This paper defines constitutional ethnography as the cultural study of constitutionalism through its symbolic representations. By focusing on the materiality of constitutionalism as embodied in various state ceremonies such as ceremonies of “royal octroy” (constitution-granting ceremonies) as well as in state monuments honouring the Constitution, it strives to offer an ethnography of a polity’s constitutional identity. In this paper, I argue that in Thailand, Westernized Hindu-Buddhist state ceremonies and monuments using Westernized Hindu-Buddhist symbolism represent the Thai monarch as the ultimate law-giver holding permanent “constituent power” and therefore yielding extra-constitutional customary powers pre-existing the Constitution. This representation, in turn, informs Thai constitutional identity as defined incrementally by courts and jurists since the early twentieth century, which in turn informs present Thai constitutional interpretation. Therefore, this paper argues that the study of state ceremonies can be a useful entry point into the analysis of a “constitutional culture” shaping modes of constitutional interpretation.

The tension between the cosmopolitan vocation of the economy and the national character of politics has lately reached a considerable level of pressure, as control over some political economic determinants of growth has been gradually acquired by European Union (EU) institutions at the expense of national political communities. In his book Authoritarian Liberalism, Michael Wilkinson calls this development a depoliticisation of fundamental decisions concerning economic and socio-economic relationships, a process which has culminated in the Maastricht Treaty. In my comment, I intend to explore the argument concerning depoliticisation, by examining the relationship between economy and politics from a constitutional standpoint. While I agree with the author that depoliticisation has been systematically translated into a political mode of screening decisions concerning economy behind the narrative of necessary and unavoidable developments within the European project, I take a difference stance on the meaning and risks of depoliticisation. I shall argue that a certain form of depoliticisation is intrinsic to any process of constitutionalisation understood as a reflex of a political will. I then shall explain that European constitutional culture’s anti-political prejudice may have at times transfigured depoliticisation into a technique to tame and restrict disagreement.

The paper discusses recent propositions that, after a period of ‘American exceptionalism’, forms of ‘European exceptionalism’ are now emerging. The paper first asks what makes a political entity ‘exceptionalist’. For this purpose inspiration is sought in the defining features of ‘American exceptionalism’. The paper then discusses whether ‘Europe’ displays comparable features in the fields of international legal policy and domestic rights culture. It also asks whether there are other aspects of European governance which could make it plausible to speak of a European exceptionalism. The paper concludes that it is misleading to use the term ‘European exceptionalism’ because the underlying phenomena are not comparable with what is usually understood as ‘American exceptionalism’.