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123 results in Trends in Southeast Asia

Page 3 of 7

A Study of Vietnam's Control over Online Anti-state Content
  • Dien Nguyen An Luong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    01 September 2023
  • Over the past two decades, the fixation on anti-state content has shaped the way Vietnamese authorities deployed various censorship strategies to achieve the dual goals of creating a superficial openness while maintaining a tight grip on online discourses. These considerations dictated how several regulations on Internet controls were formulated and enforced. Vietnamese censors also selectively borrowed from China's online censorship playbook, a key tenet of which is the fear-based approach. The modus operandi for the authorities is to first harp on what they perceive as online foreign and domestic threats to Vietnam's social stability. Then those threats are exhaustively used to enforce tougher measures that are akin to those implemented in China. But unlike China, Vietnam has not afforded to ban Western social media platforms altogether. Realizing that they would be better off exploiting social media for their own gains, Vietnamese authorities have sought to co-opt and utilize it to curb anti-state content on the Internet. The lure of the Vietnamese market has also emboldened Facebook and Google's YouTube to consider it fit to acquiesce to state censorship demands. The crackdown on anti-state content and fear-based censorship are likely to continue shaping Vietnam's Internet controls, at least in the foreseeable future. The question is how both Internet users and the authorities will make the most of their unlikely - and fickle - alliance with social media to fulfil their agendas.

Religious Extremism in Major Campuses in Indonesia
  • A'an Suryana
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    01 September 2023
  • Religious extremism among students in major campuses in Indonesia remains a problem for the Indonesian government, campus authorities and moderate Muslims. A substantial number of studies on Islam and religious extremism in Indonesia have focused on security and cultural paradigms. In contrast, this article discusses the factors that cause the rise of religious extremism among university students through an organizational and institutional lens. The dissemination and internalization of religious extremist narratives contribute to the rise of religious extremism among university students in Indonesia. Counter-extremism policies by the government and campus authorities have not been effective due to the absence of an integrative approach. All stakeholders - the government, campus authorities, parents of university students, communities and student organizations - need to establish a concerted and integrative effort to uproot religious extremism from among university students.

The Halal Project in Indonesia
  • Shariatization, Minority Rights and Commodification
  • Syafiq Hasyim
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    04 August 2022
  • The government of Indonesia in the second term of the Jokowi presidency has fully endorsed the concept of halal to become not only a sharia-driven state law but also an incentive for the advancement of the national economy and market. In addition, Jokowi wants Indonesia to become the centre of the global halal industry. In the history of Indonesian Islam, although the issue of halalness, being an unseparated part of Islamic doctrine, is not new, it had never been the role of the state to formalize it into state law prior to the legislation of State Law No. 33/2014 on Halal Legal Assurance.

    From the 1990s to 2014, halal matters including halal certification had been unofficially handled by the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). Then, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) proposed that halal certification be officially handled by the government of Indonesia, not by Muslim organizations. The legislation of State Law No. 33/2014 reflects contestation between MUI and MORA regarding which institution should serve as the authority in certifying halal products.
    Promoting and advancing the halal project of Indonesia are related not only to commodification but also to theology. The choice of the Islamic method for determining halal can become a barrier to improving inclusive economic and market performance. The halal system in Indonesia follows the Shafi’i school of thought in Islamic law, which is very strict in defining the halalness of relevant products. However, a more flexible method of ijtihad (Islamic legal reasoning), which can accommodate the development of the halal market, is needed.

Health Security in Indonesia and the Normalization of the Military’s Non-Defence Role
  • Jun Honna
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    22 September 2022
  • Like many countries, Indonesia’s armed forces (TNI) have been engaging in health security activities since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The pandemic has made TNI popular in society owing to its visible dedication to crisis response at the grassroots level. It is important to clarify how this became possible and the impact it has had from the perspective of civil-military relations. TNI’s widening and deepening involvement in health security is the product of the normalization of 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW). The 2004 TNI law restricted non-defence missions and required that ad hoc arrangements to undertake such non-war emergency missions gain parliamentary approval. TNI has skilfully used patriotic propaganda to justify its COVID-19-linked activities by invoking the spirit of the war of independence. In doing so, military elites have stoked nationalist sentiments to blunt military reform measures and normalize their role expansion. This is a new development in the history of TNI’s MOOTW; operations related to counter-terrorism and disaster relief in the past - for example, the 2018 natural disasters in Lombok and Palu - were limited in time and space. In this sense, the COVID-19 crisis should be understood as an important game changer in the country’s post-authoritarian civil-military relations.

Concepts and Patterns of Chinese Migration, with Reference to Southeast Asia
  • Leo Suryadinata, Dorcas Gan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    30 September 2022
  • Concepts and patterns of Chinese migration are often described with terms such as guigen (return to one’s original roots), shenggen (sprout local roots), shigen (lose original roots), wugen (without roots), and duogen (many roots). These terms, linked to the Mandarin word gen (roots), carry various meanings including home, citizenship, ethnicity, as well as local language, culture and society. In Southeast Asia, the predominant patterns of migration are shenggen/shigen, guigen, shenggen/shigen, wugen and/or duogen. These concepts represent the mainstream patterns during various periods, which may admittedly exist concurrently. The pattern in each particular period is influenced by an array of internal and external factors, such as colonial and subsequently government policies directed at migrants, as well as forces and opportunities afforded by globalization. Since the 1980s, the wugen or duogen concept has been at the forefront as Chinese migrate or even remigrate to developed countries. Notably, these migrants may be descendants of previously assimilated Chinese migrants from earlier periods.

Justifying Digital Repression via 'Fighting Fake News'
  • A Study of Four Southeast Asian Autocracies
  • Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Dien Nguyen An Luong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    04 August 2022
  • Southeast Asian autocracies of Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam have politicized vague definitions of 'fake news' to justify diverse tactics of digital repression. In these countries, what constitutes falseness in 'fake news' has hardly been clearly articulated. The governments instead focus on the grave threats the dissemination of 'fake news' could pose to national security, public disorder or national prestige. As the governments are vested with the power to bend the labelling of 'fake news' to their will, they can criminalize those accused of circulating such information to safeguard public interests. There are at least four methods by which the governments have tightened the screws on cyberspace under the banner of curbing 'fake news': (i) prosecute Internet users, journalists and dissidents in particular; (ii) pressure Internet Service Providers and social media platforms to block and remove content; (iii) expand and deepen social media monitoring; and (iv) shut down the Internet altogether.

    All four countries have used 'fake news' allegations to penalize critics. Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are inclined to use such allegations to strong-arm tech companies into removing content at the behest of the governments. Thailand and Vietnam tend to exploit such allegations to beef up online surveillance. Myanmar is the only country that turns to Internet shutdowns. The interplay between the methods of digital repression that exploit the pretext of cracking down on 'fake news' and the manipulation of online discourse through the deployment of cyber troops would merit further research and in-depth examination.

Freedom of Religion in Malaysia
  • The Situation and Attitudes of 'Deviant' Muslim Groups
  • Mohd Faizal Musa
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    11 November 2022
  • Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), published by the United Nations in 1948, states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.'

    Malaysia recently won its bid to sit on the United Nations Human Rights Council from 2022 to 2024. However, while the country’s constitution is progressive in underlining the rights of religious minorities, this is severely lacking in practice as it exercises heavy regulation on religion, combined with restrictions on the practices of certain faiths. Based on interviews and focus group discussions conducted in Malaysia, this paper uncovers the challenges faced by religious minorities in the country, and how treatment of them at the hands of religious authorities is illustrative of encroachments on their right to the freedom of religion. The groups that will be focused on are the Millah Ibrahim (Abrahamic Faith), the Baha’i faith, and the Ahmadiyah faith, all of which have been banned by the religious authorities.

Thailand’s Economic Dilemmas in Post-Pandemic Asia
  • Richard Yarrow
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    30 June 2023
    Print publication:
    30 September 2022
  • While Thailand’s health system has fared relatively well through the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s economy faced significant strains and likely a harsher downturn than other economies in Southeast Asia. In particular, the services sector - heavily reliant on international tourism - suffered, and debt levels worsened substantially during the pandemic. Thailand’s economy has steadily recovered following the peak of the pandemic in 2020, with greater optimism coming from the growing trade in goods and growing investments from China and Japan. The tourism sector has also steadily regained strength since the worst points of the pandemic. Despite these recent positive turns, Thailand still faces daunting long-term economic and societal challenges, many of which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Household finances appear increasingly stressed and debt levels have risen sharply across the economy. It is unlikely that Thailand will be able to return its tourism industry to 2019 conditions for the next several years. Meanwhile, deteriorating demographics and education enrolments pose serious threats to long-term macroeconomic prospects. Thailand’s population of young people is falling, but the country appears to lack momentum in elevating enrolment rates and improving the quality in secondary and tertiary education. The agriculture sector remains large, with some crop diversification but with limited gains in productivity, in the face of rising competition - for instance, from India and Vietnam. Policymakers may aim to revitalize Thailand’s economic prospects with policies aimed, for instance, at enhancing agricultural productivity, combining and internationalizing higher education institutions, easing restrictions on foreign investments, and promoting greater competition by smaller enterprises against large conglomerates, in addition to efforts to improve on transparency and stability, and reduce corruption, within Thailand’s political system.

Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions
  • The Case of Vingroup and the Automotive Industry
  • Hong Hiep Le
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019
  • Vietnam has officially admitted its failure to achieve industrialized economy status by 2020. This failure is partly due to its inability to grow a strong local manufacturing base and develop key strategic industries. The participation of Vingroup, the country's largest private conglomerate, in the automotive industry has sparked new hopes for Vietnam's industrialization drive. The company, through its subsidiary Vinfast, aims to become a leading automaker in Southeast Asia with an annual capacity of 500,000 units and a localization ratio of 60 per cent by 2025.Challenges that Vinfast faces include its unproven track record in the industry; the limited size of the national car market; the lack of infrastructure to support car usage in Vietnam; the intense competition from foreign brands; and its initial reliance on imported technologies and know-hows. However, Vinfast enjoys certain advantages in the domestic market, including the large potential of the Vietnamese automotive market; its freedom as a new automaker to define its business strategies without having to deal with legacy issues; Vingroup's sound business and financial performance and its ecosystem; strong support from the Vietnamese government; and nationalist sentiments that will encourage certain Vietnamese customers to choose its products. If Vinfast is successful, it will boost Vietnam's GDP growth and reinvent the country's automotive industry. Its success will also contribute significantly to the realization of Vietnam's industrialization ambitions and bring private actors into the centre stage of the economy. If the company fails, however, it will cause considerable problems for both Vingroup and the Vietnamese economy.

The Politics of Thai Buddhism under the NCPO Junta
  • Katewadee Kulabkaew
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    23 April 2019
  • The past two decades have been a time of turmoil in Thailand's religious affairs. Disputes, debates and controversies concerning the administration of Buddhism, Thailand's national religion by tradition, have erupted more and more frequently. This chronic and unresolvable conflict originates from Thai Buddhists' inability to achieve a broad consensus on religious reform. Under the governance of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta that came to power in 2014, the fierce struggle concerning Buddhist reform seemed to subside. Upholding and protecting Buddhism might be a duty of traditional Thai rulers who desire for a source of political legitimacy, but the NCPO's decisive actions concerning Buddhist institutional reform were not merely reflected respect for this tradition, but were closely intertwined with the dynamic of contending forces in Thailand's long-troubled religious politics. Conflicts between the influential religious nationalists and the Thai Sangha convinced the military government of the need to act, for the sake of national security and political stability.

From Declaration to Code
  • Continuity and Change in China's Engagement with ASEAN on the South China Sea
  • Hoang Thi Ha
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    01 March 2019
  • China's engagement with ASEAN over the South China Sea, from the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to the ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC), exhibits a dynamic continuum with two constants: 1. Dismissal of any legally binding instrument that would constrain China's freedom of action; and 2. Persistent territorialization of the SCS despite Beijing's simultaneous diplomatic engagement with ASEAN. The continuity is juxtaposed with elements of change in China's engagement with ASEAN, as afforded by the former's growing power and influence. This metamorphosis is manifested in China's efforts to undermine ASEAN unity, robustly assert its claims in the SCS, and use economic statecraft towards ASEAN member states in return for their acquiescence. China's more "active" engagement in the COC over the past three years is tactical and does not signify a fundamental change in its long-term strategy that seeks to eventually establish its sovereignty and control over the SCS based on the nine-dash-line (NDL). The divergent positions between China and some ASEAN member states on the COC, especially its scope of application, self-restraint elements, legal status and dispute settlement mechanism, are not easy to reconcile. The COC may end up being a non-binding political document with a general scope of application, which will have little effect in regulating the contracting parties' behaviour.

The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
  • An Australian Perspective
  • Peter Varghese
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019
  • The shift in the framework of Australia's strategic thinking from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific reflects the primary focus on the maritime environment in the coming decades and the expectation that over time India will become more embedded in the strategic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific. India is in the midst of a major geopolitical repositioning, as it pursues a hard-headed national interests-based policy and builds stronger strategic ties with a wide range of countries including the United States and its allies in the region. The region is entering a potentially dangerous phase in U.S.–China relations. China's rise needs to be managed not frustrated; balanced not contained. Constructing that balance and anchoring China in a new multi-polar strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific is the big challenge of our time. More and more individual Southeast Asian countries are being pulled into China's orbit: not with enthusiasm or conviction but because they see that the economic cost of opposing China's agenda is too high. The United States is so far doing little to change this.

How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?
  • Daljit Singh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    18 November 2019
  • A new phase in US foreign policy, in which China is viewed as a major threat to American economic and security interests, has begun under the Trump administration. The strong anti-China sentiment is accompanied by efforts to "decouple" from China. If carried too far, they will alienate allies and friends whose cooperation the US will need in order to compete with China. In the broader American foreign policy community, there is an intense ongoing debate on how strong the push-back against China should be. Both moderates and hawks agree on the need for a "tougher" approach but differ on the degree and method of toughness. No coherent strategy has been possible partly because President Trump's thinking does not always accord with that of his own administration and partly because it is still too early in the day to come out with well-thought-out policies to support such a major change in foreign policy direction. The ongoing adjustments to global policy and strategy will therefore continue as the security focus shifts to the Indo-Pacific region. The "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept provides some signs of the broad direction policy may take but its vital economic dimension is still missing. There is greater recognition in Washington of the importance of Southeast Asia. Located in the middle of Indo-Pacific, it will be a contested zone between China and the US and its allies. The US will step up its public diplomacy to better promote its own narrative in Southeast Asia. Under the Trump administration, the importance of the South China Sea to the US has risen. The US will remain a powerful factor in Asia despite Trump and problems at home. China is not on an inevitable path of dominance given its own significant domestic challenges.

China's Evolving Policy towards the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia (1949–2018)
  • Xiao An Wu
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    27 September 2019
  • The Chinese diaspora, consisting of both Chinese living overseas who are citizens of China (huaqiao), and people of Chinese descent who are citizens of foreign countries (huaren), have significantly shaped the making of modern China. China's policy towards its diaspora is primarily governed by its national interests and foreign policy imperatives. However, the Chinese government has been careful to ensure that the huaqiao and the huaren fall into different policy domains: Chinese citizens living overseas are subject to China's domestic policies, while Chinese descendants who are citizens of other countries come under China's foreign affairs. Nevertheless, from the beginning, the latter continue to be regarded as kinsfolk distinct from other foreign nationals. The huaqiao-huaren distinction is often blurred in ordinary discourse and this has been a source of much misunderstanding. However, it has not been the policy of the Chinese government to blur this distinction, and it is acutely aware of the complexity of the issue and is therefore very cautious about implying any change. As such, when terms such as huaqiao-huaren are introduced in the official lexicon, they are meant to acknowledge certain historical and contemporary realities, and not to deliberately obfuscate the two categories. The use of the combined term is in fact a recognition of the clear-cut distinction between the two groups, and is meant to convey a semantic balance in which neither category is emphasized at the expense of the other. In general, since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has treated the diaspora as an asset, rather than a liability. The sole exception was during the Cultural Revolution when returnees, or the guiqiao, were condemned as reactionary and bourgeois elements. There is therefore a fundamental continuity in China's diaspora policy: namely, that China embraces both groups as part of a global Chinese community. Some policy shifts can be expected in future as China becomes more proactive in reaching out to its diaspora while balancing the needs and interests of Chinese abroad with the needs and interests of the Mainland.

Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs
  • Siew Yean Tham, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019
  • Malaysia established the Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ) to facilitate the development of e-commerce and the country's small and medium enterprises' (SMEs') exports. The data revealed thus far indicates an increasing number of SMEs coming on board the DFTZ e-commerce platforms. The publicly disclosed data focus on the value of exports achieved but do not show whether these are from new or existing exporters or whether they are re-exports. They also do not highlight Malaysia's imports through the zone. The overall trend signals that Malaysia is losing its bilateral revealed comparative advantage in exports to China, as well as an increasing use of imports for exporting to China. While the DFTZ facilitates both exports and imports, differing standards and customs processes in different export destinations, including China, will require Malaysian SMEs to know and understand the standards and customs processes governing imports in each export destination involved. Imports are also encouraged by the de minimis rule, which allows duty- and tax-free imports of up to RM800 into Malaysia. Overall, imports can help enhance the competitiveness of Malaysian SMEs, expand choices for Malaysian consumers, as well as facilitate re-exports. A clearer understanding of the role of DFTZ in facilitating trade will require more detailed data collection, and a closer investigation of the imports going through the zone, and their uses.

Quality, Equity, Autonomy
  • Malaysia's Education Reforms Examined
  • Hwok Aun Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    26 September 2019
  • The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government promised education reforms before getting elected in 2018, and presently grapples with the complexities of making good on those pledges while seeking to negotiate continuity and change with regard to the previous administration's Malaysian Education Blueprint launched in 2013. This article situates the education reforms in the context of Malaysia's highly centralized administration, embedded practices and policy initiatives of recent years. Discussion focuses on three areas-quality, equity, autonomy—where PH has more distinctly differentiated itself from its predecessor. On the quality of national schools, efforts to alleviate teachers' bureaucratic workload and enhance the schooling experience mark a positive start. However, transforming mindsets and practices will require more systemic changes, critical self-reflection, and sustained efforts on difficult matters, particularly in basic schooling and technical and vocational programmes. On equity, the government's consistent attention to Bottom 40 (B40) households progressively allocates opportunity, and continual need to address ethnic concerns poses steep challenges. However, policy responses tend to unfold in an ad hoc manner, and the balancing of ethnic interests lacks clarity and coherence. On autonomy, at the institutional level, legislative overhaul in higher education is in the works, while at the personal level, academic freedom clearly thrives more under PH administration. Meaningful and effective reform will hinge on devolution of power away from central government, institutionalization of autonomy, and depoliticization of the system.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy Outlook
  • David Arase
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 January 2020
    Print publication:
    20 September 2019
  • The United States launched a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in late 2017 after reluctantly concluding that its patient effort to engage and socialize China to the rules-based order since 1972 had failed. China's behaviour since 2009 convinced the United States that China is a revisionist power seeking to impose an authoritarian model of governance in Asia which, if successful, would end the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific as well as endanger US security and vital trade interests. The new US FOIP strategy initiative seeks to engage like-minded nations in economic, security (both traditional and non-traditional), and political governance partnerships to construct a collaborative and scalable network of relations that will be able to respond flexibly to meet a wide range of stakeholder needs and regional contingencies across the Indo-Pacific region. The United States occupies a peak organizing role in this network and works with a hierarchy of partners distributed throughout the vast Indo-Pacific to meet the economic, security, and governance capacity needs of network members at any level. The rules-based order is the "operating system" of this network approach, and so the network itself sustains the rules-based order for its members as a collective good. FOIP is more like a club that generates rules-based order benefits for its members and as such has little in common with Cold War bloc politics and containment strategy. Bearing in mind that FOIP is only in its start-up phase and is likely to gather momentum going forward; that the elements of this network strategy are already in place; and that the United States and its main FOIP partners together have considerable material, organizational, and soft power resources, one may say that its prospects for long-term sustainability and success are not bad.

Between Social Services and Tolerance
  • Explaining Religious Dynamics in Muhammadiyah
  • Ahmad Najib Burhani
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 January 2020
    Print publication:
    20 September 2019
  • Muhammadiyah, together with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), are seen as the two pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah is currently often perceived to be the more conservative of the two and to have more affinity with Islamist groups. On political issues, for instance, it is steered by Islamist imagery. On cultural issues, Muhammadiyah is often guided by old enmity towards what is called the TBC (takhayul, bid'ah dan churafat; delusions, religious innovation without precedence in the Prophetic traditions and the Qur'an, and superstitions or irrational belief). This position has placed Muhammadiyah in an uneasy relationship with both local cultures and traditionalist Islam. Three issues that were raised in 2017—the banning of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the recurrent controversy on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan—are issues where Muhammadiyah has been easily drawn towards Islamist and conservative tendencies.Be that as it may, Muhammadiyah remains a social movement guided by its long-held theology of al- Mā`ūn (kindness) and with a strong emphasis on social services. It is this doctrine that has prevented Muhammadiyah from dwelling on mythical or abstract issues and neutralized it against Islamism, making its members more realistic in viewing the world, more prone to distancing themselves from the utopian vision of a caliphate, from the dream of shariah as the Messiah that will solve every problem, and from the temptation to create an Islamic state.The "pragmatic Islamism" that Muhammadiyah has adopted allows it to handle social dynamics well.

Whither Myanmar's Garment Sector?
  • Nick J. Freeman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    24 January 2020
    Print publication:
    14 March 2019
  • The EU has threatened to suspend Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status for Myanmar, under which the country's exports can enter Europe without any tariffs or quotas. The official reason cited by the EU is a growing concern over human rights violations and issues around labour rights in Myanmar. If this threat were to be carried out, the business sector that will be most affected is Myanmar's burgeoning garment sector, which employs around 700,000 people, most of whom are women. The principal worry in Myanmar is that if EU buyers and brands have to start paying tariffs to import Myanmar-made garments, then they will opt to shift their sourcing to other countries. Without GSP, Myanmar's garment exports may no longer be price competitive. As one of the few manufacturing sectors in Myanmar to employ semi-skilled women, many of whom migrated from poor rural areas, the garment sector has come to play an important socioeconomic role in the country. Whether or not the EU decides to withdraw GSP status, Myanmar's garment sector faces a number of challenges. How Myanmar's policymakers and garment industry leaders respond to global industry trends will be just as important, in the long run, in determining the sector's commercial sustainability.

Military Capitalism in Myanmar
  • Examining the Origins, Continuities and Evolution of "Khaki Capital"
  • Gerard McCarthy
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    24 January 2020
    Print publication:
    06 March 2019
  • Military enterprises, ostensibly set up to feed and supply soldiers, were some of the earliest and largest Burmese commercial conglomerates, established in the 1950s. Union Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are two profit-seeking military enterprises established by the military after the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1988, which remain central players in Myanmar's post-2011 economy. Military conglomerates are a major source of off-budget revenue for the military and a main employer of retired soldiers. Yet few veterans receive more than a small piece of the profits from UMEHL. The vast bulk of formal dividends instead disproportionately benefit higher ranking officers and institutions within the Tatmadaw. Military capitalism entrenches the autonomy of the Tatmadaw from civilian oversight. Despite this, obligatory or semi-coerced contributions from active-duty soldiers are a source of cash flow for UMEHL, effectively constituting a transfer from the government budget to the military's off-budget entities. The most significant source of livelihoods support for most veterans is the service pension dispersed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoPF). Despite delivering suboptimal welfare outcomes for most soldiers and veterans while eroding the legitimacy of ceasefires, successive governments since 1988, including Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, have entrenched military capitalism by encouraging commercial activities of armed groups that enter into ceasefire agreements. Extending military pensions already paid by the Ministry of Planning and Finance to retired members of armed groups could deliver a far more consistent and tangible "peace dividend" than the commercial extraction of resources from ceasefire areas. More balanced civil-military relations, and fairer social outcomes for military personnel, will rely on civilian-led state institutions delivering effective and substantive welfare support beyond the commercially oriented welfare arrangements of military conglomerates.

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