This chapter explores the origins and consequences of national security institutions in the People’s Republic of China during the tenure of Mao Zedong. It first explains the political logic behind Mao’s choice to shift from integrated to fragmented institutions: Mao chose to weaken the bureaucracy to ensure a stable political succession after his death. It then presents a medium-n analysis to show how this shift from integrated to fragmented institutions degraded China’s crisis performance. Detailed process tracing of two cases illustrates how different institutional designs shaped crisis performance through poor bureaucratic information provision at the onset of each crisis. Prior to the 1962 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao’s decision-making benefitted from high-quality bureaucratic information that comparatively inclusive and open institutions afforded. By the onset of the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border conflict, however, Mao was forced to make decisions based on incomplete and biased information provided by bureaucrats who feared Mao’s retribution. The chapter thus illustrates how institutional changes can dramatically change the quality of information upon which the same leader bases their choice of conflict.

This chapter extends the analysis of the origins and consequences of China’s national security institutions into the post-Mao era. It first discusses the political reasons why fragmented institutions persisted after Mao’s death and why Chinese leaders subsequently opted for siloed, rather than integrated, institutions. It then presents a medium-n analysis exploring the differences in crisis performance between fragmented and siloed institutions. The decision-making processes leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 2001 EP-3 Crisis demonstrate the distinct pathways by which fragmented and siloed institutions cause leaders to miscalculate. Whereas Chinese leaders received incomplete information prior to the Sino-Vietnamese War because bureaucrats feared speaking truth to power, Chinese leaders received inaccurate information prior to the onset of the 2001 EP-3 Crisis because bureaucrats were dissuaded from contesting one another’s reporting. Both cases advance the book’s argument regarding the importance of information quality as opposed to political accountability.