Law & Society scholars often dismiss Law & Economics (L&E) as insoluble with our core beliefs about distributive justice, culture, and social solidarity. This reaction has yielded missed opportunities for new theory emergent between the fields. One such opportunity came in 1978, when Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt argued that societies make “tragic choices” about scarce resource allocations so as to reconcile such choices with core culture, ethics, and values. In Calabresi’s later words, their book was a “more or less explicit appeal to anthropology for help.”1 Today, sociolegal studies remain well-poised to answer this appeal. Taking theory about moral costs from Calabresi in L&E and adding anthropological thought on the meaning of “value,” this essay presents situated valuation – a contextualized notion of value that accounts for the moral costs of inequalities while supporting principled scrutiny of redistributive policies meant to reduce inequality but sometimes worsening it. This discussion highlights the importance of interpretive social science in the study of distributive inequality, while showcasing a neglected but generative link between mutually imbricated interdisciplinary communities.

There is an interpretative puzzle at the centre of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. The text presents the single principle of morality (G, 4: 392), but instead of providing a definitive statement of the principle, we find a three-step sequence of formulas. The puzzle concerns the formula relation: given the contrast between the moral law’s individuality and the plurality of formulas, how do the formulas relate to each other and the moral law? This paper takes the first step towards a new account by focusing on G, 4: 436, a passage in which Kant makes claims about the matter and form of the moral law. By understanding the hylomorphism entailed by these claims, it is possible to achieve new perspectives on common questions about Kant’s ethics, in particular, the role of the formulas in deriving or explaining duties and how the formulas are used in the argument of Groundwork II and its transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals.

This article explores the interface between religion and international humanitarian law (IHL), and the degree to which they might complement and reinforce each other. It examines some of the challenges inherent in regulating armed conflict and the understandable limitations of IHL in this respect, and argues that re-engagement with IHL's religious roots can help to alleviate them. Engagement with religious circles mobilizes the vast resources of religions to increase knowledge of IHL and corresponding religious norms, thereby enhancing their legitimacy across religious and cultural divides. This is most effective when comparative study of IHL and religious teachings stimulates mutual learning and debate, in which both correspondences and differences are embraced. In the absence of a strong legal enforcement regime, religions can reinforce military ethics by tapping deeply into the identities, motivations and moral values of many belligerents, and possess powerful means to socialize the rules of war and improve voluntary compliance. Introspective religious practices encourage the moral self-reflection that is most effective at internalizing norms in this respect, as well as providing belligerents with the spiritual and psychological support needed to bolster their resilience and enable them to perform with precision and restraint.

Are the commands and exhortations of the Lord Jesus directed to his disciples only or are they directed to all mankind? The question arises from an examination of traditional Jewish teaching, around the time of Jesus's life in Palestine, that Jewish Law applies only to Jews. Seeing that there is no way of knowing what God requires of humans unless he reveals his requirements, and seeing that God's revealing of any requirements he has made has been carried out by Jesus the Christ and, further, that the best evidence for his teachings are the accounts of his teaching in the New Testament, this article examines it and concludes that his Law applies only to his disciples.

In this essay I offer a nuanced account of my critique of “rights” language. I argue that my primary concern is not to discount the usefulness of rights language in contemporary expressions of legal and moral duties. Rather my concern is with the overreliance on rights language such that it guards a society from acknowledging prior claims to a common good. Rights language has become too powerful when appeals to rights threatens to replace first-order moral descriptions in a manner that makes us less able to make the moral discriminations that we depend upon to be morally wise. Finally, I turn to Simone Weil and Rowan Williams, who both turn to the body to suggest a more constructive way for thinking about rights as attending to the body, which forces us to attend to contingency. Human contingency can help us resist abstractions that fail to properly account for and address bodily needs.

Objectives: The aim of this study was to identify and discuss appropriate approaches to integrate ethical inquiry in health technology assessment (HTA).

Methods: The key question is how ethics can be integrated in HTA. This is addressed in two steps: by investigating what it means to integrate ethics in HTA, and by assessing how suitable the various methods in ethics are to be integrated in HTA according to these meanings of integration.

Results: In the first step, we found that integrating ethics can mean that ethics is (a) subsumed under or (b) combined with other parts of the HTA process; that it can be (c) coordinated with other parts; or that (d) ethics actively interacts and changes other parts of the HTA process. For the second step, we found that the various methods in ethics have different merits with respect to the four conceptions of integration in HTA.

Conclusions: Traditional approaches in moral philosophy tend to be most suited to be subsumed or combined, while processual approaches being close to the HTA or implementation process appear to be most suited to coordinated and interactive types of integration. The article provides a guide for choosing the ethics approach that appears most appropriate for the goals and process of a particular HTA.

Background: Although value issues are increasingly addressed in health technology assessment (HTA) reports, HTA is still seen as a scientific endeavor and sometimes contrasted with value judgments, which are considered arbitrary and unscientific. This article aims at illustrating how numerous value judgments are at play in the HTA process, and why it is important to acknowledge and address value judgments.

Methods: A panel of experts involved in HTA, including ethicists, scrutinized the HTA process with regard to implicit value judgments. It was analyzed whether these value judgments undermine the accountability of HTA results. The final results were obtained after several rounds of deliberation.

Results: Value judgments are identified before the assessment when identifying and selecting health technologies to assess, and as part of assessment. They are at play in the processes of deciding on how to select, frame, present, summarize or synthesize information in systematic reviews. Also, in economic analysis, value judgments are ubiquitous. Addressing the ethical, legal, and social issues of a given health technology involves moral, legal, and social value judgments by definition. So do the appraisal and the decision-making process.

Conclusions: HTA by and large is a process of value judgments. However, the preponderance of value judgments does not render HTA biased or flawed. On the contrary they are basic elements of the HTA process. Acknowledging and explicitly addressing value judgments may improve the accountability of HTA.