This two-part article examines the global public health (GPH) information system deficits emerging in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. It surveys past, missed opportunities for public health (PH) information system and operational improvements, examines current megatrend changes to information management, and describes a new multi-disciplinary model for population-based management (PBM) supported by a GPH Database applicable to pandemics and GPH crises.

The Department of Defense does not implement health-sector humanitarian assistance impact assessments to complement those of the international humanitarian aid community. This oversight fails to meet the recent Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 mandate calling for the application of measures of effectiveness. The decision by the Department of Defense to incorporate humanitarian assistance in stability operations should be supported by evidence-based impact assessments. This article proposes implementation of an impact assessment model in Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations. The use of an impact assessment model will refocus previously identified information gaps from traditional military input-output management toward a greater emphasis on outcomes. This will help answer which humanitarian activities are successful, which are not, and why. Over time, the use of an impact assessment model will ensure that the Department of Defense and its operational units are learning as an organization while applying evidence-based lessons learned to future stability operations. Most important, the use of this model will both provide better understanding of the role that the Department of Defense has in humanitarian activities and help interpret and transfer these activities to the host nation and international aid community in a timely and efficient manner. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:237–244)

Background: A recent Department of Defense instruction mandates country-specific assessments, identification of interventions, and development of guidance for Department of Defense to plan, train, and prepare for the provision of humanitarian assistance in stability operations. It also directs the use of outcome-based measures of effectiveness and the establishment of processes facilitating transparency of information. Whereas this would align military-led projects closer to the standards of the international aid community, how this process will be developed and implemented within the military has not yet been determined.

Methods: To begin developing an evidence-based program for military-led humanitarian aid, we conducted a qualitative gap analysis comparing information from a Web search of Department of Defense medical after-action reports, lessons learned, and expert interviews with the internationally accepted standards in humanitarian assistance impact assessment.

Results: There is a major gap in the ability of the Department of Defense to assess the impact of humanitarian assistance in stability operations compared with international development standards. Of the 1000 Department of Defense after-action reports and lessons learned reviewed, only 7 (0.7%) reports refer to, but do not discuss, impact assessment or outcome-based measures of effectiveness.

Conclusions: This investigation shows that the Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations are, historically, recorded without documentation using quantifiable health data identifying which aid activities contributed directly to desired outcomes or favorable public opinion, and rarely are analyzed for effectiveness. As humanitarian assistance operations assume an ever greater role in US military strategy, it is imperative that we investigate useful impact assessment models to meet mission directives and, more important, to maximize coordination in a necessarily integrated and cooperative development environment. These findings provide baseline knowledge for the implementation of an evidence-based impact assessment process to validate future Department of Defense humanitarian assistance operations. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:230–236)

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are defined as operationally quantifiable management tools that provide a means for measuring effectiveness, outcome, and performance. No clear MOEs exist for determining success or failure of the management of a bioterrorism response. This is especially critical because management requires a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary decision-making and evaluation process. It is suggested that the minimum MOEs required to operationally measure outcome must contain a measuring response capacity for: (1) real-time public health surveillance system; (2) full coverage health information system; (3) capacity to measure variance across management timelines; (4) demonstrated decline in mortality and morbidity; (5) control of transmission rates of communicable agents; and (6) resource distribution across the entire population.

During the past decade, indicators for the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of services provided by humanitarian organizations to populations affected by complex emergencies (CEs) were developed to improve the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian response. The quality of data used to develop individual indicators and their relationship to positive health outcomes varies greatly. This article states the essential characteristics necessary for the development and implementation of effective indicators in CE response and proposes the establishment of an evidence-based grading system. The importance of trend analysis and the modification or addition of various indicators and their thresholds, according to phase and location of CEs, are stressed. Limitations in the development, implementation, and interpretation of these indicators, including those outside of the organizations' control are discussed. More evidence-based research is needed as to the type and thresholds of indicators that lead to improved health outcomes in populations affected by CEs. The use of indicators by non-governmental organizations, and how they affect their program's decision-making in different phases and settings within CEs need further study. Finally, the establishment of a regulating body with the authority to enforce the attainment of standards by use of these indicators is necessary to avoid inappropriate humanitarian assistance causing loss of life in the future.

Disasters always have been a part of life, whether caused by unavoidable natural events or by avoidable, man-made events. Being rendered helpless by such events has caused fear and concern in all periods of history. To some extent, a disaster is expected, but there are varying degrees of uncertainty as to how and when it will occur. The occurrence of a disaster creates varying degrees of chaos combined with a mismatch between resources and needs. Therefore, in order to restore an affected society back to its pre-event status requires extraordinary efforts.

Complex humanitarian emergencies lack a mechanism to coordinate, communicate, assess, and evaluate response and outcome for the major participants (United Nations, Intenational Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and military forces). Success in these emergencies will depend on the ability to accomplish agreed upon measures of effectiveness (MOEs). A recent civil-military humanitarian exercise demonstrated the ability of participants to develop consensus-driven MOEs. These MOEs combined security measures utilized by the military with humanitarian indicators recognized by relief organizations. Measures of effectiveness have the potential to be a unifying disaster management tool and a partial solution to the communication and coordination problems inherent in these complex emergencies.