In their logical analysis of theorems about disjoint rays in graphs, Barnes, Shore, and the author (hereafter BGS) introduced a weak choice scheme in second-order arithmetic, called the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of finite choice (hereafter finite choice). This is a special case of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of choice ($\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$) introduced by Kreisel. BGS showed that $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ suffices for proving many of the aforementioned theorems in graph theory. While it is not known if these implications reverse, BGS also showed that those theorems imply finite choice (in some cases, with additional induction assumptions). This motivated us to study the proof-theoretic strength of finite choice. Using a variant of Steel forcing with tagged trees, we show that finite choice is not provable from the $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension scheme (even over $\omega $-models). We also show that finite choice is a consequence of the arithmetic Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem (introduced by Friedman and studied by Conidis), assuming $\Sigma ^1_1$-induction. Our results were used by BGS to show that several theorems in graph theory cannot be proved using $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension. Our results also strengthen results of Conidis.

We define the notion of a completely determined Borel code in reverse mathematics, and consider the principle $CD - PB$, which states that every completely determined Borel set has the property of Baire. We show that this principle is strictly weaker than $AT{R_0}$. Any ω-model of $CD - PB$ must be closed under hyperarithmetic reduction, but $CD - PB$ is not a theory of hyperarithmetic analysis. We show that whenever $M \subseteq {2^\omega }$ is the second-order part of an ω-model of $CD - PB$, then for every $Z \in M$, there is a $G \in M$ such that G is ${\rm{\Delta }}_1^1$-generic relative to Z.