This chapter considers the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as articulated in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) project. At the NIEO’s core was the push to consolidate the legal status of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources. This idea’s champions argued that ownership and control of resources is an essential and necessary element of statehood, one that involves the right to nationalize foreign-held property. By contrast, its critics contended that no state could lawfully seize assets of foreign investors without compensation. They also insisted that the quantity of such compensation should be determined by international law, or through international arbitration, in the event of disagreement. While most aspects of the NIEO, including resource sovereignty, had been debated for some time, partly during broader discussions of neocolonialism and uneven development within the UN Conference on Trade and Development, it was only in 1974 that the project was formalized in a set of General Assembly resolutions. This project was largely the expression of a desire on the part of political and legal elites in the global South to renegotiate their roles in the world capitalist system, reforming rather than repudiating the existing international order.

In the 1960s, Algeria and Cuba became global archetypes of revolution. Opposed to the international system, militant, and loosely allied with the Soviet Union, the two countries challenged Western security in both the Caribbean and North Africa. This similarity created an important if superficial solidarity that emphasized regional support for armed revolutionary movements as a way of safeguarding their states from US intervention. Nevertheless, the Cuban and Algerian positions in Third World affairs started to diverge in the late-1960s as the two countries politico-economic positions changed and they adopted distinct strategies for advancing a radical Third World agenda. Algeria became increasingly invested in using established structures and norms to adjust the international order. In contrast, Cuba championed a global armed militancy, sometimes targeting Third World governments associated with such groups as the G-77 but viewed as insufficiently dedicated to Tricontinental goals. This divergence in international perspectives and tactics reveals the complexity of the Tricontinental ideology, as well as the evolution of radical diplomacy as revolutionary states matured.