This chapter challenges the dominant paradigm of a ‘use of force’ in article 2(4) of the UN Charter as a coherent concept by giving examples from the subsequent agreement and subsequent practice of States showing that none of the elements of a ‘use of force’ is strictly necessary for the definition to be met. It examines anomalous examples which lack the elements of physical means, physical effects, gravity or hostile intent, taking as a basis of analysis certain acts listed in the 1974 Definition of Aggression: military occupation (article 3(a)), blockade (article 3(c)), mere presence in violation of a Status of Forces Agreement (article 3(e)) and indirect use of force through inter-State assistance (article 3(f)) or through non-State armed groups (article 3(g)). It also examines anomalous examples of non-‘use of force’: acts which appear to meet the criteria but are not characterised as such by States in their subsequent practice. These include forcible response to aerial incursion and purported maritime law enforcement. This chapter then offers possible explanations for these anomalous examples and discusses the implications for the interpretation of a prohibited ‘use of force’.

This chapter examines the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, focusing on its required means. It analyses whether ‘force’ in article 2(4) is restricted to particular means, namely, if it refers to physical/armed force only, if a weapon must be employed, what is considered a ‘weapon’ and if a release of kinetic energy is required. In doing so, it discusses subsequent agreements on the meaning of a ‘use of force’ in article 2(4), including the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression, 1987 Resolution 42/22 and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. It also examines in detail the travaux préparatoires of the Friendly Relations Declaration regarding the definition of ‘force’ in article 2(4) and arguments for and against a broad interpretation. This chapter concludes that ‘use of force’ article 2(4) refers only to physical force and not to non-physical forms of coercion, that it is not necessary that a ‘weapon’ be used nor is it required that kinetic energy be released, and that physical means are not essential for an act to constitute a ‘use of force’, as what counts are its physical effects.

This chapter presents and applies an original framework – type theory – to identify a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, focusing on the meaning of ‘use of force’ and the contextual element of ‘international relations’. The theory of ‘type’ is firstly set out before explaining how it applies to the prohibition of the use of force. This chapter argues that a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States is characterised by a basket of elements, not all of which must be present for an act to meet the definition. Instead, these elements – including certain effects, gravity and intention – are identified and weighed to determine whether the definition of a ‘use of force’ is met. Illustrative examples are given from State practice including targeted killing and excessive or unlawful maritime law enforcement. Finally, this chapter applies the type theory framework to the testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in outer space to show how it can be applied in novel contexts. Through these case studies, this chapter draws definitive conclusions regarding the definition of a ‘use of force’ and demonstrates how to apply this framework in practice.

This conclusion sets out a definitional framework for a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter according to the type theory developed in this monograph. It sets out the contextual elements of that provision and the elements of a ‘use of force’ that are identified and discussed in greater detail in earlier parts of the monograph. Finally, it offers some reflections on the legal nature of this framework and its potential as a tool for scholars and practitioners to assess whether forcible incidents meet the threshold of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law.

This introduction highlights the prevailing uncertainty regarding the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It sets out the key research questions that this monograph addresses regarding the meaning of ‘use of force’ under jus ad bellum, including if ‘force’ means physical/armed force only and whether kinetic means or the use of particular weapons required, if a (potential) physical effect is required and the required nature of such effects, if there is a de minimis gravity threshold, and if a coercive or hostile intent is required. It also explains why the definition of prohibited force matters and its consequences under international law, including with respect to the gap between ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and ‘armed attack’ under article 51 as well as the rise of grey zone operations. Finally, it sets out the aims and contributions of this monograph and an outline of its structure.

This chapter examines two ways the customary norm could have emerged post-1945: the two-element approach or that article 2(4) gave rise to a new customary rule of its own impact, following the approach of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. It demonstrates the challenges of applying the two-element approach to the customary prohibition of the use of force due to the presence of the parallel and near-universal treaty obligation in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which makes it difficult to identify sufficient relevant State practice and opinio juris outside the treaty. Establishing evidence of the customary rule and its content in this way depends on a number of theoretical issues that remain unsettled or over which significant controversy exists. This chapter then applies the criteria set out by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to article 2(4) and argues that article 2(4) meets this test. This chapter concludes that, in contrast to the right to self-defence in article 51 of the UN Charter which explicitly has its origins in customary international law, article 2(4) is itself the origin of the customary international law prohibition of the use of force.

This chapter examines the relationship between the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law: if they are identical, the role the customary rule plays in the interpretation of article 2(4) and which one to interpret or apply to determine the meaning of a prohibited ‘use of force’. In doing so it examines the following concepts: the use of pre-existing or subsequently developing custom to fill gaps in the treaty, the use of subsequently developing custom to informally modify the interpretation of the treaty, an evolutive interpretation of the UN Charter and informal treaty modification through subsequent practice. It argues that since article 2(4) is the origin of the customary prohibition, it is not appropriate to use pre-existing or subsequently developing customary international law to fill gaps in interpretation of article 2(4) nor to use subsequently developing custom to modify article 2(4). It concludes that due to the present relationship between the customary and Charter prohibitions, the preferable approach to determine the meaning of prohibited force under international law is to focus on interpreting the UN Charter.

This chapter examines the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, focusing on its required effects, gravity and intention. It analyses the required type of effects, namely, whether they must be physical, the required object/target, the required level of directness between the act and its harmful effects, and if temporary or potential effects count. With respect to gravity, it argues there is no de minimis threshold for a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) but that gravity is nonetheless relevant to the contextual requirement that the act be in ‘international relations’ and is an indicative element of a ‘use of force’. Finally, it analyses whether a particular intention is required for a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), examining accident, mistake and coercive and hostile intent. This section considers the relationship between the prohibitions of the ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force, the non-intervention principle and the object and purpose of article 2(4). It concludes that like gravity, a coercive or hostile intent is relevant to the contextual requirements of article 2(4) and is an indicative element of a ‘use of force’.

This chapter examines the origin of the customary prohibition of the use of force between States and its relationship to article 2(4) of the UN Charter, focusing on the pre-UN Charter era. In doing so, it critically analyses two possibilities for the norm to have emerged prior to 1945: that it developed prior to the UN Charter and article 2(4) was declaratory of that pre-existing custom, or that article 2(4) crystallised a customary rule that was already in the process of formation. It rejects these two possibilities, arguing that article 2(4) was a significant legal development which went beyond the existing laws of the time in order to found a new international legal order in the aftermath of World War II. Any pre-existing customary limitations on the use of force were significantly broadened by article 2(4), and the drafting process was not accompanied by meaningful State practice developing in parallel with this radical change in the law. Therefore, the customary rule prohibiting recourse to force between States must have arisen after the Charter entered into force. The emergence and development of the customary rule from 1945 onwards are examined in the next chapter.

This chapter examines the contextual elements of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the requirement that a prohibited ‘threat or use of force’ be in ‘international relations’. It analyses the meaning of this term and whether it requires that the object of a prohibited use of force be another State and draws conclusions about the types of acts that fall within and outside the scope of this term (and thus the scope of article 2(4)). The type of acts discussed include use of force on another State’s territory or against its extraterritorial sovereign manifestations, to reclaim disputed territory not within de facto control, those in violation of international demarcation lines, those directly arising from a political dispute between States, use of force by a State within its own territory against its own population, in the exercise of law enforcement jurisdiction against private foreign actors, against entities falling short of Statehood, those with no nexus to another State (such as against an international organisation or on terra nullius) and the use of force within a State’s own territory against small-scale incursion by another State’s armed forces.

This chapter provides the background to Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It demarcates the analysis by, first, elaborating on the notion of ‘war’ in cyberspace, and second, on “legal problem-solution” (Koskenniemi) as the shared aim of the international legal scholars involved. It furthermore explains the focus of chapters 3 and 4 on the debate on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in particular, and discusses some of the problems scholars run into as they try to apply the prohibition on the use of force to cyberattacks. The last part of the chapter provides a broad sketch of these attempts, and as a contrast to 'legal problem-solution' details the work of those scholars who claim that the characteristics of cyberattacks preclude their regulation under international law.

This chapter takes a step closer to legal writing on Article 2(4) and cyberattacks, and considers the use of consensus claims: specifically, claims that there is 'general acceptance' of, 'unanimity' on, or 'a majority view' with regard to the meaning of the prohibition as armed force. It asks what is invoked when these kinds of claims are made, and seeks to account for what consensus claims signify in legal writing. The chapter then proceeds by looking at the footnotes following these claims. The ‘sources’ these footnotes list seemingly function to substantiate the consensus claim. However, as shown in the chapter appendix, in order to support their consensus claims scholars largely refer to the same publicists. Using the notion of “concept symbols” as coined by Henry Small, the chapter seeks to account for the function of these references to the most-cited scholars, and how they turn into the bearers of majority opinion. The chapter concludes that even though one single reference can appear to be quite innocuous, when considered as a more widespread practice it seriously impacts who gets a say – and thus, ultimately, what we know – in international law.

This chapter asks how scholars reconstruct the meaning of the prohibition on the use of force in light of the “novel features” (Benatar) of cyberwar. Given the range of effects cyberattacks can have the question is where scholars draw the boundary of force. By creating a dialogue between different pieces and juxtaposing the arguments scholars make, this chapter shows what legal knowledge construction at the boundaries of Article 2(4) looks like. Specifically, it identifies two argumentative turns scholars take. The first pertains explicitly to the boundaries of the norm, and the chapter shows the subsequent trajectory of an argument about the (in)sufficiency of Article 2(4) in regulating these kinds of cyberattacks. The second turn pertains to the classification of the threat. Whereas to some scholars cyberattacks simply constitute a new means to wage war, to others the change is much more fundamental. Whether a scholar opts for the first label or the second, matters to how the legal analysis proceeds towards, again, a diagnosis about the (in)sufficiency of the norm. In sum, this chapter shows how exactly legal writing constructs legal knowledge in relation to Article 2(4).

Chapter 2 counters each of the policy arguments that have been mounted against the criminalisation of State acts of aggression, including arguments relating to uncertainties surrounding the prohibition of the use of force; that acts of aggression are too complex an episode for adjudication by a criminal tribunal; that the criminalisation of aggression will politicise the ICC; that there is a risk of a fragmentation of relevant rules of international law caused by differing decisions of the ICC, the UN Security Council, and the International Court of Justice; and claims that the criminalisation of acts of aggression will have a chilling effect on States’ willingness to use force when they should (namely, to prevent atrocity crimes). The dissection of such arguments demonstrates that each objection is misguided and sets out the case in favour of criminalisation. The chapter also assesses the geopolitical significance of the crime, considering the extent to which the criminalisation of the unlawful use of force represents a shift in the balance between power and law. Finally, the chapter examines the likely impact of the crime of aggression on the rules of the jus ad bellum.

Chapter 3 considers the meaning of an ‘act of aggression’, defined in Article 8bis (2) of the Rome Statute. It opens with a comparative analysis of the terminology employed in the UN Charter to describe inter-State armed force. It then summarises the shortcomings of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3314 (1974), which provided a basis for Article 8bis (2). Among other things, it is demonstrated that the 3314 Definition does not reflect the understanding of an act of aggression seen in the practice of the UN Security Council, GA, or the International Court of Justice. It is also explained how some of the 3314 Definition’s shortcomings were exacerbated by the selective use of its provisions in Article 8bis (2). In addition, the chapter considers the treatment of the acts of non-State actors, and cyber operations and emerging weapons technologies. Finally, the chapter analyses the status of the ‘Understandings’ adopted by the ICC Assembly of States Parties alongside the aggression amendments, and their effect on our understanding of the definition of the State act element of the crime.