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3 results

  • Chapter 5 - Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

  • Federico Luzzi, University of Aberdeen
  • Book:
    Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
    Published online:
    26 July 2019
    Print publication:
    01 August 2019, pp 121-166

  • Summary

    I present the debate on testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge. After explaining Jennifer Lackey's challenges to the received view that a hearer can only come to know p testimonially if the speaker knows p, I raise several difficulties for Lizzie Fricker's view, according to which testimonial knowledge is necessarily second-hand knowledge, and reject it on the basis of these problems. I then argue that Sandy Goldberg's case of safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony survives Lackey's criticism. I offer a first comparison between inferential and testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge in terms of defeaters.

  • Chapter 6 - Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

  • Federico Luzzi, University of Aberdeen
  • Book:
    Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
    Published online:
    26 July 2019
    Print publication:
    01 August 2019, pp 167-183

  • Summary

    In this chapter I present the received view in the epistemology of memory, according to which one only knows p via memory if one knew p at an earlier time. I discuss Jennifer Lackey's counterexamples to this view and address Thomas Señor's criticisms to Lackey's cases. I explain why factual-defeater-based cases of mnemonic knowledge from non-knowledge should not be expected.

Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
  • Inference, Testimony and Memory
  • Federico Luzzi
  • Published online:
    26 July 2019
    Print publication:
    01 August 2019
  • According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible - that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.