This brief essay aims to interpret the fourth chapter “In the Human World” of Zhuangzi by analyzing the seven fables in philosophical terms. The seven fables can be divided into two groups: the first three are concerned with how to be useful (youyong zhi yong 有用之用); the following four with “the use of the useless” (wuyong zhi yong 无用之用). From those two groups of fables, two different ways of life are identified in relation to the world. Zhuangzi's choice between them can be revealed in light of his art of speaking.

This article explores how Chinese Daoist thought can address the need of an ethics that can cope with “the Anthropocene.” It explores the similarities between Daoist thought and posthumanist theories which arose partially as a response to the challenges of the Anthropocene. And it examines how Daoist thought can radicalize posthumanist thinking by means of an ethics based on a genuinely flat ontology that treats all things, human and nonhuman, as equal.

The present discussion aims to help corroborate recent claims that the link between nourishing life 養生 and the Butcher Ding 庖丁 vignette from chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi 莊子 (c. fourth to third century bce) might be taken seriously, while at the same time falsifying recent claims that it is nonetheless uncommon for the connection to be taken seriously. This is achieved by supplying several pieces of textual evidence from leading figures from throughout the history of Zhuangzi studies who all explicitly make the connection and take it seriously. Beyond corroborating one claim and falsifying the other, the present discussion provides renderings of much hitherto untranslated work so as to prevent future scholars from underestimating just how common it is to take the link between the Butcher Ding story and nourishing life seriously.

Traditionally, in both East and West, laughter, and in particular its causes, have been studied under the category of humour. However, ideas on and practices of laughter itself have been largely ignored. This paper intends to lead readers beyond the topic of humour and focus on the act of laughter in the Zhuangzi as a starting point for the study of laughter in early China. It examines frequently ignored areas, such as how laughter draws readers into the text; how it functions to exclude people with different social value judgements; how it is used as a tool to challenge political power; how it serves rhetorical functions as a means to construct a conversation among people of different social or political status; and how it is used as an important signal and marker for a change of perspective. By examining questions such as: “What are the types of laughter?”, “What are the functions of laughter?”, and “How does laughter operate in different situations, and between different persons?” we can see a new idea of laughter in the Zhuangzi with multi-layered philosophical significance. Using the Zhuangzi as a case study, we can envision a series of well-crafted, intentional practices of laughter for various purposes throughout early Chinese texts.

Many ancient traditions recognise certain people as exemplars of virtue, the models for the good or flourishing human life. Certain traditions, however, incorporate a cosmic mode of emulation, where the virtues are manifestations, in human form, of qualities or aspects of the ground or source of the world. I defend this claim using the sustained case study of the forms of Daoist exemplarity found in the Book of Zhuangzi, then consider the charge that the aspiration to cosmic emulation is inhumane. It emerges that there are forms of emulation where the ultimate model for the good or flourishing life as manifested by the exemplar is nothing human.

One challenge involved in integrating so-called ‘non-Western’ philosophies into ‘Western’ philosophical discourse concerns the fact that non-Western philosophical texts frequently differ significantly in style and approach from Western ones, especially those in contemporary analytic philosophy. But how might one bring texts that are written, for example, in a literary, non-expository style, and which do not clearly advance philosophical positions or arguments, into constructive dialogue with those that do? Also, why might one seek to do this in the first place? This paper addresses these questions by means of a case study involving the Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi.