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2 results

  • 5 - Conventional Implicature and Presupposition

  • from Part II - Types of Implicature
  • Sandrine Zufferey, Universität Bern, Switzerland, Jacques Moeschler, Université de Genève, Anne Reboul
  • Book:
    Implicatures
    Published online:
    10 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 June 2019, pp 88-110

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses a special case of implicature that since Grice has been labelled conventional implicature and explains how it differs from both particularized and generalized conversational implicatures. The second purpose of this chapter is to show the analogies and differences between presuppositions and implicatures. It is argued that the two notions are clearly distinct because, unlike presuppositions, conventional implicatures cannot be backgrounded and cannot project.

  • Part II - Types of Implicature

  • Sandrine Zufferey, Universität Bern, Switzerland, Jacques Moeschler, Université de Genève, Anne Reboul
  • Book:
    Implicatures
    Published online:
    10 June 2019
    Print publication:
    13 June 2019, pp 67-140

  • Summary

    This chapter focuses on the notion of particularized conversation implicatures. It starts by illustrating these implicatures with the case of metaphors, and shows the different ways in which Grice and relevance theory accounted for them. It goes on to argue that neither framework is equipped to explain why speakers use implicatures to communicate. The chapter presents a possible explanation for the existence of implicatures in terms of plausible deniability. Finally, the chapter introduces the notion of epistemic vigilance, a mechanism that hearers develop to avoid being deceived or manipulated.