Recently, scholars have advanced an ideal of the entrepreneurial state in which industrial policy is pursued in a mission-directed manner. Crucially, this perspective does not merely call for the heavier use of industrial policy, but envisions the state as a central focal point, mobilising society around the pursuit of a common mission. Using the historical example of East Asia's developmental state, which closely resembles its contemporary variant, I demonstrate that mission-directionality – should it be consistently applied – tends towards the pursuit of a singular overarching mission, and could require the use of authoritarian and disciplinary mechanisms to sustain mission focus in an environment of uncertainty. In turn, this potential risk arises because mission-directionality seeks to transcend the otherwise directionless nature of market-based and democratic decision-making through the use of bureaucratic discretion, to align the behaviour of social actors in a cohesive and directional manner.

This article examines the role of state-owned firms in economic growth. While some scholars denigrate state firms, most analysts of East Asian development have noted their importance. To date, however, little work has been done on how state firms operate and how they have actually contributed to industrial development and economic growth. Looking closely at postwar Taiwan as a newly industrializing country and the case of Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing Corporation (TMMC), this article argues that state enterprises resolved coordination failures and provided manufacturing capacity to infant industries. Drawing on company archives and state records, I argue that TMMC helped drive growth through the provision of manufacturing machinery, equipment, parts, repairs, and upgrading. By supplying firms with the necessary technology and materials to modernize production and be competitive on the global market, I show how TMMC helped facilitate Taiwan’s economic miracle.

China was a centre for early plant domestication, millets in the north and rice in the south, with both crops then spreading widely. The Laoguantai Culture (c. 8000–7000 BP) of the middle Yellow River region encompasses a crucial stage in the transition from hunting and gathering to farming, yet its subsistence basis is poorly understood. The authors present archaeobotanical data from the site of Beiliu indicating that farmers exploited a variety of wild and cultivated plants. The predominance of broomcorn millet accords with other Neolithic cultures in northern China but the presence of rice—some of the earliest directly dated examples—opens questions about the integration of rice cultivation into local subsistence strategies.

How do states as social actors cope with stigma-induced status anxiety? I propose the concept of “stigma shifting” as a way in which status-anxious states overcompensate for their stigma-induced inferiority and reaffirm their place in the world: by seeking identification with higher-status states and differentiation from lower-status states. In identifying with the desired group of states, stigmatized states engage in approval-seeking behavior and reaffirm their in-group status in areas where they feel discredited. In differentiating themselves from the undesired group, stigmatized states engage in distinction-seeking behavior, claiming their superiority over this “lesser” group in areas that gave rise to their status anxiety in the first place. Stigma shifting, in other words, allows a stigmatized state to take the role of a stigmatizer. To demonstrate the concept's depth and analytical utility, I draw on the case of East Asia in three disparate issue areas: colonial redress, nuclear disaster, and international order making. Japan, stigmatized in all three areas, has reaffirmed its status by shifting the stigma onto its significant but “lesser” others: China and Korea. Ultimately, stigma shifting solidifies status hierarchies in the world—not just the hierarchy as represented by the “Western” dominance of international society but also the regional hierarchies of the non-Western world.

This article examines culture, an ambiguous yet prevalent concept in comparisons of crime and justice. It investigates the extent to which culture’s application and meaning across research reflects Western-centric bias in criminological knowledge-production despite it being a concept meant to advance understanding on different groups and places beyond the “Western” worldview. The article extends the discussion on Western-centric bias but also on culture in criminology by tracing the use of this concept on East Asian populations and by identifying patterns of application and meaning in international and comparative research through a scoping review of 230 journal publications. The findings address patterns of culture’s appearance in criminology journals in the past two decades and its meaning. Similar to previous scholarship on Western-centrism in criminology, the article finds that this bias does, too, exist in uses of culture but also shows how culture’s conceptual ambiguity is conducive to this bias, in that some groups and places are given one meaning of culture while others receive another.

The transition to sedentary agricultural societies in northern China fuelled considerable demographic growth from 5000 to 2000 BC. In this article, we draw together archaeobotanical, zooarchaeological and bioarchaeological data and explore the relationship between several aspects of this transition, with an emphasis on the millet-farming productivity during the Yangshao period and how it facilitated changes in animal husbandry and consolidation of sedentism. We place the period of domestication (the evolution of non-shattering, initial grain size increase and panicle development) between 8300 and 4300 BC. The domestication and post-domestication of foxtail (Setaria italica) and broomcorn (Panicum miliaceum) millet increased their productivity substantially, with much greater rate of change than for rice (Oryza sativa). However, millets are significantly less productive per hectare than wet rice farming, a point reflected in the greater geographical expanse of northern Neolithic millet cultures (5000–3000 BC) in comparison with their Yangtze rice-growing counterparts. The domestication of pigs in the Yellow River region is evidenced by changes in their morphology after 6000 BC, and a transition to a millet-based diet c. 4500–3500 BC. Genetic data and isotopic data from dogs indicate a similar dietary transition from 6000 to 4000 BC, leading to new starch-consuming dog breeds. Significant population increase associated with agricultural transitions arose predominately from the improvement of these crops and animals following domestication, leading to the formation of the first proto-urban centres and the demic-diffusion of millet agriculture beyond central northern China between 4300–2000 BC.

Characterised by the extensive use of obsidian, a blade-based tool inventory and microblade technology, the late Upper Palaeolithic lithic assemblages of the Changbaishan Mountains are associated with the increasingly cold climatic conditions of Marine Isotope Stage 2, yet most remain poorly dated. Here, the authors present new radiocarbon dates associated with evolving blade and microblade toolkits at Helong Dadong, north-east China. At 27 300–24 100 BP, the lower cultural layers contain some of the earliest microblade technology in north-east Asia and highlight the importance of the Changbaishan Mountains in understanding changing hunter-gatherer lifeways in this region during MIS 2.

Rice agriculture was brought to Japan during the first millennium BC by migrant communities of farmers from the Korean peninsula. Substantial geographic variation is observed in the uptake of this new subsistence economy, reflecting different forms of interaction between farmers and foragers. Here, the authors analyse a combination of settlement and radiocarbon data to determine the extent to which these different forms of interaction led to regional variations in population growth rate. Their results confirm the presence of different trajectories of growth, providing new insights into the diversity of demographic processes during the earliest stages of farming in Japan.

This article begins by examining the historiography of Shanxi piaohao and asking how modernist financial discourse gradually took shape over the past century. It then counters the persistent modernist discourse and its anachronistic application to the history of piaohao and the north Chinese interior from two aspects. First, how piaohao managed to build an empire-wide financial network and facilitated flows of capital and goods during the nineteenth century. Second, how family-centered capitalist and non-capitalist histories countered piaohao's unrealized path to modern Western-style banking. This article challenges the perceived universalism of the Western European economy and adopts a Braudelian emphasis on an essential feature of the history of capitalism in a global context—that is, capitalism's unlimited flexibility and capacity for change and adaptation, as seen throughout the history of the Shanxi merchants and piaohao firms, not confined to the singular future of transformation into modern Western-style banks.

Many studies have been conducted on the link between Confucianism and democratic values in East Asia, but they have failed to account for the complex character of Confucianism and the possible impact of political systems. This study re-measures Confucian values into four dimensions—authoritarianism, familialism, collectivism, and harmoniousness—based on data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer survey. It then uses a multi-layer linear regression model to examine the relationship between the Confucian cultural values and the democratic values held by people in six East Asian societies at both the macro and micro levels. The findings demonstrate an asymmetrical pattern in the relationship between the various dimensions of Confucian cultural values and the democratic values of East Asia, collectivist values do not affect democratic values, while familial and authoritarian values have a significant and negative correlation with democratic values. Harmonious values have a significant and positive correlation with democratic values. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation between democratic institutions and the democratic values, and the relationship between the values of harmoniousness and collectivism and democratic values varies across countries with different political systems. This offers insightful material for reflection as we reconsider the connection between Confucianism and democracy in East Asia.

This study examines whether a degree of autocracy and high quality of bureaucracy—two mechanisms often discussed in the context of Covid-19 responses—provide a meaningful explanation for East Asia's relative success compared to the rest of the world at the beginning of the Covid pandemic. Our multiple regression analysis for 111 countries supports our expectation, as East Asia as a region is significantly and negatively associated with confirmed Covid-19 cases and deaths compared to the rest of the world, and its interaction with the quality of bureaucracy further contributes to the negative association. In sum, this research highlights the important role of East Asia's regional characteristics in pandemic responses.