Res judicata is a core belief of international law; the ICJ’s judgments are seen as final and without appeal, to doubt that is apparently equal to calling the entire international legal order into question. But the doctrine is not as absolute as the orthodoxy makes it out to be, neither as a matter of positive international law nor as a statement of legal theory. Even final judgements are not always final and appeals procedures and judicial review are not special in that they engage res judicata whereas regular legal change does not; rather, both do from a legal-theoretical vantage-point. This article makes the point by looking at ICJ interpretation judgments under Article 60; it argues that, far from leaving the original judgment’s res judicata intact, interpretation judgments actually impinge or even disrupt it. The article discusses ICJ interpretation judgments (the 2013 judgment in Preah Vihear serving as convenient example), introduces Adolf Julius Merkl’s Error Calculus theory as the theoretical framework best suited to analysing the nomomechanics and critiques the Preah Vihear interpretation judgment as change disguised as a hermeneutic exercise. It then turns the critical enterprise on its head to look at the Error Calculus theory itself to lay the groundwork for an even more audacious argument that the Error Calculus does not depend on errors in the narrow sense of the word: it is neither an ex post ratification of an imperfect norm nor a confirmation of invalidity, but the derogation of a perfectly valid norm.

This article considers the approach to the res judicata principle taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) and, specifically, its application in its 2016 judgment on preliminary objections in the latest dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. The judgment joins the small number of ICJ decisions in which the Court was evenly split, an altogether rare situation, which, at the time of the decision, had not occurred since the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Intriguingly, such a fracture seems to have been prompted by differences over the operation of a procedural principle the understanding of which is comparatively uncontroversial. Upon closer analysis, however, the disagreement reveals that more significant questions were at stake, with members of the minority issuing a vocal joint dissent and several individual declarations. This study will move in three parts: first, it will provide an overview of the nature and purpose of the principle of res judicata, its application in international adjudication, and its use by the ICJ; second, it will analyze the Court's reading of the principle in the case at issue; third, it will expose the broader implications of one such approach for the role and authority of the World Court and the international judiciary.

The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 11 November 2013, interpreting its 1962 judgment in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, inspires a reconsideration of the role of interpretation proceedings pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court. In particular, it invites us to take a closer look at the role and scope of the principle of res judicata in public international law in general and as considered in the case law of the Court in particular. This contribution reveals the competing concepts of the principle in interpretation and consecutive original contentious proceedings, and promotes instead a uniform concept that avoids the conflict inherent in current approaches.

Section 1 introduces Article 60 of the ICJ Statute (section 1.1.) and thereinafter views interpretation proceedings before the Court in light of the Court's case law, in particular its 2013 interpretation judgment in the Temple case (section 1.2.). Section 2 constitutes the heart of the analysis and discusses what will be identified as the competing concepts of res judicata. Section 2.1. presents the functions, concepts, and case law of res judicata in public international law in general, whereas section 2.2. focuses specifically on the case law of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in this regard. Finally, section 2.3. concludes this study by setting out the approach that the author regards as appropriate to reconcile the competing concepts of res judicata.

This article investigates what effects a recognized foreign judgment in civil and commercial matters has in English proceedings. Does the judgment have the effects that it has in the foreign country (extension of effects) or the effects that a comparable English judgment would have (equalization of effects), or a combination of these? After a review of the current law, it will be discussed what approach is preferable on principle. The suggested approach will then be illustrated by considering whether a foreign decision on one legal basis of a certain claim ought to preclude English proceedings involving another legal basis of the same claim. Finally, it will be discussed whether and how the effects of a recognized foreign judgment in England are affected by interests of a third country.

Forms of res judicata – Unwritten principle of EU law – National procedural autonomy v. EC supremacy – Revision of decisions v. state liability – Finality of administrative decisions v. judicial decisions – Higher respect for judicial decisions than for administrative decisions – Res judicata not absolute – ECJ itself under demands of legal certainty – Analogy between res judicata rules and rules of direct and indirect effect.

This article is intended to be a report of the oral proceedings in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), detailing what took place in the Peace Palace and considering the arguments of the parties relating to the procedure adopted in the proceedings. These include the preliminary question of whether or not the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in the case, a question which has been reopened by Serbia and Montenegro following the 2004 judgment in the Legality of the Use of Force cases; the question of the impact of the workings of the ICTY on the current proceedings; the issue of new documents which has arisen, given the very long gap between the written and oral proceedings; the burden and standard of proof adopted by the Court and what inferences it may draw; and the methodology for hearing witness testimony in the Court. Each of the parties addressed the Court on these procedural issues in some detail, in addition to their pleadings on the substance of the merits of the case.

The question whether the International Criminal Court may use its review powers to determine the admissibility of a case during the arrest warrant phase has gone widely unnoticed in legal literature on the International Criminal Court. This article treats the question from different perspectives. It presents the different stages at which admissibility questions may arise in response to a state party referral. Then it analyses the first jurisprudence of Pre-Trial Chambers I and II of the Court on the treatment of the question of admissibility at the arrest warrant stage. The article concludes that the Court may, proprio motu or based on a Prosecutor's request, rule on admissibility questions during arrest warrant proceedings per Article 58.

In its judgments on the preliminary objections in the Legality of Use of Force cases, the Court held that the FRY was not a UN member in the period between 1992 and 2000. This finding is controversial, at odds with previous decisions of the Court, and has indeed attracted criticism from various judges. This article proposes a different construction of the question of the FRY's membership within the UN and reviews arguments that allow doubts to be cast on the reasoning of the Court. Because of the link between UN membership and the FRY's participation in the Genocide Convention, the Court's finding in the Legality of Use of Force cases may have some implications for two sets of proceedings still pending before the Court (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro). In the former case, an interpretation of the extent of the res judicata principle may allow the Court not to reopen the issue of jurisdiction, already decided in 1996 on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention. In the latter case, various options might allow the FRY to be regarded as a party to the Genocide Convention.

This decision is the latest of several by arbitral bodies of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) addressing a claim by Amco Asia Corporation (Amco Asia) against respondent Republic of Indonesia. An ICSID tribunal (First Tribunal) in 1984 rendered an award on the merits in favor of claimant Amco Asia. In 1986 an “ad hoc committee” (Ad Hoc Committee) convened on Indonesia’s request pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention annulled the 1984 award on the grounds that, with respect to a principal holding, the tribunal had “manifestly exceeded its powers” and “failed to state reasons,” both being grounds for annulment specified in Article 52(1) of the Convention. The Ad Hoc Committee did not disturb certain other holdings of the tribunal. Claimant then resubmitted the dispute, and a second tribunal (Second Tribunal) was constituted pursuant to Article 52(6) of the Convention. The first task of the new tribunal was to determine which holdings of the previous bodies were res judicata and therefore could not be relitigated. The three-member ICSID Second Tribunal held: (1) that holdings of the First Tribunal that had not been annulled by the Ad Hoc Committee were res judicata; (2) that issues as to which the First Tribunal’s holdings had been annulled could be relitigated; and (3) that the Ad Hoc Committee’s reasoning, as distinct from its actual decision of annulment, was not binding on the Second Tribunal.