After close examination of the Allied campaigns of the SWPA, the importance of the Australian infantry brigade as a key combat formation is without question. An examination of the infantry brigade group (jungle) as an intermediate formation commanding infantry battalions and numerous attached units demonstrates the role of an infantry brigade as crucial to the victories in New Guinea and Borneo. The complex terrain of the SWPA islands, which sometimes constrained and at times isolated the brigades, offered these formations the opportunity to evolve.

Digital traces that people leave behind can be useful evidence in criminal courts. However, in many jurisdictions, the legal provisions setting the rules for the use of evidence in criminal courts were formulated long before these digital technologies existed, and there seems to be an increasing discrepancy between legal frameworks and actual practices. This chapter investigates this disconnect by analyzing the relevant legal frameworks in the EU for processing data in criminal courts, and comparing and contrasting these with actual court practices. The relevant legal frameworks are criminal and data protection law. Data protection law is mostly harmonized throughout the EU, but since criminal law is mostly national law, this chapter focuses on criminal law in the Netherlands. We conclude that existing legal frameworks do not appear to obstruct the collection of data for evidence, but that regulation on collection in criminal law and regulation on processing and analysis in data protection law are not integrated. We also characterize as remarkable the almost complete absence of regulation of automated data analysis – in contrast with the many rules for data collection.

The 18th Australian Infantry Brigade returned from the Buna and Sanananda campaigns a victorious but physically broken force. It had suffered more than 96 per cent casualties owing to a combination of weather, terrain, disease and the enemy, and would have to reconstruct the foundations of the brigade, built around a core of experienced veterans and the assimilation of motorised troops and replacement soldiers.1 The 18th Brigade would have to start building basic soldiering skills, the integration of jungle warfare lessons learnt, and the introduction of formal brigade leadership schools. This is also the period when the brigade undergoes a dramatic reorganisation under 7th Division’s establishment as a jungle division, which was outlined in chapter 1.

Chapter 6 further examines the Jenkinson map, remarkable far more for its voluminous illustration than its cartography, which adds little that is new and renders Jenkinson’s route into Central Asia inaccurately. The map includes dozens of small illustrations, explained by almost thirty captions in cartouches, producing a map that informed Muscovy Company merchants of societies they would encounter on the route. The chapter concludes with three images of Central Asian exotica, added to the map for no more obvious purpose than entertainment.

Robots have not only become part of our everyday life – they have assumed functions in our criminal justice systems. The following chapters from Sara Beale and Hayley Lawrence, Andrea Roth, Erin Murphy, Emily Silverman, Jörg Arnold, and Sabine Gless focus on evidentiary issues arising from human–robot interaction, while Bart Custers and Lonneke Stevens, as well as David Gray, look at the emerging impact of data protection on criminal justice. This introduction places the chapters in context of the broader issues surrounding the deployment of AI systems in criminal investigations and trials, not all of which are dealt with in the chapters.

This chapter urges justice systems to recognize five key rights of the accused with respect to digital and machine evidence of guilt or innocence, in line with systemic goals such as accuracy, fairness, dignity, and public legitimacy: (1) front-end development and testing safeguards to minimize error and bias (based on a consensus view of algorithmic fairness); (2) meaningful and equitable pretrial access, including disclosure requirements, eliminating trade secret privileges, allowing defense testing, and defense access to potentially exculpatory technologies; (3) contestation, including a right to be heard in the development and testing process and access to experts both to review government evidence and develop defense evidence; and (4) a factfinding process that is epistemically competent but that also keeps a human in the loop, to protect equity and mercy, avoid automation complacency, and reject dehumanizing technologies. The chapter offers proposals to operationalize each right and discusses how each would apply to the various categories of digital and machine evidence discussed in Chapters 1–6.