This article compares the Secretary General of the Elysée Palace and the US Chief of Staff, central political advisors to the French and US presidents. Our aim is twofold. Firstly, we identify the precise roles of these advisors. By mapping their respective powers, we demonstrate their importance in presidential decision-making. By examining what the French Elysée Secretary General and the US White House Chief of Staff have in common and how they differ, we develop a comparative understanding of the mechanisms of the presidentialization of political executives. We show that the similarities of the two offices are linked to the ongoing presidentialization of the French and American political systems, which, by giving greater power to heads of state, also strengthens their advisors. This commonality does not rule out marked differences between these officials, demonstrating that presidentialization takes distinct forms, reflecting distinct political cultures as well as different balances of power within each institutional system.

Motivated by a previous finding that single-party cues have no effect in Japan and by the increasing ‘presidentialization’ of Japanese politics, the present study examined whether the use of prime minister cues in place of single-party cues helps Japanese voters form policy preferences. In addition, to probe the effect of party cues that are unique to multiparty systems, the effect of multiple-party cues, which indicate that a policy is supported by multiple rather than single ideologically distinct parties, was investigated. The results of a survey experiment showed that while prime minister cues are not utilized by the supporters of incumbent parties, the supporters of opposition parties demonstrated significantly reduced approval of a policy when there was an indication that the prime minister supported it. The effect of prime minister cues on opposition supporters was stronger than that of Liberal Democratic Party cues, suggesting that leader cues are effective in Japan. Furthermore, a cue indicating that ideologically distinct parties support a policy enhances approval for that policy among the public, which suggests that multiple-party rather than single-party cues are informative in multiparty systems. Theoretical implications are discussed.

The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.

Power of state – President as state's and as people's representative – Bicephalism of government – Unity in cabinet – History – Guizot, Chateaubriand – Orleanism – President's arbitration is form of leadership – De Gaulle engaging political responsibility – penal responsibility – Cohabitation – Constitutional amendment and referendum (1962) – President structures parliamentary majority – Weakness of Parliament – Full presidentialization? – Sixth Republic?