We study the association of shareholder returns with liberalization in government policy during Britain's railway run-up of 1844–5. The findings sustain two main claims. First, the railway returns during the run-up were associated with the advent of liberalizing policies, especially related to free trade, enhanced transparency and governance of firms, and industry consolidation. Second, analysis of cross-sectional variation reveals higher returns to large railways in the South and Midlands of England, several of which were leading consolidators. This study is the first to report an association between policy liberalization and run-up returns and to identify consolidators as the prime beneficiaries of the liberalization.

This paper presents a unique database that explores how industrialisation affected municipalities' incomes, expenditures and education spending. Using the importance of the mines and steelworks in Biscay in northern Spain between 1860 and 1910 as indicators of industrialisation, the findings show that there was a positive relationship between these dimensions and towns' incomes, which was indirectly transmitted to municipalities' expenditures, showing that municipalities were able to benefit from industrialisation. However, the thriving mining and metallurgy sectors did not support an increase in education spending. The lack of short-term results from spending on education may have led town councils to divert the revenues of industrialisation into more urgent areas, or those that could deliver faster results.

To fully understand and exploit the contents of stock exchange official price lists, an in-depth knowledge of local stock exchange regulations and practices is required. This article offers a comparative perspective on price discovery and quotation on the two most important Belgian stock exchanges, Brussels and Antwerp, from their establishment in 1801 up to the reform of 1935.

In this paper, we present a series of environmental policies that were implemented by the city-state of Athens during the Classical period (508–323 BCE) through a specific set of environmental institutions. They included: waste management, the implementation of a recycling process regarding animal manure as well as hygiene practices. Special administrative bodies were set up for this purpose with the power to impose heavy fines to offenders, and the actual job of environmental protection was contracted out to private operators. We argue that the success of the Athenian environmental institutions should primarily be attributed to the economic stimuli that the Athenian state provided to their staff so as to perform their duties efficiently, as well as to the imposition of fines and/or other penalties if they provided subpar services. We finally provide proposals as to how the Athenian environmental policies may be seen as an inspiration for our modern societies.

The equilibrium size of a nation state is, in part, the result of a trade-off between the gains from scale economies in the provision of public services and the costs of applying uniform policy to heterogeneous cultural, institutional and geographical fundamentals. Changes in such fundamentals can thus place pressure on states to reform over time. We consider this dynamic state formation process in the context of Scotland within the United Kingdom. First, we review the recent research in economic history on the persistence and evolution of such fundamentals. Second, we consider the history of Scotland both before and after the 1707 Act of Union in the light of that broader economic history literature. We conclude with some implications of fundamental persistence for current debates on the place of Scotland within the United Kingdom.

In the mid thirteenth century, England used only a single coin, the silver penny. The flow of coins into and out of the government's treasury was recorded in the rolls of the Exchequer of Receipt. These receipt and issue rolls have been largely ignored, compared to the pipe rolls, which were records of audit. Some more obscure records, the memoranda of issue, help to show how the daily operations of government finance worked, when cash was the only medium available. They indicate something surprising: the receipt and issue rolls do not necessarily record transactions which took place during the periods they nominally cover. They also show that the Exchequer was experimenting with other forms of payment, using tally sticks, several decades earlier than was previously known. The rolls and the tallies indicate that the objectives of the Exchequer were not, as we would now expect, concerned with balancing income and expenditure, drawing up a budget, or even recording cash flows within a particular year. These concepts were as yet unknown. Instead, the Exchequer's aim was to ensure the accountability of officials, its own and those in other branches of government, by allocating financial responsibility to individuals rather than institutions.

This article analyses the 1783 proposal to issue readymade notes to the Bank of England's private banking customers. Prior to 1783, I argue that there were two broad categories under which the Bank issued its notes into circulation: (1) notes which were issued to government in relation to the Bank's role as facilitator of the fiscal revenues of state, and (2) notes which were issued to its private banking customers. The readymade note was a form of paper money which the Bank had previously been issuing only to government and, unlike the notes which the Bank originally issued to its private banking customers, was made out in advance of its being issued into circulation. I argue that the transformation suggested in the 1783 proposal was made possible by the unique relationship which the Bank had always had with the government, and I will make three observations based on identifying how this transformation took place.

In 1786, the Van Staphorst brothers, America's Dutch investment bank, entered the French office of the Director General of Finance, intent on making an offer for a portion of France's holdings of American bonds. Unknowingly, their offer set off a bidding war that could have ended with poorly capitalized American financial adventurers owing a large portion of bonds which could threaten the fragile health of American credit. At the eleventh hour, the Van Staphorsts conjured up a bold, unprecedented, scheme to persuade the French that it would be unnecessary to sell their American bonds at discounted prices.

This paper revisits the political economy during Spanish rule in America by reappraising the allegedly positive impact that intra-imperial transfers (situados) had on the Caribbean economy. It raises concerns concerning categories such as bargaining and absolutism and their accuracy in accounting for the nature of Spanish imperial rule. Three main findings are reported. Firstly, it seems inaccurate to hold that all remittances were injected into the economy with positive effects. Liquidity apparently provoked a real estate bubble. Secondly, the local market was not necessarily sensitive to the arrival of bullion. Finally, jurisdictional fragmentation allowed the king to issue debt in a disorderly fashion and with no constraints, and local officials and groups of interests to behave as free riders.

El artículo se enmarca en las líneas de investigación actual sobre la mujer en la economía marítima preindustrial. Se trata de un estudio de caso centrado en las capitanas y las patronas durante el auge del corso en Mallorca entre 1635–80. En él se destaca la labor de las mujeres de mar como procuradoras de sus maridos mientras permanecían ausentes, especialmente cuando la situación les exigió demostrar iniciativa e ir más allá de lo estipulado en la procura. Asimismo, se constata un mayor protagonismo en cuatro áreas de la empresa corsaria, mientras ésta se rigió por un modelo de corte familiar.

Joseph Brennan, as secretary of the Irish Department of Finance (1923–7) and chair of the Irish Currency Commission (1927–43), was a pivotal influence on Irish banking and currency affairs. Yet, within the existing literature, his adherence to conservative British norms is seen as providing a ‘bleak prescription’ for the Irish economy. However, such a view ignores the fact that Brennan was far from dogmatic on banking and currency issues and underplays his incrementalist, and often internationalist, approach to the development of Irish monetary institutions. Brennan's actions up to the early 1940s were based on the realities of Ireland's slowly receding economic and intellectual dependency on Britain, a ‘dependency’ often misrepresented in the existing literature as a more primitive, pre-Keynesian, conservative approach. However, rather than acting as a restraining influence on Irish economic development, the policies Brennan advocated enabled Ireland to avoid the instability associated with many smaller, emerging nation states in the 1920s and 1930s. The focus on continuity – which guaranteed currency and banking stability – represented the realities of Ireland's reliance on the sluggish British economy in the decades after independence. Brennan's achievement, in helping to sustain banking and currency stability notwithstanding economic uncertainty, a fragile political environment (and suspicious banking interests), deserves wider acknowledgement.

In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the eradication of successful coups. This can be partially attributed to the turno pacífico, which allowed the main political parties to alternate in office without dragging the military into politics. We suggest, however, that the reduction in coup risk was also associated with a conscious budget policy. This, though, did not rely on increases in total military expenditure (which actually stagnated during most of the Restoration), but on the steady improvement of officers' remunerations and promotions. This strategy was probably detrimental to Spanish military capacity abroad, but was consistent with the objective of keeping the military out of politics.

After Southern Italy became part of a new, national state in 1860, its financial sector was radically transformed under Piedmontese influence. This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the aggressive penetration of a Northern credit institution, the future Bank of Italy, into the South following unification harmed the local banking system and highlights instead its transformative role in modernising and deepening regional credit markets. On the basis of new statistics, banking and political records, this contribution shows that the introduction of ‘foreign’ banking from Northern Italy under the auspices of a national, constitutional government resulted in a financial revolution and a democratisation of credit supply to the advantage of the whole South. Public banking under the Bourbons had privileged the needs of an absolute government over those of the private economy and of the capital city over those of the rest of the country, retarding financial development. Credit undersupply and regional fragmentation could only be overcome through the integration of the South within a larger Italian market, in which, however, the lion's share went to a predominantly Northern institution.

This article examines the geo-economic consequences of the financial panic of October 1907. The vulnerability of the United States, but also of Germany, contrasted with the absence of a crisis in Great Britain. The experience showed the fast-growing industrial powers the desirability of mobilizing financial power, and the article examines the contributions of two influential brothers, Max and Paul Warburg, on different sides of the Atlantic. The discussion led to the establishment of a central bank in the United States and institutional improvements in German central banking: in both cases security as well as economic considerations played a substantial role.

This study explores parliamentary reforms related to the financial accountability of banks following the 1825–6 and 1836–7 financial crises in England. An appraisal of nineteenth-century parliamentary Hansard transcripts reveals early banking legislative pursuits. The study observes the laissez-faire and interventionist approaches towards the banking enactments of 1826, 1833 and 1844 that underpin the transformation of financial accountability during this era. The Bank Notes Act 1826 imposed financial accountability on the Bank of England by requiring the mandatory disclosure of notes issued. The Bank Notes Act 1833 extended this requirement to all other banks. The Bank Charter Act 1833 increased the financial accountability of the Bank of England by requiring it to provide an account of bullion and securities belonging to the governor and company, as well as deposits held by the bank. Thereafter, the Joint Stock Banks Act 1844 pioneered the regular publication of assets and liabilities and communication of the balance sheet and profit and loss account to shareholders. State intervention in the financial accountability of banks during the period from 1825 to 1845 appears to have been cumulative.

The privatisation of communal assets tends to be presented as an irreversible linear movement that was driven from above. Based on a case study (Navarre, nineteenth century), this article seeks to give greater prominence to local players and their response to changing circumstances. The process thus appears less linear and compact by revealing certain anomalies, such as the reversibility of certain sales or the alienation of partial ownership rights that were compatible with the preservation of rights of use in favour of local councils and households, as an example of institutional bricolage. Against a backdrop of war and municipal bankruptcy, the privatisation of collective lands between 1808 and 1860 followed various paths, each one benefitting different social classes. Borrowers, outside investors and wealthy individuals accumulated large estates, but there was also a chance for peasants and local people to become property owners. The recovery of part of these lands on the back of social conflicts from 1884 onwards confirms that privatisation was not a fait accompli.

From 1716 to 1718, Sweden experienced a shock of liquidity when the absolutist regime of Charles XII issued large amounts of fiat coins (mynttecken) in order to finance the Great Northern War. After the death of the king in November 1718, the new parliamentary regime decided to partially default on the coins. In international literature, this episode is largely unknown, and in Swedish historiography, scholars have often claimed that the country's currency collapsed in hyperinflation. We assess the performance of the new coins by studying how prices of commodities in various geographic locations developed. We also study bookkeeping practices in order to see how accountants treated the new coins. Our results show that there was a complex relationship between prices and liquidity. Prices of products in high demand by the military increased more than other prices. Accountants did not treat mynttecken and other currencies differently in 1718. It was only after the death of the king that accountants started to differentiate between different types of coins. The value of the fiat coins was linked to the actions and the legitimacy of the royal regime, which is in line with the State theory of money.

New Institutional Economics treats early modern Spain as an example of a state whose political and contracting institutions hindered economic growth. However, the assumption that Spanish political institutions were predatory in this respect has been called into question. This paper challenges the idea that Spain was unable to develop sufficiently good contracting institutions, of which we know relatively little. Using data from Malaga's notarial credit market, I show that legal institutions facilitated contractual compliance in private financial transactions. Specifically, public mortgage registries, which had improved the registration of properties used as collateral since their creation in 1768, favoured the subscription of larger contracts. Furthermore, results suggest that registries could have contributed to the development of a more impersonal credit market.

The Exchequer bills were a key component in Britain's financial revolution of the 1690s. Using a range of archival sources not examined in previous work, this article argues that closer study of how these bills were given credit and circulation between 1696 and 1698 can offer a more nuanced reading of the mechanisms which helped to create credible commitment in this period. Though proper institutional design did help to give the bills credit, it was only one part of a wider series of informal measures used by the Treasury to secure subscribers for the fund for circulating the bills and to manage the emission of bills to prevent high discounts. This reflects the fact that credit and confidence in this period were influenced by a wide range of factors, including commercial advantage, patriotism and the example offered by other investors, all of which could be manipulated by the Treasury to promote the credibility of the Exchequer bills. Proper institutional and financial incentives were therefore not the only factors which could create credible commitment in Britain's financial revolution.

The construction of the rail network in Spain was supported by public aid. A part of them were “subvenciones adicionales”, which came from the exemption of the payment of customs duties on the imports of railway equipment. The exact amount of these grants is only known after 1870 when they were rather small. In this paper, we quantified them for the period 1857-1886 in the company MZA, by then the largest in the country. Moreover, we estimate the costs of the construction of the railway lines of that company until 1869 and how much did each of the sources of funding, public and private contributed. The main conclusion is that in MZA the State’s grants were higher than the shareholders’ investment.