Chapter 3 summarizes existing theories of election-related violence and introduces a theory of violence as a result of elite misperception. Existing theories rely upon the assumption that politicians choice of violence as an electoral tactic is based on an accurate assessment its relative costs and benefits. The theory of elite misperception, on the other hand, builds on two insights: (1) that voter backlash against violence is substantial and can cost politicians votes and (2) politicians frequently misjudge voter preferences – including with respect to violence – which can lead them to overestimate its benefits as an electoral tactic. The theory points to the difficulties politicians face in accurately assessing the impact of electoral tactics, as well as to the prevalence of cognitive biases that can cause them to misinterpret what information they have. It also highlights the importance of founding elections in determining which electoral tactics – violence included – are considered effective and worthy of emulation. With these insights in mind, the theory explains the incidence and persistence of election-related violence as a result of politicians misperceptions about voter preferences and the effects of violence on voting rather than the objective electoral benefits that violence provides.

This chapter summarizes the argument and findings presented in the book, explores a number of their implications, and discusses their relevance to broader debates. It argues that the books findings point to a need for research to more carefully evaluate the costs of violent electoral tactics in addition to its electoral benefits, including more micro-level research – such as that presented in the book – that explores voter responses to violence. In addition, scholars should ask more explicitly whether and how political elites are able to accurately assess the relative costs and benefits of violence and other electoral tactics. Future research should delve deeper into the question of how and why elite misperceive voter preferences, and when and why it is most likely to occur.

Chapter 4 evaluates the overall relationship between violence and election outcomes, finding that violence provides no benefit, on average, to the parties that use it. In some cases, it may even undermine the candidacies of the politicians associated with it. In particular, an analysis of the relationship between the incidence of violence prior to elections in Kenyas first two multiparty elections in the 1990s and constituency-level election outcomes for the ruling KANU party (the primary instigator of the violence) finds no relationship between the incidence of violence and KANU vote share or the likelihood that their parliamentary candidates won election. Second, an analysis of the subsequent electoral performance of candidates allegedly involved in the large outbreak of violence in 2007/08 finds that these candidates lost their reelection bids at a much higher rate than the average incumbent. Several lost in rather unusual ways, including by losing their party primaries, losing to minority ethnic group candidates, or losing the general election after securing the nomination of the locally dominant party.

This chapter introduces the research question and motivation for the book. It introduces and defines the concept of election-related violence, defining it as physical acts of violence carried out for the purpose of affecting the results of an election. It introduces existing explanations for election violence and previews the theory of elite misperception presented in the book, highlighting its basis in observations about voters opinions about violence and politicians difficultly in inferring what voters want. Finally, it summarizes the empirical strategy the book uses to evaluate the argument and competing explanations, and it provides a roadmap for the rest of the book.

This chapter explores whether and how the findings from Kenya travel elsewhere around the world, analyzing cross-national quantitative analyses and case studies of a diverse group of countries with historically varying levels of violence, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, and Brazil. The analyses show how the causes and consequences of election-related violence identified in Kenya can help explain violence (or its absence) in other competitive electoral contexts as well. The cross-national quantitative analysis demonstrates the key role that the conduct of founding elections – in particular, the tactics used by the founding election winner – appears to play in whether or not violence becomes commonly employed by parties and candidates in the electoral cycles that follow. The case studies reveal little to no evidence that violence is effective in helping parties and candidates win office but do identify instances in which it may have resulted in voter backlash. In addition to identifying key structural conditions that make violence a more viable option in some cases than others, the analysis finds evidence consistent with the idea that the conduct of founding elections plays an important role in shaping politicians beliefs and expectations about the effects of violence on their electoral prospects.

This chapter analyzes the effects of violence – via coercion and persuasion – on voting. Existing research provides some evidence that violence can be used to prevent voters from turning out to vote. However, an analysis of the relationship between violence and turnout in Kenyan elections in the 1990s finds no relationship between violence on the one hand, and the aggregate level of voter registration or turnout on the other, suggesting that the relationship between violence, turn-out and electoral geography may be less straightforward than previously thought. On persuasion, the analysis finds consistent evidence of a large and broad-based voter backlash against violence, including among the coethnic voters that politicians rely on to win elections. Furthermore, while antagonistic ethnic rhetoric does appear to increase the likelihood of violence breaking out, it is not a useful strategy for mobilizing coethnic support. These results suggest that voter backlash against violence and violent rhetoric may undermine the efficacy of violence as an electoral tactic, and they help explain why violence is not associated with better outcomes for candidates in real elections.