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3 results

Invitation to Linear Programming and Game Theory
  • David C. Vella
  • Published online:
    11 March 2021
    Print publication:
    11 March 2021
  • Written in a conversational tone, this classroom-tested text introduces the fundamentals of linear programming and game theory, showing readers how to apply serious mathematics to practical real-life questions by modelling linear optimization problems and strategic games. The treatment of linear programming includes two distinct graphical methods. The game theory chapters include a novel proof of the minimax theorem for 2x2 zero-sum games. In addition to zero-sum games, the text presents variable-sum games, ordinal games, and n-player games as the natural result of relaxing or modifying the assumptions of zero-sum games. All concepts and techniques are derived from motivating examples, building in complexity, which encourages students to think creatively and leads them to understand how the mathematics is applied. With no prerequisite besides high school algebra, the text will be useful to motivated high school students and undergraduates studying business, economics, mathematics, and the social sciences.

  • 6 - Game Theory

  • David C. Vella, Skidmore College, New York
  • Book:
    Invitation to Linear Programming and Game Theory
    Published online:
    11 March 2021
    Print publication:
    11 March 2021, pp 242-300

  • Summary

    We introduce the notion of a mathematical game. We give examples and classify them into various types, such as two-person games vs. n-person games (where n > 2), and zero-sum vs. constant-sum vs. variable-sum games. We carefully delineate the assumptions under which we operate in game theory. We illustrate how two-person games can be described by payoff matrices or by game trees. Using examples, including an analysis of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea from World War II, we develop the notions of a strategy, dominant strategy, and Nash equilibrium point of a game. Specializing to constant-sum games, we show the equivalence between Nash equilibrium and saddle point of a payoff matrix. We then consider games where the payoff matrix has no saddle point and develop the notion of a mixed strategy, after a quick review of some basic probability notions. Finally, we introduce the minimax theorem, which states that all constant-sum games have an optimal solution, and give a novel proof of the theorem in case the payoff matrix is 2 x 2.

  • How large is the support of an ESS?

  • John Haigh
  • Journal:
    Journal of Applied Probability / Volume 26 / Issue 1 / March 1989
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 July 2016, pp. 164-170
    Print publication:
    March 1989

  • Suppose the payoffs (aij) in the n × n matrix A are drawn independently from some continuous probability distribution. The number of tactics used in an ESS is investigated. Asymptotic results on the size of the ESS with largest support are given, using the work of Karlin and Kingman on the size of polymorphisms in one-locus multi-allele diploid selection models.