Zimbabwe’s 1995 general election was conducted in the context of a ferocious debate on the country’s controversial constitution and a disastrous economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP). Zanu PF had already won a parliamentary majority well before votes were cast. It had the advantage of having thirty presidentially appointed MPs and fifty-five of its sitting MPs stood unopposed. The national voters’ register remained in a complete shambles. A weak and divided political opposition seemed to be a permanent feature in the country. Zanu PF neither accepted nor tolerated political opponents, believing it had entitlement to be in power forever. Zanu PF participation in the anti-colonial liberation war was a major justification for supressing political opposition parties. Zanu PF’s mindset was, by hook or crook, de jure or de facto bent on achieving a one-party state. The hallmarks of the 1995 elections were the controversial constitution, weak opposition, Zanu PF’s manipulation, and bending and breaking of election rules, including its lack of political will to develop a viable voters’ roll. The economic structural adjustment programme had already ruined peoples’ livelihoods by the mid-1990s. The source of violence emanated from Zanu PF’s non-acceptance and intolerance of competitive election contests, including within its own leadership selection processes.

While the field of political psychology has overwhelmingly focused on political orientation (i.e., ideological content), this chapter proposes that political extremism (i.e., ideological strength) at the left and right also matters for a range of important variables. The main argument is that feelings of distress prompt a desire for epistemic clarity, which increases the appeal of the clear-cut answers that politically extreme movements provide for pressing societal problems. The chapter subsequently proposes that political extremism in most cases is a problem for societies. We review evidence that politically extreme beliefs are associated with overconfidence in the correctness of one’s beliefs and knowledge about the world, an increased susceptibility to beliefs that are not supported by science or reason, and intolerance of competing belief systems or groups perceived as ideologically different. We conclude by articulating a few limitations and research directions in this research domain.

Chapter 3 begins the introduction to Jan Assmann through material that is shared between him and Girard: Sigmund Freud’s Moses and Monotheism. This text stepped into a multi-century discourse that tried to abolish the monotheistic distinction between “Israel” vs. “Egypt.” But, contrary to simplistic readings of Freud as the enemy of religion, he ultimately argues (with mixed veracity) that monotheistic intolerance is a beneficial “progress in intellectuality.” This introduces much of Assmann’s topics: that is, comparing monotheism between Akhenaten and Egypt, Moses and Israel, and theorizing monotheism’s relationship to violence and politics.

In Chapter 1, I lay out the paradox of “intolerance” as analyzed in the work of Chantal Mouffe. Her understanding of the incompatibility between liberalism and democracy illuminates the complex relationship between pluralism and intolerance. Of crucial concern is how Mouffe’s pluralism requires what I describe as apophatic intolerance, a refusal to lay hold of the Absolute and a refusal of political closure and pure tolerance.

The Conclusion ties the themes of the book together to emphasize monotheism not as an "identity forged negatively against the other," nor as an escape from this othering. Rather, through the apophatic intolerance explored in all chapters, monotheism is conceived as othering-in-reverse, as a revelation of our blindness to scapegoating the other, highlighting our need not for mere inclusivity but agonistic pluralism.

Despite more than a decade of repeated recommendations by international human rights bodies to enact comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation, South Korea has not done so. This raises fundamental questions about the conditions under which international human rights mechanisms can affect domestic human rights legislation. This chapter argues that despite the apparent lack of legislative change, Korea’s movement for antidiscrimination legislation successfully brought the international human rights norms of equality and nondiscrimination into Korean society. South Korea has long been regarded as a homogeneous society in which assimilationist forces dominate policymaking and culture. Strong opposition to comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation from conservative Protestant groups paradoxically exposed Korean society’s prevalent but hidden intolerance of diversity, energizing the antidiscrimination movement and increasing the visibility of minorities. This process of “discovering” diversity has catalyzed significant changes in social norms and values, which constitute a critical step toward enacting comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation that embraces all forms of diversity.

The rise of intolerant groups using media to publish images and stories about vulnerable groups creates a special problem for media ethics.

Extremism leads to serious media harm, including unjustifiable profound offence. The more that extreme messages are circulated, the greater likelihood that citizens, frustrated by slow-moving moderate politics, may adopt more extreme “solutions” to complex problems. Dialogic democracy wanes.

Today hate crimes are on the rise locally, nationally, and internationally. Many of these crimes stem from racism, discrimination, and xenophobia. The questions that arise are (1) What are the psychological premises that underlie one’s beliefs about racism, discrimination, and xenophobia? and (2) What are the psychological, social, and human rights consequences if we fail to act? In this chapter we address these questions by (1) describing the psychology of racism, prejudice, and discrimination; (2) examining how the United Nations and the global community have historically addressed racism and discrimination; and (3) providing an overview of the history of how psychological science has been used to address racism and discrimination within the global community. Finally, the chapter concludes by addressing the psychology of diversity and calling upon the global community to use evidence to address how we can best create a more equal society, given our differences, so as to maximize the potential of all of humanity and ensure the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

This introduction discusses the debate surrounding offensive language both past and present. We look at the way people talk about being offended, or not being offended, and issues of free speech and social justice.

This chapter focuses on the period 1680–1720, noting how religious confrontations exacerbated tensions between different visions of legitimate power and civic society across many parts of Europe. This instability is reflected both in the experimental work produced by some writers and in the need for subversive texts to be disseminated illegally to evade censors. Textual analysis of the Bible itself led to profound controversies to which the only rational response seemed to be the implementation of some form of religious toleration, but no government could do so effectively. This chapter looks at the very different arguments and styles deployed by a range of writers from Hobbes and Spinoza to less well–known underground polemicists in the early years of the eighteenth century. A rich vein of fictional writing, too, confirms that this was a period of huge significance in terms of questioning established authority in all fields of knowledge, creating new networks of writers with ideas that might be considered ‘dangerous’, and laying solid foundations for a recognisable public opinion. Print was creating an effective ‘republic of readers’.