In recent years, the movement of personnel from the public sector to interest groups has garnered considerable attention throughout Europe. Consequently, there has been an increased focus on the phenomenon of revolving door lobbyists within academic literature. This research contributes to this scholarly discussion by examining how the employment of such lobbyists facilitates access. We argue that interest groups gain advantages by recruiting individuals from the public sector in policy domains with limited mobilization, but this benefit decreases as more interest groups mobilize. Our analysis of survey data from seven European political systems supports these expectations, indicating that recruiting professionals with experience in the public sector enhances access, especially in policy areas with minimal lobbying activity. This highlights the potential for interest mobilization to counterbalance the advantages of hiring revolving door lobbyists.

Until 1838 the U.S. government lent railroads Army engineers to survey routes. Though not strictly regulators, these army engineers would consequently face powerful versions of the incentives that make regulatory capture a pervasive problem—including an intensified “revolving door,” the opportunity for institutional empire building, and a fertile ground for cognitive capture. Nevertheless, engineering officers would push to abolish federal railroad aid, succeeding by 1838. This article argues that they turned against railroad aid when the nation’s growing rail network revitalized long-standing republican hopes of replacing standing armies and fortifications with floating batteries and militias. Though this scheme was strategically quixotic, Jacksonian populism and fiscal retrenchment during the Panic of 1837 combined with the transportation revolution to make it appear a credible threat to the Corps’s institutional raison d’être—building coastal fortifications. Engineers thus turned against railroad aid to protect their core competency, highlighting underappreciated tensions between institutional and industry interests.

Former legislators who lobby exacerbate the effects of financial resources on the relative political influence that various organized interests achieve. These lobbyists receive more income and achieve favorable policy outcomes more often than other lobbyists. The value of these revolving-door lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued presence of former colleagues in legislatures. Former legislators achieve influence because of their insider connections, and membership turnover among incumbents decreases the value of this asset for interest groups. I examine the incomes and clienteles of former legislators who lobbied in the American states over seven decades. Turnover is a consistent, negative predictor of revolver value. This effect is enhanced by the presence of legislative staff support. This study is the first to examine the value of revolving-door lobbyists in the state legislatures. My findings imply that reforms that induce turnover help to level playing fields of political advocacy among interests with different levels of financial resources.

This paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of “bureaucratic capital” and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US “diversified banks.” We show that regulators who supply a large stock of bureaucratic capital are more likely to be hired by the top five banks. We also develop indices of the inequality of influence between banks. We show that banks in the top revenue quintile concentrate around 80% of revolving door movements. Goldman Sachs appears as the prime beneficiary of this process, capturing approximately 30% of the total stock of bureaucratic capital.

Objectives: De-institutionalisation and the expansion of community services have resulted in a reduction in the number of inpatient admissions in Ireland having fallen by 31% between 1986 and 2006. However, despite this, readmissions continue to account for over 70% of all admissions. The policy document A Vision for Change identified many shortcomings in the current model of provision of mental health services, making recommendations for the future development of community-based services with emphasis on outreach components such as homecare, crisis intervention and assertive outreach approaches. These recommendations are reviewed in relation to readmissions and the impact they may have on reducing the revolving door phenomenon.

Method: Three main intervention programmes essential to the delivery of an effective community-based service outlined and recommended by A Vision for Change, along with other pertinent factors, are discussed in relation to how they might reduce readmissions in Ireland. A series of Pearson correlations between Irish inpatient admissions rates and rates of outpatient attendances and provision of community mental health services are carried out and examined to explain possible relationships between increasing/decreasing admission rates and provision/attendances at community services. International literature is reviewed to determine the effectiveness of these intervention programmes in reducing admissions and readmissions and their relevance to the Irish situation is discussed.

Conclusions: Whilst A Vision for Change goes a long way towards advocating a more person-centred, recovery oriented and integrated model of service delivery, it is apparent from the consistently high proportion of readmissions in Ireland that there are still many shortcomings in service provision. The availability of specialised community-based programmes of care is as yet relatively uncommon in Ireland and uneven in geographical distribution. A considerable improvement in their provision, quantitatively and qualitatively, is required to impact on the revolving door phenomenon. In addition a re-configuration of existing catchment populations is required if they are to be successfully introduced and expanded.