Deaths in workplace incidents – of both workers and members of the public – normally spark a number of official responses, including coronial inquests. In many instances, however, these investigations have examined the incident in isolation from the wider context of hazards in that industry and are rarely informed by the extensive research literature on health and safety, and death and disaster, at work. In this examination of a tragic theme park disaster in 2016, we demonstrate that applying a wider lens and drawing on the ‘ten pathways model’ not only provides a more compelling explanation of how and why safety measures failed but may also inform more fatality and injury prevention measures. Drawing on James Reasonʼs concept of latent failures, the ten pathways model identifies latent failures that are repeatedly associated with death and disaster in workplaces across different industries. Using the Dreamworld coronial inquest findings and other related source material, this paper finds that at least nine and possibly all ten pattern failures were present in the Thunder River Rapids ride disaster at the Dreamworld theme park and contributed to the deaths of four visitors. In particular, it highlights the corroding effects of poor maintenance, inadequate management systems, and regulatory failure. The paper also raises questions about why theme parks as high-hazard workplaces marked by injuries, deaths, and ‘near misses’ were not subject to more rigorous oversight prior to the event and how regulatory failures might best be addressed.

This article argues for domestic legislative regulation of global value chains to protect offshore workers. First, it outlines the policy reasons necessitating such legislation. Empirical evidence confirms that global value chains are a dominant feature of the global economy. It is contended that lead firms wield influence in global value chains in a manner which leads to poor outcomes for offshore workers. Second, the article sets out the minimum steps necessary for a domestic state to attribute the responsibility for transparency of global value chains to lead firms. Then, it proceeds to explore the possibilities and limits of the proposed scheme of regulation. Despite some complexities with implementing the scheme, it is argued that if domestic legislative regulation of global value chains strengthens even to a small extent the monitoring of global labour issues, it is worth pursuing.

This article has three objectives. First, we examine what is meant by minimum labour standards, including the array of different standards and their procedural and substantive elements, in differing or even diverging regulatory jurisdictions. Examination of different areas of labour standards provides instruction in the dynamics of these protections and we give illustrative examples, from several countries. The second objective is to highlight the importance of enforcement of standards. We do this through a brief historical overview of the emergence of labour standards as well as of how the recent rise of neo-liberalism has shaped current debates over their development and application. The third element of the analysis is an examination of some contemporary debates, pointing to areas requiring further study as well as to positive examples both in research and in policy/regulation.

The sudden decline in Australian manufacturing associated with the current resources boom necessitates a renewed examination of the foundations of industry policy. Since the reforms of the 1980s, industry policy has been characterised by an economic liberal approach, the purity of which has been compromised by political pragmatism — particularly evident in the continued support for the auto industry. This article examines the issues raised by industry policy, and the history of industry policy in Australia, as a context for a review of a Report recently released by the Non-Governmental Members of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Manufacturing. This review finds useful proposals within the document, as well as a strong statement of the need for interventionist policy, albeit buried in the main text and an appendix. That this discussion is not front and centre in the Report’s presentation indicates ongoing sensitivity about the main choice in industry policy — whether the government should selectively intervene, or leave the organisation of industry to the market.

Despite its greatly weakened condition, could organised labour again be counter-hegemonic to and ultimately transformative of capitalism? Or is the current crisis, a crisis of collapse of manufacturing and wages and under-consumption due to the loss of redistributive power by key socio-political agents, possibly the final crisis of unionism, as argued by Wolfgang Streeck? Some on the political left, such as Streeck, argue that a new phase has been reached where redistributive and oppositional power of organised labour has been not just defeated but destroyed, with enormous consequences for the future of workers and capitalism itself. This article rejects such an overly pessimistic interpretation and asks what the possibility is of the labour movement’s again playing its historic role of transforming capitalism. It explores the potential role of organised labour in re-embedding the economy within democratic society, as Karl Polanyi argued, and building a socio-economic structure that is both stable and enhancing of social and environmental health. This problem is approached through a critique of the theories of Polanyi and Streeck and an examination of the unfortunate embrace of labourism and accommodation to neo-liberalism in the Australian labour movement.

The purpose of this article is to record and analyse the historical circumstances in which Singapore complemented its legacy of British-type collective bargaining with the compulsory arbitration system long practiced in Australia. It notes the role of Australians (particularly one Australian industrial relations scholar at the University of Malaya) in the inception and adoption of industrial arbitration in Singapore. It seeks to identify, analyse, explain and assess the extent of the subsequent divergence of Singapore’s regulatory industrial relations regime from that of Australia since the 1960s. In doing so, it contributes to Asia-Pacific labour history and adds to the literature on international and comparative labour relations with its focus on cross-national influences on national industrial relations regimes.

The implications of Knightian uncertainty are frequently discussed in the context of market-based institutional settings. Given money prices, entrepreneurs can engage in calculative action, in conjunction with ‘judgment’, to guide decision-making and bring about a coordination of production plans with consumer preferences. However, if the existence of Knightian uncertainty is ubiquitous and applies to all human action, then what are its implications in non-market institutional settings? This paper explores questions related to the implications of Knightian uncertainty for two important non-market institutional settings: democratic government and the nonprofit or philanthropic sector, where there is an explicit lack of monetary calculation, yet nonprofit and political entrepreneurs still must use ‘judgment’ to deal with Knightian uncertainty. For instance, what are the implications of private property and privatized cost in the case of nonprofits versus the absence of private property and socialized cost in the case of democracy, in the presence of Knightian uncertainty? Which group of ‘consumers’ is likely to have their preferences satisfied when it comes to nonprofits (benefactors or beneficiaries) and democratic government (voters or lobbyists)? The paper, thus, points to the importance of further research on the implications of Knightian uncertainty in the hard case of non-market institutional settings.

The paper addresses the issue of who pays for the cost of creating artistic works and other forms of intellectual property. It examines the effect of current legal structure on regulatory performance in markets for intellectual property; specifically the effects of sequential and partial regulation. These entail the regulation of multiple market intellectual property on a “market-by-market” basis (sequential regulation) where the performance in other markets for the same intellectual property is taken as given (partial regulation). The analysis demonstrates that this form of regulation is sub-optimal and creates an incentive for copyright and antitrust laws to be employed strategically by consumers, firms and regulators. In particular, it creates an incentive to use domestic regulation as an international strategic device. The theoretical exposition is augmented by an analysis of two regulatory decisions relating to the US market for music performance rights which reflect the strategic implications of partial and sequential regulation.