This chapter demonstrates how the punishments associated with laws that govern public property entrench individuals in homelessness, such that they will continue to experience non-egalitarian coercion and domination. It explores how these laws result in fines, fees, and surcharges that can result in significant criminal justice debt. It shows how punishments can result in collateral consequences that limit employment prospects and access to housing.

This chapter explores the simple mandate contract which is governed by Articles 394–406 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. This chapter commences with the sources of this contract, its main characteristics as well as its delimitations with other contracts. This chapter then moves on to discuss the formation of the simple mandate contract before discussing in detail the obligations of the agent and the principal. These include the agent’s obligation to provide the promised services, duty to render the services in a diligent and faithful manner, duty to give an account, duty to return and duty to transfer vested rights as well as the principal’s duty to reimburse expenses, duty to discharge the agents from their obligations, duty to compensate for any loss incurred and obligation to pay fees. Finally, this chapter explores the end of the simple mandate contract either by termination or due to legal reasons.

Scores of lawsuits have pushed retirement plan sponsors to shorter, easier-to-navigate menus, but – as Ian Ayres and Quinn Curtis argue in this work – we’ve only scratched the surface of retirement plan design. Using participant-level plan data and straightforward tests, Ayres and Curtis show how plan sponsors can monitor plans for likely allocation mistakes and adapt menus to encourage success. Beginning with an overview of the problem of high costs and the first empirical evidence on retirement plan fee lawsuits, they offer an overview of the current plan landscape. They then show, based on reforms to a real plan, how streamlining menus, eliminating pitfalls, and adopting static and dynamic limits on participant allocations to certain risky assets or “guardrails” can reduce mistakes and lead to better retirement outcomes. Focusing on plausible, easy-to-implement interventions, Retirement Guardrails shows that fiduciaries need not be limited to screening out funds but can design menus to actively promote good choices.

Chapter 4 addresses the rising civil costs of dissent. It examines the various costs and liabilities that apply to protest organizers, participants, and supporters. These include permit fees, damages resulting from personal injury lawsuits, statutory penalty enhancements, and loss of public benefits. The chapter makes the case for stricter First Amendment scrutiny of these costs and argues that certain fee-shifting arrangements and civil causes of action violate the First Amendment. It encourages public officials to commit to reducing rather than piling on the costs of dissent.

Already at a young age, Strauss made initial contacts with well-known publishing houses. Eugen Spitzweg of the Munich publishing house Jos. Aibl became a paternal friend for the aspiring composer. At the beginning, when Strauss was barely known to a wide audience, Spitzweg expressed his friendship by including Strauss’s compositions in his catalog. But soon Strauss’s reputation grew – and with it his self-confidence in negotiations with his business partners. Unlike some other important composers in music history, Strauss developed into a capable businessman and secured high fees for his music. This chapter highlights the publishing context of Strauss’s work. It characterizes his relationships with his long-time main publishers, names the publishers with whom Strauss collaborated only briefly, and presents an overview of the great variety of sheet music editions (from historical publications to modern critical editions) in which Strauss’s music is available.