel and Nichols2022), what Fitouchi et al. term “puritanical” norms were highly apparent; but they were much more strongly emphasized in the Chinese data. All three cultures had at least one factor about sexual infidelity and promiscuity; notably, in the Hong Kong data an additional “public indecency” factor included behaviors such as swearing in public and wearing revealing clothing. In the Chinese data (but not the United States), additional prudish factors related to lacking civic virtues included unhygienic behavior (spitting on the streets, not washing hands), or rude, disruptive public behavior (e.g., talking loudly, cutting in line). Finally, although the United States prototype had two “criminal” factors including extremely violent behavior, violence was notably missing from the Chinese lay prototypes. It is also notable that all three cultures had a “bad character” factor (e.g., being selfish, uncaring, arrogant, or irresponsible).
We also went on to ask other American and Chinese participants about why different behaviors were wrong – how would they explain it to a child? In one version of these studies, we asked them to explain why it was wrong to carry out behaviors representing violations of the five moral foundations (MFT, Graham et al., Reference Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik and Ditto2013): behaviors that were harmful, unfair, disloyal, disrespectful, or disgusting. Curiously, Americans kept on returning to the theme of harmfulness when trying to explain why these were wrong; even for disgusting behaviors, they said it was wrong because it constituted self-harm. But our Chinese participants instead emphasized character traits – for example, that the behavior was disrespectful, impolite, or lacked sympathy. Even for the prototypical harmful behaviors, Hong Kong participants’ most common reason given for its wrongness was that the behavior was disrespectful.
We concluded that modern Chinese lay concepts of morality focus on behavior that reflects the degree to which one has a civilized and cultivated character – a Confucianism-infused form of the puritanical morals described by Fitouchi et al. In China, violent and criminal behaviors are also extremely wrong behaviors, but they are deemed too extremely bad to be called budaode – they have been historically regulated by law, not virtue (Head, Reference Head and Nichols2022). Despite budaode's accompanying de-emphasis on violent and criminal behavior, Fitouchi et al.'s argument helps us to explain why budaode (in Chinese) and immorality (in English) are connected psychological concepts.
A next step for moral psychologists may be to consider how morality that focuses on moral character, instead of directly on the amount of harm caused by certain behaviors, changes moral cognition. I would argue caution against taking it too literally when one says that all moral norms can be reduced to harm and fairness; in terms of lay cognition, our Chinese laypersons might conversely argue that all moral norms are reducible to lack of respect and moral character. I appreciate the argument that cooperation-focused biological systems could give rise to puritanical norms, and that in this way such “moral” norms are cognitively or biologically connected. However, what psychologists commonly call “moral cognition” – how we judge people and their behaviors, whether we consider them to be universally wrong, how we punish violators, how we educate children – could take different forms, and have different societal effects, when there is a focus on character cultivation. For example, perhaps a focus on virtue, which may set a higher standard for harmonious, cultivated, appropriate behavior, may conversely de-emphasize universal right-and-wrong judgments that require us only to consider the amount of harm to others that we cause. I look forward to seeing more research on how puritanical morality influences the moral mind.
Financial support
Research described here was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. HKIEd ECS 859813).
Competing interest
None.